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Abstract
This thesis assesses the role of modem environmental risks and their institutionalized 
management in the subpolitics of North Slope stakeholder groups. It draws primarily on 
the concepts developed by Ulrich Beck and the literature that has grown out of his Risk 
Society thesis. The purpose of this research is to determine whether the current designs 
for knowledge production and management inside Alaska’s oil management regime are 
inclusive of the indigenous knowledge (IK) of North Slope residents during the mediation 
of environmental risks, and whether the extent of inclusion is in proportion with the risk 
exposures of these communities. The premise of the thesis is that Alaska’s oil politics is 
influenced by risk society conditions, and inclusion of North Slope residents’ IK in 
environmental risk mediation has failed to match the scope of risks imposed upon local 
communities by negative externalities of oil development policies. Consequently, this 
trend has resulted in a technocratic hegemony of administrative agencies over risk 
definitions and disputes over the legitimacy of expert risk-decisions. The thesis is 
supported by an extensive literature on the politics of science and risk, an examination of 
the public process at state agencies, and a qualitative analysis of knowledge management 
initiatives both at the state and at the subpolitical level. The findings of this study 
support the idea that a new knowledge management model for risk mediation is needed to 
effectively include indigenous stakeholders’ cultural rationalities on the acceptability of 
risks.
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1Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Background and objectives
“Villages resist oil, gas development in Yukon Flats,” “Oil companies expect 
battle over polar bear listing,” and “U.S. appeals court cancels Alaska offshore drilling 
program,” read some of the headlines from the Fairbanks, Alaska newspaper where oil 
resource-related issues regularly make the front page.1 The subject of oil development 
involves a large number of stakeholders, stirs debate -  and at times, controversy - over 
such diverse topics as energy need, sustainability, economic gain, environmental risks, 
scientific uncertainty, and human rights. There are many stakeholder groups with a 
vested interest in the politics of Alaska’s oil. Depending on the issues these may include 
federal, state and local officials, national and state publics, pressure groups from Non­
Governmental Organizations (both domestic and international), multinational 
corporations, industry representatives, lease-holders, locals directly residing at or near 
drill sites, and many Alaskan businesses. The democratic avenues of natural resource 
management at times become the frontlines when competing interests, and competing 
knowledge bases assert themselves through public input. Stakeholders often find 
themselves at an impasse due to diverging opinions on economic, environmental, social 
and cultural costs of gain of natural resource development.
Oil development in Alaska is administered through a multi-tiered management 
process, which includes federal oversight where applicable, state-federal cooperative 
arrangements, state governance, and local (borough, city) involvement. The Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is the primary agency charged with
1 Tom Kizzia, “Villages resist oil, gas development in Yukon Flats,” Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily News- 
Miner, 21 July 2008 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.newsminer.com/news/2008/jul/21/ 
villages-resist-oil-development-yukon-flats/; Internet; Retrieved on May 9, 2009; Steve Quinn, ’’Oil 
companies expect battle over polar bear listing,” Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily News-Miner, 15 May 2008 
[newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.newsminer.com/news/2008/may/15/oil-companies- 
expect-battle-over-polar-bear-listin/; Internet; Retrieved on May 9, 2009; and Nedra Pickier, “U.S. appeals 
court cancels Alaska offshore drilling,” Fairbanks (Alaska) Daily News-Miner, 17 April 2009 [newspaper 
on-line]; available from http://www.newsminer.com/news/2009/ apr/17/us-appeals-court-cancels-offshore- 
drilling-program/; Internet; Retrieved on May 9, 2009.
2administering oil and gas exploration and development at the state level. The DNR’s 
mission is to “Develop, conserve, and maximize the use of Alaska's natural resources 
consistent with the public interest.” The process of determining public interest can be an 
adversarial, highly competitive procedure. Resource management issues regularly invoke 
both subjective and objective reasoning processes, as priority setting entails as much 
value judgment as scientific facts. The public dialogue may be, at times dominated by 
seemingly conflicting absolutes, such as economic versus environmental imperatives. 
The validity and availability of sound scientific facts may be questioned, when regulators 
receive information with elements of scientific uncertainty. During this process multiple 
sources and forms of knowledge systems may emerge as stakeholders lobby for 
recognition by Alaska’s natural resource management regime. Often times subjective 
and scientific opinions have to be merged within the politics of oil development and risk 
management, and decisions have to be made. But who makes decisions, and based on 
what findings? Whose science matters in the end? What is the relationship between 
citizens, decision-makers and science when it comes to risk management and the politics 
of oil in Alaska?
The focus of this thesis is the use of science during the management of 
environmental risks associated with oil production in Alaska’s North Slope region. As 
the rapid changes resulting from global climate change make Arctic ecosystems
•5
especially vulnerable, the dialogue surrounding the management of Alaska’s oil 
resources increasingly involves the notions of risk, and uncertainty. Definitions for, 
measurements of, and perceptions of risk diverge among stakeholder groups. Diverging 
rationalities on environmental risk can be the result of unequal risk exposures. For 
example, residents living in close proximity to risk sources who would be afflicted the 
most should harmful consequences of risk-based decisions materialize, are likely to hold 
vastly different views on the acceptability of risks from those less affected. However,
2Alaska DNR, Division o f  Oil and Gas, “Division Programs,” available from 
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/programs.htm; Internet; retrieved on October 12, 2009.
3 Arctic Council, Impacts o f  a Warming Arctic. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Synthesis Report. 
Available from http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/overview.html, Retrieved on March 17, 2010.
3even identical exposures to risk may result in conflicting risk rationalities. Individuals 
may respond differently to similar risks and equal risk proportions, because attitudes 
towards risk are also shaped by economic, cultural and political factors. It is important to 
establish avenues for input from all stakeholder groups when it comes to resource 
development, and carefully consider input from those who live near development sites, 
and hold specialized knowledge of the local ecosystem. Doing so diversifies the 
scientific and cultural knowledge base upon which policy decisions are founded, and it 
creates a holistic, flexible risk management strategy needed to deal with uncertainty. In 
turn, such collaborative resource management and risk mediation practices may build 
understanding among stakeholders, and increase the perceived legitimacy of policy 
decisions.
However, the extent to which diverse knowledge systems are, or should be, 
incorporated to inform officials on environmental risks is an often-contested policy issue 
in Alaska. This thesis examines existing attitudes and trends in Alaskan politics towards 
the use of science in risk management during oil development, with a special focus on 
Alaska’s North Slope Borough area, and the diverse knowledge forms entwined in the 
politics of local issues. Resource management decisions are often complicated by an 
element of uncertainty surrounding either the scientific information available (e.g. 
modeling error), or some natural component of a system (e.g. biological diversity).4 U.S. 
regulatory agencies have increasingly recognized the value of new kinds of information, 
and experimental approaches to gathering information beyond purely technocratic means.
Technocracy is a term used to describe a form of scientific governance that is 
‘hard science’ driven, - experts with specialized knowledge are delegated the power to 
calculate unambiguous answers for us under the guise of social neutrality.5 Public 
skepticism however has led social theorists and citizens groups alike to challenge the 
technocratic elite, and the decision-making processes of technocracy. New discourses for
4 North Slope Science Initiative, Science Strategy. Available from: http://www.northslope.org/; Internet; 
retrieved on February 18, 2010, 22.
5 Jack DeSario and Stuart Langton, Citizen Participation and Technocracy. In Citizen Participation in 
Public Decision Making, ed. Jack DeSario and Stuart Langton. 1-17. (New York: Greenwood Press,
1987), 7.
4knowledge production have emerged in policy initiatives, creating novel incentives to 
redefine the flow of information between policy makers and citizens. To what extent has 
this trend been successful in the resource management processes for North Slope oil?
Consequently this thesis researches whether inclusion of stakeholder input in oil 
resource management decisions is proportionate with the risk distributions imposed upon 
North Slope residents by policy outcomes. The goal of this study is to investigate the 
relationships between inclusion of stakeholder input, the scope of risks faced by 
stakeholders, and regulators’ ability to build consensus for environmental risk decisions. 
When political decisions include risk-based decisions, which disproportionately affect 
some stakeholder groups, is there meaningful, balanced inclusion of risk-affected 
stakeholder groups in risk management processes? Are citizens pushing for increased 
influence over official risk determinations? In order to answer these questions, this 
research relies on Ulrich Beck’s risk society (RS) thesis. Beck’s thesis is vital to this 
research because it assesses the role of environmental risks and their institutionalized 
management in the shifting political powers of stakeholder groups. The RS thesis is an 
especially useful tool for gaining an increased understanding of stakeholders’ diverging 
rationalities on risk and knowledge. The existence of an Alaskan RS bears huge 
significance to the core questions and theories of this thesis. If RS conditions are present 
in Alaska’s oil resource management, this means that a socially explosive trend develops 
according to Beck. In a RS the calculability of risks is undermined by scientific 
uncertainties, while public risk awareness grows and the need for risk regulation becomes 
increasingly crucial. Since the notion of risk often invokes the question of responsibility 
and a call for justice, stakeholders' interactions can be greatly influenced by their 
knowledge of, and perceptions about environmental risks. To what extent may average 
citizens contribute to official risk determinations within Alaska’s oil politics?
Through such an analysis of the politics of risk and knowledge, this research 
reveals the mechanisms by which non-expert citizenry may spur political movements 
through knowledge production, and attempt to change the flow of information among 
citizens and policymakers. More specifically, this research focuses on the inclusion of
5North Slope Borough’s Alaska Native residents, and their indigenous knowledge (IK) in 
state and federal level risk management processes. This thesis proposes that, inclusion of 
North Slope residents’ IK in environmental risk mediation has failed to match the scope 
of risks imposed upon local communities by negative externalities of oil development 
policies. Furthermore, this trend has resulted in a technocratic hegemony of 
administrative agencies and creates disputes over the legitimacy of expert risk-decisions. 
The goal of this research is to introduce new strategies for effective pooling of diverse 
knowledge forms. The set of recommendations proposed in this research bring together 
ideas for a new institutional design, one that hopefully increases consensus among 
stakeholders regarding risks and resource priorities. To support this endeavor the 
methodology employed within draws directly from Beck’s risk society literature.
1.2 Theories and methodology
What is science and how is it used? If science can inform the lives of ordinary 
citizens, can citizens effectively inform scientific issues? In theory, science is an 
objective realm and should operate outside of any interference or control from competing 
private or public interests. Yet science and experts cannot be autonomous of politics in a 
democratic society. Just as the ordinary citizen may pass judgment on specialized, 
scientific topics during the political process, so does science influence our political lives, 
and invisibly, on a collective basis, our entire social order. The borders of science and 
politics are often blurred. Political agendas may benefit from (or suffer because of) 
science, as science may either justify or refute the validity of policy issues. In return, 
successful political agendas may boost some scientific projects, while hindering others by 
allocating funding based on political, as opposed to purely scientific, considerations. This 
close, symbiotic relationship between science and politics is at the center of Beck’s RS 
thesis. Beck’s work was chosen because of its focus on the politics of knowledge, 
specifically, the socially revolutionizing nature of modem risks and their environmental 
impacts, which evolve as a result of policies rooted in scientific and technical knowledge. 
My research project investigates the interactions between science, environmental risks,
6citizens and the institutions of Alaska’s oil management, and Beck’s work provides the 
framework to accomplish this task. In order to establish the linkages between Beck’s 
thesis and this research, it is necessary to discuss what science and knowledge systems 
mean in the context of my research. This thesis uses the terms science and knowledge, or 
knowledge systems interchangeably, and they may indicate a number of different bodies 
of knowledge. The differences among knowledge systems may be a factor of the identity 
or the locale (geographic, or political) of the knowledge bearer, but may also be 
influenced by cultural, temporal and spatial relationships between the knowledge holder 
and the subject of the known. Resource management schemes in developed countries use 
the western science tradition as the prominent language of regulation and rationale behind 
policy decisions. In the context of this research, the terms “scientific knowledge”, or 
science are used to refer to a body of knowledge that is normally assumed to be an 
objective realm, rooted in facts and hard data but insulated from social or cultural 
influences. Within the boundaries of science, the divide between scientist and citizen is 
clear, and the dominant flow of information runs from experts to laypersons. Alternate 
knowledge systems have been gaining attention in resource management however, as 
science has been forced to “accept its own cultural boundaries that obscure and patronize 
the intellectual and moral substance of other ways of knowing.”6
Skepticism about the separability of science from society, its values and 
politics, began appearing in philosophy of science more than four decades 
ago. W.V.O. Quine (1960) proposed that scientific and everyday beliefs 
were linked in networks. How scientists theorized nature’s order and 
chose to revise their hypotheses when faced with counterevidence 
depended in part on the ontologies, logics, and epistemologies they 
brought to their work, largely unconsciously, from their particular cultural 
contexts. Thomas Kuhn (1970) produced influential arguments claiming
6 Melissa Leach et al., Science and Citizens: Globalisation and the Challenge o f Engagement. (New 
Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007), 7.
7that (...) particular moments in the history of modem (western) science 
had an “integrity” with their historic eras7 
As philosophers of modem science began to question its universality, certainty and 
neutrality, the science of ecology emerged as one of several disciplines in need of reform. 
The infrastructures of a highly technological modem world seem to make it increasingly 
difficult for many people to relate to the environment, and this trend prompted the 
question of whether there is a need to find a new way to relate to nature not found in 
scientific ecology.
The science of ecology, or at least one school of ecology that takes a 
broader holistic view, provides a new vision of the earth as a system of 
interconnected relationships (...) people concerned with environmental 
ethics have searched for the personal and spiritual element of ecology that 
has been missing in scientific ecology (...) these efforts are very much a 
part of the broader context of the interest in traditional ecological 
knowledge, since it represents experience acquired over thousands of 
years of direct human contact with the environment.8 
Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is just one of several alternate forms of 
knowledge. TEK may be defined as: “a cumulative body of knowledge, practice, and 
belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by cultural 
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another 
and with their environment.”9 Depending on the locale and identity of the participants, 
knowledge systems can have many dimensions and definitions. Local knowledge (LK) is 
a term frequently used by scholars to describe a specialized set of knowledge relevant to 
the specific locale of the knowledge bearer. LK does not however convey the ecological, 
cultural and temporal aspect of the concept, and refers to recent knowledge.10 TEK may 
be viewed as a subset of LK.
7 Robert Figueroa, and Sandra Harding. Science and Other Cultures. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 2.
8 Fikret Berkes, Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management. 
(Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1999), 4.
9 Ibid., 8.
10 Ibid.
8Subtle differences between terminologies can at times simply be a factor of 
preference; for example some scholars favor using the term indigenous ecological 
knowledge (IEK) over TEK, because the term “traditional” may imply something of the 
past, something static.11 The study of knowledge systems is a well-documented, complex 
field and authors often write their own working definitions to describe TEK, IEK, or LK 
in the specific context in which they conduct their research. There are no universally 
accepted definitions for each knowledge system. This thesis focuses mainly on the 
intersections of western science and indigenous knowledge (IK), however in this the 
study some policy statements may explicitly reference TEK. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
introduction into the politics of knowledge, and descriptions of science, IK, TEK and 
related terminology in the specific context of this research.
Another important concept to this thesis is the concept of risk as set forth in RS 
theory. Beck’s thesis examines the changing structure of risk, and posits that we live in a 
new social order in which knowledge production and politics have been revolutionized 
due to the hazards of modem risks. Beck argues that modem risks are very different 
from natural hazards, as they are potentially more catastrophic (e.g. nuclear warfare), yet
1 7not restricted temporally and spatially as natural hazards (e.g. earthquakes) are. Beck 
describes a society where risks become a socially organizing and reforming force. Unlike 
natural hazards, the risks of a RS are socially produced, decision-contingent, and 
manufactured risks, generated by the processes of modernization.13 These risks are 
highly technical (e.g. particulate air pollution), often invisible (e.g. radioactive 
contamination) and pose unpredictable environmental hazards. According to Beck, the 
magnitude of risks, and the inability of protective institutions to control these new risks 
are responsible for the ongoing crisis of modernity.
Beck points out that the risks of modernity escape the control of post-modem 
industrial societies, to the point that the very pillars o f risk begin to change. The 
changing pillars of risk are crucial elements in RS, as these pillars are a reference to the
11 Berkes, 5.
12Gabe Mythen, A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society. (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 19.
13 Ibid., 16
9basis for industrial society’s risk calculus, which are transformed in RS.14 The first pillar, 
compensation, is impossible, due to the catastrophic nature of manufactured risk. The 
second pillar, restriction, is also crumbling, because modem risks elude the protective 
grasp of risk management institutions. The third pillar, the practice of safety and 
classification, is also impossible because modem risks transcend temporal and spatial 
limitations. During the 20th century, the massive expansion of public institutions 
designed to generate scientific knowledge increasingly left risk calculation and 
management to experts. Beck argues that the institutions in charge of risk regulation 
have since been paralyzed due to the widespread production of risks (e.g. pollution), as 
well as the scientific uncertainties, which surround the extent and meaning of risks. 
However, science is rarely neutral or objective, since during the course of their work, 
scientists must make assumptions, draw inferences, interpret data, and extrapolate 
relationships. Even regulatory agencies may at times be guided by assumptions, as much 
as facts, especially in cases where scientific certainty simply does not exist. Given that 
regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Alaska’s 
DNR have to conform to policy directives, their scientific practices may have certain 
arbitrary elements, exposing risk regulation to political and moral bias. The sometimes- 
arbitrary nature of risk determinations, and the ambiguities of certain scientific issues 
reinforce the argument for the co-production of policy-relevant information. Through the 
inclusion of citizens, and alternate knowledge forms in policy making, risk management 
may gain greater legitimacy and avoid the appearance of being biased. Multiple 
viewpoints about the same question can result in findings that lower the risk of 
environmental damage resulting from oil development: For example local citizens are 
closest in physical proximity to risks produced by modernization such as oil 
development, and therefore tend to interpret risks differently from risk producers. As a 
consequence, local people, who bear locally-produced (i.e. highly pertinent) knowledge 
can become important experts in judging hazards. Co-production of knowledge is an 
acknowledgement of the social dependence of knowledge, of the fact that science is not a
14 Scott Lash and John Urry. Economies o f  Sign and Space. (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 34.
10
neutral reflection of reality. Science and technology is embedded in social practices, 
identities, norms, conventions and institutions.15 “Co-production can therefore be seen as 
a critique of the realist ideology that persistently separates the domains of nature, facts, 
objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and 
politics.”16
Co-production may be achieved when an active citizenry mobilizes to challenge 
expert institutions from below through what Beck calls subpolitics. Subpolitics is a form 
of direct politics outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political 
systems of nation states.17 Subpolitics changes politics by changing the rules and 
boundaries of governing processes, so that they become more susceptible to new
1 o
linkages, and to being negotiated and reshaped. For knowledge production, subpolitics 
means that citizen-initiated knowledge production influences research, which in turn is 
designed by, and oriented towards the public's questions and concerns.
So long as risks are not recognized scientifically, they do not exist -a t least 
not legally, medically, technologically, or socially, and they are thus not 
prevented, treated, or compensated for. No amount of collective moaning 
can change this, only science. Scientific judgment’s monopoly on truth 
therefore forces the victims themselves to make use of all the methods and 
means of scientific analysis in order to succeed with their claims.19 
Therefore, citizen-initiated science does not reject science; it engages it, being at once
9flsuspicious and trusting of it. The relationship between established politics and science 
is well recognized; however the relationship between subpolitical movements and science 
is not well explored. It is clear that subpolitics does not exclude research-based science. 
Subpolitical movements may even use bureaucratic structures to challenge the official 
position (i.e. environmental impact statements), but they don’t rely on quantitative
15 Sheila Jasanoff. States o f  Knowledge: The Co-Production o f  Science and the Social Order. (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 3.
16 Ibid.
17 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd, 1999), 39.
18 Ibid., 40.
19 Beck (1992), 71.
20 Ibid., 72.
11
judgments entirely, taking into account social and cultural aspects of environmental 
policy and research as well. Through such direct democracy risks may be identified, and 
distributed based on local production of knowledge.
The questions raised in this research answer whether the risk management 
processes of oil development have included stakeholder knowledge in proportion with 
their risk exposures, and whether in turn, risk-based decisions have mobilized affected 
stakeholder groups to fight for increased input. The concepts of manufactured risks, 
official risk determinations, and subpolitics are crucial to this research, and the 
methodology employed within relies on Beck’s framework. The case studies presented 
in this thesis are evaluated based on three criteria. To begin with, all cases will be 
analyzed by their risk contents. Each case study begins with a discussion of risk, paying 
close attention to the relationship between risk, time and space, and the capacity of 
protective institutions to control risks. Risk is an important criterion for identifying signs 
of RS. This inquiry focuses on the types of risk tackled by administrators and 
stakeholders, and these risks are evaluated for signs of change in accordance with Beck’s 
changing pillars of risk. Changes in risk compensation (or its cost of gain), risk 
restriction (or its systemic manageability), and safety across temporal and spatial limits 
are good markers for the presence of RS conditions. The three pillars of risk encompass 
the essence of the RS thesis, and we may cross-reference Alaskan trends by checking for 
changes in these pillars. If it can be established that oil resource development exposes 
North Slope residents to changing risks as described in RS theory, then the next step is to 
examine the inclusion of these residents’ social rationality on the acceptability of these 
risks: if policy decisions do not account for the value premises inherently involved in risk 
definitions (statements on how we want to live), the administrative institutions managing 
oil resources establish a technocratic hegemony over scientific and social truths.
Therefore the second criterion for evaluation of each case is based on the uptake 
of science in policy decisions. This evaluation identifies stakeholder group hierarchy in 
the political process, and probes the success of available avenues for IK input in decision­
making. This area of research investigates weaknesses in the administrative devices
12
designed for uptake of citizen input, analyzing areas of conflict between risk managers 
and locals during knowledge co-production. According to RS theory, we find locals 
increasingly marginalized in scientific policy matters. This discussion identifies 
conditions for RS, which exacerbate diverging risk rationalities among Alaskan 
stakeholders, and set the stage for subpolitical negotiations.
The third, and final criterion in the evaluation of each case is a scrutiny of the 
connections between changing risks, ineffective inclusion, and policy disputes. This 
analysis focuses on the links between the technocratic hegemony of administrative 
institutions, growing awareness of risks, and subpolitical challenges to the use of science. 
Beck’s RS thesis suggests that due to the catastrophic nature of risks, the inability of 
protective institutions to manage risks, and diminished citizen input in risk management, 
a new way of conducting politics emerges at new sites. Subpolitics is a way for citizens 
to identify important issues based on local needs, and it is a way to shape knowledge 
from below. This section investigates the extent of citizen action in each case, in order to 
find out what shape subpolitics has taken in the pursuit of IK inclusion, and risk 
mediation in Alaska.
These three selected criteria provide the framework for assessment of the case 
studies. Analysis of these key indicators of RS is a reliable methodology for considering 
the focal questions of this thesis: Is risk mediation inclusive of IK in proportion with the 
risks imposed upon North Slope residents by oil resource development? In what ways 
does the inclusion IK contribute to policy disputes, and contested scientific truths? 
Answers to these questions can help formulate new strategies for a regulatory scheme, 
one in which complex issues of risk and uncertainty are approached using multiple facets 
of understanding, and cultural as well as scientific value premises are accounted for 
during decision making.
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1.3 The setting
Alaska presents an excellent case study to explore the risk society thesis based on 
its demography and geography. Alaska’s geographical attributes -its relative physical 
isolation from the rest of the U.S., its unique climate, low population density, combined 
with its natural resource assets- make for an economy dependent on oil.
In strictly economic terms, Alaska is an oil-dependent state, exhibiting the 
lack of diversification typical of all resource-dependent states. In 1991, 
approximately 86 percent of unrestricted general fund revenues came from 
oil and gas industry activities, and although that amount declined to 79 
percent in 2000, with the price surges of subsequent years the share had
”7 1increased to 88 percent by 2005.
Oil resource development is a good example of what Beck calls the “dilemmas of 
modernization”, because it inherently couples with the problem of decision-contingent 
risk management. Despite great advancements in technologies employed in oil 
extraction, and despite environmental protection policies enacted at nearly all levels of 
government, the potential for environmental hazards remain. The development of 
Alaska’s natural resources carries environmental risks in varying degrees of uncertainty, 
since it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to precisely quantify the chance of oil 
spills, or to calculate local hazards from toxic waste disposal, or to predict subsistence 
impacts such as change in wildlife habitats as a direct result of oil production. Since these 
risks are the result of the processes of modernity, they fit the definition for Beck’s 
manufactured risks. Science uncovers as many questions as answers under expert risk 
calculation systems. New challenges in resource management and new environmental 
crises have highlighted the significance of inclusion of new knowledge forms within the 
political process. The second and third case studies focus on this challenge in oil 
development, regarding the inclusion of IK in North Slope-relevant oil policies. The 
North Slope Borough (NSB) provides an excellent source for studying the realm of RS. 
The NSB covers a vast land area at nearly ninety thousand square miles, and it
21 Jerry McBeath et al., The Political Economy o f Oil in Alaska: Multinationals vs. the State. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008), 4.
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encompasses the human communities of the entire North Slope region. Based on 2008 
census figures, the population size is 6,615, and nearly 70 percent of the population is of
9TInupiat Eskimo descent. The NSB receives tax revenue from oil and gas properties, and 
depends on these resources for providing basic services, and maintaining village 
infrastructure. Subsistence activities are also very important to NSB residents, as much 
for providing food as for cultural survival. The simultaneous presence of modem risks, 
the pressure of the economic imperative, and Alaska Native residents’ engagement in 
subsistence activities often result in conflicting dialogues over resource uses and priority 
setting.
Alaska’s unique demographic assets provide exceptional opportunities for 
complementing conventional scientific practices with other knowledge systems. Alaska’s 
sizeable indigenous population, (approximately 15% of Alaska’s total population per the 
2000 Census), possess intimate knowledge of local ecosystems based on long-term 
observation of, and interaction with, their environment.24 According to the RS theory, we 
would expect to find an increase over time in the inclusion of expert advice in policy 
making, and a simultaneous agitation of subpolitical groups as they organize to try to 
influence policy. Indeed, Alaska Native peoples have felt marginalized by the 
institutional apparatus responsible for determining the meaning and extent of risks 
affecting their communities, and have mobilized to advocate inclusion of their IK in 
management decisions. As managers direct Alaska’s resource development and 
preservation, and as citizens seek to be heard in the process, the signs of RS are 
increasingly present in Alaska.
99
22 Science Strategy. North Slope Science Initiative. Internet; Available from http://www.northslope.org/, 
retrieved on February 18, 2010. A-6.
23 Ibid.
24 “FAQ Alaska”, Statewide Library Electronic Doorway, available from 
http://sled.alaska.edu/akfaq/aknatpop.html; Internet; Retrieved on October 16, 2009.
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1.4 Problem context and framework
Three carefully selected case studies are presented in this work. These three cases 
were chosen because they reveal the intersections of knowledge and politics when 
stakeholders strive to influence environmental risk-relevant policy during the 
development of oil resources. The first case is intended as a backdrop to establishing the 
presence of RS in Alaska. This case is presented as one of the earliest, and strongest 
examples of subpolitical pursuits for knowledge inclusion in risk assessment. It is an in­
depth study, which evaluates the weeklong Workshop on Arctic Contamination, held 
May 2-7, 1993 in Anchorage, Alaska, and the subsequent founding of the Alaska Native 
Science Commission (ANSC). The Workshop illustrates the conflict between 
stakeholders’ rationale when faced with exclusion from expert risk calculation systems, 
and explains how such conflicts often become the genesis for subpolitical movements. In 
order to focus on the relationship between subpolitical groups, risk and knowledge 
production, this case provides a careful study of the ‘Traditional Knowledge and 
Contaminants Program’ of the ANSC.
The second and third case studies provide recent examples of conflict spurred by 
the power of RS in Alaskan oil politics, and provide a glimpse into the current state of RS 
in the Alaskan context. Through these case studies, the research looks beyond the RS 
theory to examine what problems may emerge when alternate knowledge claims reach 
expert institutions. These current cases reveal the ongoing struggle to define the meaning 
and extent of inclusion. The second case study describes the contentious participation of 
the North Slope Borough in the State of Alaska’s Coastal Management Plan program, and 
ongoing conflicts since major reforms came into effect in 2005. The third study 
examines the controversy surrounding a federal initiative, the North Slope Science 
Initiative (NSSI) created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and whether the Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation is a valid vehicle of LK, and IK in studying the impact of oil 
development on subsistence. Although the goal of this research is to examine state-level 
use of science in risk mediation and the NSSI is a federally funded entity, it is a multi­
agency initiative with heavy state involvement. The NSSI is a relevant case to this
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discussion of risk and knowledge inclusion within Alaska’s oil management regime, 
because its directive is to gather knowledge on the effects of oil development on the 
North Slope region, and to inform policy at all levels of government. These case studies 
were chosen to highlight the predicament of modem risks and their management in 
resource management consistent with Beck’s RS thesis.
1.5 Sources and methods of data collection
This research relies on previous body of work by Ulrich Beck titled Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity (1992), and World Risk Society (1996), which examine the 
changing nature of risk and the reforming influence risk may have on knowledge 
production and ultimately on the entire social order. To complete this assessment of risk 
in contemporary societies, the study evaluates risk in a variety of contexts through other 
risk theorists as well (some supportive and some critical of Beck’s social theories).
In collecting evidence to explore the Alaskan RS experience, both oral and 
archival sources were used. A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
state and borough agents, ANCSA Corporation representatives, and private agency 
spokespersons. Archival sources included in this research come from both electronic 
resources such as World Wide Web pages, as well as textual analysis of printed materials.
1.6 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 2 starts with an introduction of the many dimensions of knowledge. 
Beginning with a general literature review on the interfaces of science and politics, the 
chapter is a conceptual analysis of knowledge within democratic systems. The chapter 
continues with an introduction and critique of Beck’s RS thesis, vital to this evaluation of 
knowledge production inside Alaska’s oil resource administration. Chapter 2 addresses 
the following questions: What are science and politics? How does Beck’s RS thesis fit 
into the discussion of science and politics?
Chapter 3 presents the first in-depth study making the case for the arrival of the 
risk society on the Alaskan political scene. This case study presents an example in which
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the RS experience mobilized stakeholders to pursue meaningful inclusion of their 
knowledge in expert risk calculation and management. This case does not strictly relate 
to oil resource development. Through a broader approach, this case demonstrates the 
evolution of subpolitical activism following widespread effects of manufactured risks, 
and the subsequent transformation of stakeholder transactions in the Alaskan context. 
This case therefore presents a general discussion of the Alaskan RS experience. What 
specific signs suggest that RS conditions have begun to shape science and politics in 
Alaska?
Chapter 4 starts with an overview of Alaska’s oil administration regime. The 
chapter begins with a brief political timeline of Alaska’s oil policy development, 
selecting notable events in Alaska’s political history based on their significance to 
Alaska’s progression towards RS. The chapter continues by presenting current examples 
of conflict under RS, with specific focus on Alaska’s management of oil resources. This 
chapter reveals two cases of conflict that arose during inclusion of alternate knowledge 
systems within expert institutions. These cases reveal the struggle knowledge holders 
and administrators face as they attempt to cooperate amongst each other, and begin to 
deal with the complexities of inclusion. This chapter illustrates that gaining inclusion is 
not the end of the road, but rather it is the beginning of new struggles as stakeholders 
strive to influence the extent of inclusion.
Chapter 5 provides a final analysis of stakeholder transactions under conditions of 
RS in Alaska’s oil development policy. The thesis concludes the meaning of the Alaskan 
RS experience for the present, and provides recommendations for conflict resolution for 
the future in the development of Alaska’s oil resources. In Chapter 5 the thesis 
concludes with an analysis of contemporary risks and the inclusion of IK in the mediation 
of these risks in Alaska. The goal of the final analysis is to reveal the role of knowledge 
inclusion in the agitation of subpolitical pursuits, and to offer a set of recommendations 
for a more effective collaborative scheme, through a discussion of the following 
questions: Is the inclusion of IK in official environmental risk determinations in
proportion with the risks imposed by oil policies? What are some of the examples of
18
successful inclusion of alternate science forms, and what lessons do they hold for 
Alaskan stakeholders?
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Chapter 2
Citizens, Science, and Politics in the Risk Society
2.1 Introduction
My research examines the status of science, experts and citizens in the public 
sphere, and reveals the tensions that exist between science and environmental politics in 
the risk society. This chapter introduces science and politics and their intersections in 
RS. In order to begin, it is important to define who the stakeholders are in this 
discussion. The case studies presented within this thesis group stakeholders together 
based on political affiliation, geographic location, and scientific expertise. The term 
stakeholders is used throughout to reference those individuals or entities (such as 
corporations and political subdivisions), who have direct vested interest in the issues 
presented here. Their interest may be expressed through political awareness (such as 
active participation in the public sphere, or tribal affairs), or socio-cultural awareness 
(such as participating in production of alternate knowledge). Some stakeholders live near 
the sites, which are affected by policy decisions, thus by simply being in close proximity 
to risk sources, they are stakeholders in the debate. Therefore, the list of stakeholders 
discussed in this research may include national and state publics (both Native and non­
Native), federal and state agencies in charge of regulating oil resources, many 
corporations (both Native and non-Native), Borough and City Departments, Tribal 
governments, and interest groups. As stakeholders debate policy issues, they each bring 
with them their own set of rationalities, and priorities. Science and technology are often 
blamed for environmental degradation, but they are also often trusted with identifying 
solutions. This paradox is at the source of much conflict in risk regulation, and 
stakeholders often disagree over risk-benefit analyses. The politics of knowledge is 
fraught with such tensions.
25 Frank Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics o f  Local Knowledge (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2005), 87.
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2.2 The Politics of knowledge
In order to interpret the link between science, politics, and the ordinary citizen, we 
must identify their meanings. In this discussion, I will examine science in the western, or 
Eurocentric context, because it is the dominant form of knowledge within western 
regulatory agencies. Both science and politics have various definitions, but science 
perhaps is the one associated with the greater sense of ambiguity. Simply stated; science 
is in pursuit of knowledge. In a Eurocentric context, science strives to include “inquiry 
processes that could be made value free and thus capable of transcending any particular 
cultural context.”26 Scientific endeavors thus aim to achieve neutrality, and ideally, 
science is an objective discipline. Politics is anything but objective, since it is a process 
of collective decision-making through the process of bargaining, negotiation, and 
compromise.27 Political issues often come to the center stage of politics when “opposing 
groups try to affect government action to resolve conflicting goals.”28 In such political 
conflict, the ordinary citizen is anyone without particular expertise, but with importance 
in the political realm via the power to vote. The political lives of ordinary citizens could 
be observed simply as their participation in the political process, or, on a more subtle 
level their situation in a complex society as objects influencing, and being influenced by 
the state, special interest groups, and the market economy.
What is then, the role of science in politics? As stakeholder groups often disagree 
on issue priorities, and issue resolution, scientific knowledge is often summoned as a 
neutral mediator. Science is suited to contribute to conflict resolution only in simple 
decision contexts, while in cases of highly complicated context, looking to science to 
enable a political consensus may indeed compromise both the odds for consensus, and the 
value of science in policy making.29 So, can science ever be purely neutral, or objective?
Much influential, but unfounded, ideology of our time involves an
extension of science well beyond its legitimate limits, so that social and
26 Figueroa and Harding, 1.
27 Roger A. Pielke, Jr. The Honest Broker: Making Sense o f  Science in Policy and Politics. (New Y ork: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31.
28 J. Richard Udry, “The Politics o f  Sex Research,” The Journal o f  Sex Research 30 (May 1993): 103.
29 Pielke, 8.
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political problems are construed as scientific ones, and ‘solutions’ offered 
in a way that obscures the social and political issues at stake. For 
example, we have illegitimate extensions of biology and social Darwinism 
and sociobiology posing as explanations of social phenomena, thereby 
disguising the political realities and serving to justify various kinds of
-J A
oppression such as the poor or women or racial minorities 
It is evident that social and cultural values influence knowledge production, and its place 
in policymaking, especially with regards to environmental issues. Environmental 
policymaking is complicated by opposing intellectual absolutes, such as ecological versus
3 1market viewpoints. A still prevailing belief in economic primacy, that a man's 
economic needs come first, rejects ecological ideology as a postmodern indulgence. 
Departing from pure "economism" takes the equivalent of a religious conversion towards 
holistic ecological ideologies without absolutes.32
As the status of science has come into question in democratic societies, the very 
foundation of democracy may be indicted as stakeholders debate who should be qualified 
to produce science, who should decide on what constitutes as science, and to what extent 
science may be included and relied upon in policy decisions. The relationship of science 
and democracy has inherent ambiguities, since science has, on the one hand, enormous 
value to society, but misused, science may lead to bad decisions, political gridlock and 
threaten the sustainability of its own enterprise.33 Science has a dual role in society and 
public decisions, for it is both the cause of environmental instabilities, and a tool for 
better policy making.34
30 Alan Chalmers, Science and Its Fabrication. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1990), 125.
31 Lynton K. Caldwell, Environment as a Focus fo r  Public Policy, ed. Robert Bartlett and James Gladden. 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 14.
32 Ibid., 271.
33 Pielke, 38.
34 Caldwell, 14.
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2.2.1 Science and democracy
Throughout history, the pursuit of knowledge meant more than just an 
autonomous entity, the scientist, conducting research, performing experiments, recording 
findings and publishing conclusions for the public. Inevitably scientific works were 
judged not only amongst peers, but also by the authorities in place, be it state or church, 
and by average citizens as well. Science often had to excel based on accuracy, and merit, 
but also based on social and political correctness. Galileo’s struggle with church 
authorities in Rome is just one such historical example of science operating under 
undemocratic conditions. How has the relationship between state, science and the public 
changed? Can science and the culture within which it operates be separate entities?
Science and technology are human activities, and not some sort of alien invasion 
into our lives.35 Yet scientific methods are aimed to be impersonal. Whatever can be 
produced by one scientist should be reproducible by another. Scientific observations and 
measurements are intended to be objective and testable, relying on the notion that 
nature’s underlying principles are relatively constant.36 Citizens at times trust this 
neutrality ideal of science as a reliable driver behind policy decisions, while they may 
also question how experts will frame political issues through the use o f  science. Just as 
science may be subject to power structures, so may power operate through the use of 
science to organize society. Many consider this normalizing power of science positive 
based on the promise that human welfare goes hand in hand with advancing human
-37
knowledge.
But as citizens have been gaining political influence throughout modem history, 
simultaneously so have bureaucratic organizations and technical expertise. The fact 
that science and its technological byproducts bear responsibility in the incredible growth
35 Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: A study o f  people, expertise, and sustainable development (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 2.
36 Jacob Bronowski, The Common Sense o f  Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 57.
37 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Let them eat cake’: GM foods and the democratic imagination. In Science and Citizens: 
Globalisation and the Challenge o f  Engagement, ed. Melissa Leach et al., 183-198. (New Delhi: Orient 
Longman, 2007), 196.
38 Fischer, 6.
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of expert networks is evident in the global rise of the knowledge society, which 
transcends the boundaries of nation states.
To the extent that we can speak today of ‘only one earth’, it is science and 
technology perhaps more than any other form of human activity which 
have made the singularity a meaningful concept. The problem for 
governance, then is not the spread of techno-specific cultures in and of 
themselves, but rather their increasing isolation from other institutions and 
modalities of deliberation (...) more important still is the loss of 
reflexivity within the scientific enterprise itself, a phenomenon that 
disables modem science from recognizing, and admitting, how profoundly 
normative are its visions of progress. Science enters the political playing 
field seemingly shorn of values and prejudices; automatically coded as a 
‘public good’, it offers no further justification for its existence, nor feels 
any need to expose its internally generated agendas to wider public 
inspection.40
Western democratic systems are indeed highly complicated institutions, in which 
knowledge can organize society. Foucault observed that science and knowledge are 
normative forces in society, and noted that the intricacies of individual identity and 
autonomy are tied in with the dominant power structures.41 His studies focused on the 
invisible links between subject, knowledge, and power. Foucault described how through 
classifying individuals, and rationalizing the concepts of “normalcy”, dominant 
institutions of knowledge control political, social and economic discourses. He believed 
the relationship between rationalization and excesses of political power to be evident42
This relates directly to another key theme in Beck’s thesis that recognizes the 
powerful influence of science over our social order. Science can legitimate the risks of 
modernity, such as the development and employment of hazardous technologies, and 
even the introduction and widespread use of toxic materials, by setting acceptable levels
39 Jasanoff (2007), 196.
40 Ibid.
41 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 14.
42 Ibid., 13.
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of toxicity. Science has, at various times in history, been a very effective instrument of 
power when subordinated to power structures. For example, natural sciences have been 
used to conduct experiments to prove that dominance hierarchies are natural 
phenomena.43 Haraway writes that by observing domination in primate social groups, the 
political perspective of domination was legitimized as normal based on primate studies of 
the 1930s and 1940s. The way scientists classified or deconstructed the primate social 
groups was embedded in a structure of dominance typical to human hierarchy. Their 
conclusions as such, says Haraway, simply mirrored this already existing human 
prejudice into primate behavior in order to validate aggression, competition and hierarchy 
in human behavior. At times, ideological functions can take on the guise of science 
merely to impose or reinforce social order. The political debate over environmental risks 
further highlights the link between knowledge, power and rationalization.
Many industry representatives, scientists, and economists subscribe to a risk- 
based approach to environmental regulation, as opposed to technology-based, or 
incentives-based regulation. The rationale behind the risk-based approach is that good 
science and rational choice should drive regulatory decisions, instead of qualitative ideals 
such as the public’s apprehensions, or prudence and precaution.44 The outcome of such 
dialogues among policy makers, experts and citizenry is a factor of the political culture 
within which it takes place. A comparison of US and European regulatory tendencies 
prove that social values bear influence on the relationship between rationality, science, 
power and citizenry.45 In fact, risk regulation may largely be shaped by public demands 
for accountability: the traditionally adversarial, transparent US policymaking process has 
caused officials to rely on a system of objectivity, of formal, quantitative calculations of 
risks, costs and benefits. European political culture on the other hand relies on 
negotiations, and consensus building, which in turn has conditioned regulators to be
43 Donna J. Haraway. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention o f  Nature. ( New York: Routledge, 
1997), 21.
44 Norman J. Vig, and M.E. Kraft, Environmental Policy: New Directions fo r the Twenty-First Century, 
(Wahsington, D.C. : CQ Press, 2006). 225.
45 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 18.
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dependent on subjective, qualitative judgments of experts. Judging from Jasanoffs 
account, it could be said that, ironically, the securities sought by the US public through 
demands for institutional responsibility, accountability, and rational explanations, has 
caused those institutions, and relevant policies to now be somewhat shielded from public 
pressures. In other words, before official action can be taken, scientific reason must be 
present. In this manner, scientific rationalization may reinforce excesses of power by 
creating an atmosphere of elitism among experts, and marginalizing ordinary citizens.
On the other hand, European corporatism, bureaucratic control over public 
participation, and the culture of expert judgment, and qualitative reasoning (all of which 
initially largely excluded the lay person from policy making), has allowed the public to 
fight for stricter consumer protection, even in the absence of sound scientific data. 
Collective criticism of new technologies based on a lack o f  scientific certainty in their 
safety may lead to regulation for the sake of precaution. Such precautionary regulatory 
tendencies have typically been present in European regulation over the past decade.
As politics and science interface, they together shape the political lives of 
ordinary citizens. When highly specialized issues surface in a democratic public arena, 
citizens are expected to judge their merit. Occasionally, individual research projects are 
brought into light, and the public is asked to come to a moral consensus on specific 
issues, priority setting. Other times science is at the center of partisan political rhetoric. 
Such is the democratic process. It relies on citizen participation, the influence of interest 
groups and market considerations. But politics and science form another, less visible 
alliance, which normalizes various dominant institutions. Although science ideally is 
objective, it is also a human endeavor, and as such it cannot escape partiality. One view 
on the politics of knowledge is that it is a set of overt actions and policies which intrude 
into “pure” science, but there is another, different notion of politics, where power is 
exercised less visibly, less consciously, and not on but through the dominant institutional 
structures.46
46 Sandra Harding, After the neutrality ideal: Science, politics, and “strong objectivity”. 
Social Research 59 (Fall, 1992) 567-587.
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2.2.2 Alternate knowledge forms
Scrutiny of expert scientific models has led to the mobilization of alternate 
knowledge systems, because such scrutiny has revealed gaps between expert definitions 
of risks and risk priorities and those of the general public. Citizens often get directly 
involved at the root of scientific process, examples of which may include participation in 
identifying problems, data collection, and analysis (participatory science), and political 
activism through community meetings, public hearings and comment periods. There are 
many examples of participatory science, in which ordinary citizens take part in the 
collection of data, and in the monitoring of ecological changes. Such citizen science 
builds on local knowledge, and often engages expert institutions directly. There are 
parallel discourses through which the public may engage expert science.
The case studies presented in this thesis focus on the inclusion of indigenous 
knowledge (IK) in expert decision-making. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are subtle 
differences between traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and IK, although these 
terms are often used interchangeably in literature. IK is defined as the local knowledge 
held by indigenous peoples or local knowledge unique to a given culture or society.47 
The IK of an Alaska Native person is most often practiced through subsistence activities, 
such as hunting, fishing and gathering. Subsistence is an applied form of IK, because 
subsistence activities rely on the knowledge collected through the experiences and 
teachings of the community, “garnered from hundreds of years of their patient 
interrogation of the landscape.”48 IK about subsistence is practical knowledge, such as 
detailed understanding of the natural history of local wildlife and plant species, or having 
the ability to predict weather patterns, or knowing which tools are best for a job.
IK is not a compartmentalized local knowledge and classification system, rather it 
is an integrated package that includes knowledge of environmental practices, 
management systems, social institutions that provide rules, and worldviews that 
constitute the ideological basis of these systems.49 TEK is used to describe knowledge
47 Berkes, 8.
48 Barry Lopez. Arctic Dreams. (London: Vintage, 2001), 6.
49 Berkes, 24.
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specific to ecological relationships, such as relationships of living beings with one 
another and with their environment.50 IK is a term used to describe a broader set of 
knowledge not confined to ecological relationships, rather it is knowledge about many 
fields of ehtnoscience. Both IK and TEK offer knowledge with added theoretical and 
cultural layers, but TEK is considered a subset of IK.51 This study is focused on 
integration of IK in resource management, in order to offer a wider view of knowledge 
uptake in resource management not restricted to ecological relationships. For example, 
the classification of snow, freshwater ice, and sea ice are examples of IK without the 
added element of ecological relationships. TEK is also discussed as needed when it is 
referenced specifically in resource policies.
There are practical differences between western science and IK. In traditional 
Native American societies, science is not separate from the culture within which it is 
observed and interpreted. Seemingly there are no boundaries of science and politics, as 
knowledge is the guiding set of principles by which people abide. Knowledge doesn’t 
have an independent, transforming role separate from its people. Furthermore, 
knowledge is not broken down into modem concepts of disciplines or areas of expertise, 
because doing so would disrupt the interconnectedness of the universe. Oscar Kawagley, 
a Yupiak elder sums this up: “For the Yupiak people, culture, knowing and living are 
intricately interrelated.”53 Fischer describes the same phenomenon within the wider 
context of local knowledge. “Whereas science seeks to theoretically separate its 
knowledge from the culture in which it is produced, local knowledge remains inherently 
associated with, and interpreted within, the specific culture in which it is produced.”54 
In both developing and developed society contexts, therefore, it has been 
accepted, at least in principle, that science can gain democratic public 
legitimacy only if  it recognizes its own need to understand itself in relation
50Berkes, 6.
51 Ibid., 8.
52 Ibid.
53 Oscar Kawagley (University o f  Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska Native Science Commission). Personal 
Communication, June 2007. University o f Alaska Fairbanks campus.
54 Fischer, 195.
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to these other cultures, and to learn to respectfully negotiate with, and 
accommodate to them, rather than dismiss them as vacuous, untrustworthy 
and emotive.55
Cultural diversity yields different scientific discourses through varying perceptions of 
reality. Perhaps this difference in observation is to be celebrated, and it may be where the 
real potential for knowledge co-production lies. In terms of breaking down the 
progression of RS politics in Alaska, the presence of Alaska Native peoples and their IK 
then proves to be an ideal condition for the expert-citizen divide, and for the mobilization 
of subpolitical groups.
2.2.3 The concepts o f  inclusion and participation
What does inclusion in politics really mean, and where and when should it 
happen? What motivates expert institutions to seek input from the public? Policy 
analysis has traditionally safeguarded itself against what it considered to be the 
unsubstantiated opinions of the general public, failing to recognize its dependence on 
such everyday knowledge.56 This is because the relationship between the public (or non­
expert) judgment, and science is a symbiotic one; citizens often rely on science to 
decipher many of life’s issues, while science relies on certain social expectations and 
public value judgments. “Science, no less than politics, must conform to these 
established ways of public knowing in order to gain broad-based support -  especially 
when science helps underwrite significant collective choices.”57 Beck also notes these 
competing, yet codependent value systems of so-called 'scientific' and 'social' 
rationalities. Scientific rationality refers to dominant devices of science and technology 
utilized by expert systems, while social rationality refers to cultural evaluations based on 
everyday expenences. Just as science depends to some extent on social rationality for 
legitimation, so do social rationalities of risk depend on scientific arguments. Laypersons 
do not routinely reject expert claims, but they are both “critical and credulous of
55 Leach et al., 9.
56 Fischer, 194.
57 Jasanoff (2005), 249.
58 Mythen (2004), 56.
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science.”59 Green movements face this paradox as they distrust scientific authority yet 
have nowhere else to turn for definitive answers.60 Due to the ever-growing number if 
scientific policy issues, expert institutions and citizens must find a way to define their 
relationship within the constantly shifting boundaries of science and society.
The form and direction taken by our science and technology are no longer 
seen as inevitable (...) instead they are increasingly recognized as being 
open to shaping by individual creativity, collective ingenuity, cultural 
priorities, institutional interests, stakeholder negotiation and the exercise 
of power. The irony is thus intensified. Just at a time when globalization 
seems to render the governance of science and technology more obscure, 
remote and inaccessible, so we begin to appreciate the inherent openness 
to the exercise of human agency and -potentially- to deliberate social 
order.61
In recent years, there has been a push to increase public participation in issues involving 
science and technology, and a variety of organizations have hosted events to respond to 
crisis and concerns over risks from technology, to gain input in decisions, or to explore
fx'yfuture development options. Especially when it comes to issues about scientific and 
technological choices, the ideal of a contemporary society is that it strives to include all 
relevant constituencies in the decision-making process.63 The rationale behind allowing 
for participation is that it is a right, and a path to becoming a full citizen; however the 
extent such an action-based learning process grants empowerment in a wider political 
arena depends on the context.64 In other words, evaluating the efficacy of inclusion and 
participation in policy processes is a difficult task. Inclusion and participation are
59 Beck (1992), 72.
60 Steven Yearley, Nature’s Advocates. In Misunderstanding science? The public reconstruction o f  
science and technology, ed.Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, 172-190. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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mutually dependent on each another, and we cannot evaluate one without the other: 
inclusion doesn’t happen without stakeholder participation, and similarly, stakeholders 
cannot participate when avenues for inclusion do not exist. The efficacy of knowledge 
co-production is influenced by the political impetus behind the collaboration. Motivation 
affects the types and results of stakeholder participation.
Inclusion implies a top-down directive, while participation refers to a bottom-up 
implementation of involvement. The motivation for inclusion on behalf of organizations 
can include crisis response, gaining public input, weighing development options, 
reputation management, among others, and these may have a huge, normative role in the 
success of participation. “The framing of the modes and scope of participatory 
initiatives” can result in “a disciplining and thus participation-closing role.”65 Ethridge 
offers three reasons for externalizing administrative decisions, and questions whether 
inclusion is motivated by concerns for democratizing agency decisions: (1) a legal 
movement to restrict administrative authority, (2) legislative movement to constrain the 
aggressiveness of regulatory agencies with delegated legislative power, and (3) 
generalized interest in maintaining independent political power bases.66
On the other hand, the incentive to participate in the public sphere can be defined 
as normative (it is the right thing to do), instrumental (it is a better way to achieve 
particular ends), and substantive (it leads to better ends).67 These three perspectives 
imply very different relationships with political, economic and institutional power 
structures: normative perspectives aim to ameliorate “undue exercise of power in social 
choice”, instrumental perspectives have been conditioned by existing power structures, 
and maybe intentionally or not, tend to reinforce them, while substantive perspective 
focuses on authenticity, such as the genuineness of equity, or whether the process of
65 Leach et al., 11.
66 Marcus E. Etheridge, Procedures for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy: An Assessment o f  
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public participation really embodies diversity.68 Participation is largely motivated by a 
newfound desire to reform the “largely undemocratic expert-client relationship.”69
Various types of civic engagements have evolved over time. Initially, alternative 
movements within professions established so-called advocacy research practices, but 
failed to achieve authentic participation due to the fact that citizens allowed themselves to
70act as audiences while experts still spoke for them. The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) of 1946 set specific regulation for public hearings prior to administrative decision­
making. The Federal Register Act of 1935 is an even earlier example of mandated public 
process, as it made available official documents related to formal actions.71 The 
environmental movements of 1960s-1970s, and concurrent avalanche of environmental 
legislation further cemented the idea of external participation and influence of agency 
actions.
Public Access to Information campaigns such as the U.S. Freedom of Information 
Act, followed by public information campaigns, and science education programs 
promoted the flow of information from experts to laypersons.72 However, local 
knowledge was still excluded from the policy process, as the policymakers were 
informing the public, and not the other way around. Following the emergence of 
advocacy research, participatory inquiry appeared as the solution to this problem, as an 
effort to directly include citizens and their local knowledge in expert exchanges: science 
and expertise have been the prime targets of such countercultural opposition, especially 
in the case of the environment. Aided by new technological frontiers such as the 
Internet, citizens have been empowered to gather information, to form new associations, 
and to explore new potentials arising from being connected. Yet, inclusion remains 
frequently riddled with tension, as expertise and alternate movements merge during 
participation. The question often emerges: “How do we analytically integrate empirical
68 Stirling, 223.
69 Fischer, 172.
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and normative knowledge?”74 And this question leads to another dilemma, one of 
collaborative decision-making. What is the best avenue to involve the public as a partner 
in negotiating modem risks? How might the public move beyond their role as 
informants, and become full partners in risk management?
2.2.4 Finding common ground: Implementing indigenous knowledge in policy decisions 
The dominant scientific paradigm in western political systems has been slowly 
extending scientific scrutiny towards truth claims of other cultures, resulting, in some 
cases, in collaborative knowledge production schemes, especially in areas of ecology. 
Changes in scientific climate have also occurred in many indigenous societies, as some 
byproducts of western science and technology have in turn been accepted and used to 
empower self-determination causes, such as indigenous land claims.
“Just as maps were powerful tools of European imperialism in the 18th 
and 19th Centuries, GIS returned the favor by supporting aboriginal land 
claims with presentations in a language that dominant-culture courts could 
appreciate. And many tribes in the western United States use unmodified 
commercial GIS to manage tribal lands and maximize productivity of 
forests and grazing lands, just as private land holders or government 
agencies might do.”75
The relationship between western and traditional ways of knowing is a reciprocal one, but 
for the purposes of this research, this discussion focuses on the acceptance of IK into the 
policy processes of the administrative state. The inclusion of alternate knowledge forms 
such as IK, in top-level policymaking merits special discussion, because engaging IK in a 
resource management dialogue carries added cultural and social knowledge layers which 
may complicate cooperation. It is important to consider these issues that may arise 
when applying IK to a joint resource management regime. Issues such as colonialism
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and cultural destruction, the need for self-determination and protection of intellectual and 
cultural property rights, may make convergence difficult.
Comanche educator and musician Dr. Cornel Pewewardy notes, that power and 
control work when we have the ability to define reality and getting others to respond to
7 f \our definition as if it were their own. He notes that science should not be a privileged 
field limited to those who subscribe to a particular mythic tradition. He believes that 
Native Americans should resist colonization of the mind, and nurture the tradition of 
holistic thinking in order to avoid cultural extinction. The effort to gain recognition for 
an IK system is inherently influenced by the struggle to put an end to colonization, be it 
physical or intellectual. The economic imperatives of an increasingly globalized, modem 
social order dictate collective thinking and policy priorities, often at the cost of ecological 
and other values and practices outside them. “Globalization is essentially ‘action at 
distance’; and, unlike in colonialism, which required the physical presence of managers 
of capital, their physical absence in global control of capital flows predominates over
77their physical presence.” In other words, colonialism no longer comes in ships, but 
rather through the normative processes o f modernization.
The other side of the coin, acknowledgement and inclusion of IK is also a 
complex matter however, because issues of authority, autonomy, and moral conflicts can 
arise if IK is removed from its context.78 The postmodernist criticism of IK inclusion 
sees the attempt to translate and institutionalize IK in resource management as an
70extension of modernist hegemony. Postmodernists warn that integration may in fact 
reinforce western biases by taking knowledge out of contextual meanings, and by forcing 
indigenous peoples to justify their views in a scientific language foreign to them.80 
Proponents of IK inclusion argue that indigenous communities must engage the
76 Keith James. Science and Native American Communities. (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press,
2001),
77 Peter Harries-Jones, The ‘Risk Society’: Tradition, Ecological Order and Time-Space Acceleration. In 
In the Way o f  Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalization, ed.Mario Blaser et al., 
279-298. (London: Zed Books, 2004), 283.
78 Leach et al., 9.
79 Eugene S. Hunn et al., Huna Tlingit Traditional Environmental Knowledge, Conservation, and the 
Management o f a “Wilderness” Park. Current Anthropology 44 (2003):S79-S103, S79.
80Ibid., S80.
34
administrative “encompassing polity that holds ultimate power”, and that it is in the best 
interest of these communities to foster a dialogue, however imperfect, with resource 
managers in charge.81
In order to minimize the possibility of a biased translation of IK, and to maximize 
the benefit of its inclusion for indigenous communities, the rights of indigenous peoples 
to exercise control over research conducted within their territories, or which uses their 
people as subjects of study, are protected under U.N. human rights laws and numerous
O'y
declarations by indigenous governing bodies. However, it wasn’t until recently that 
indigenous peoples have begun to assert control over their IK in order to fight the 
perception of IK as public domain.83 IK is a valuable resource and deserves to play an 
active role in a dynamic democracy, but care must be taken to avoid its exploitation. The 
use of traditional knowledge is often very political because “it threatens to change power 
relations between indigenous groups and the dominant society.” IK integration may also 
involve intellectual property rights issues. As biological products enter the realm of 
patented goods in western societies, products of traditional management systems, and 
species of traditional uses may deserve similar consideration.85 Berkes lists three 
avenues of effective engagement with IK, ways that promote political empowerment and 
reduce prejudice: community-based and sponsored IK studies, development of
o/r
indigenous scholarship, and recording and archiving IK without interpretation. 
Indigenous groups have taken an active role in sharing their IK with western science: 
Alaska Native people have taken an active role in promoting the 
integration of traditional knowledge with western science traditions, 
though their reasons for sharing their knowledge with outsiders have been 
varied, as indicated by Richard Glenn, an Inupiaq who has served on the
81 Hunn et al., S80.
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Arctic Research Consortium and the Alaska Native Science Commission:
“Why do Inupiat share traditional knowledge? Despite the stigma, our 
community is proud of a long history of productive, cooperative efforts 
with visiting researchers, hunters, travelers, scientists, map makers and 
others. We share when we consider others close enough to be part of 
Inupiat culture and share when it is in the best interest of a greater cultural 
struggle.”87
The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (1977), and Berger Commission Inquiry 
(1985) are some of the earliest, and most successful examples of participatory inquiry
DO
involving IK. Canadian Justice Thomas R. Berger led both projects, pioneering a 
participatory design for inclusion of indigenous communities and their IK in the public 
space.89 The first project, the Mackenzie Inquiry began when the Canadian Minister of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, appointed Berger to study the social, 
economic and environmental impacts of a gas pipeline across northern territories 
occupied by largely Inuit peoples. The Mackenzie Pipeline Inquiry was empowered “to 
recommend terms and conditions that ought to be imposed to protect the people of the 
North, their environment, and their economy.”90 Berger traversed the Mackenzie River 
Valley, and visited all affected communities during his three-year journey. He conducted 
community hearings, and heard hundreds of testimonies, creating a forum for locals in 
which they could develop and state their positions. His recommendation shocked the 
federal government, when he recommended a ten-year moratorium on pipeline 
construction until Native land claims are settled, and a permanent ban on a pipeline 
running south via Alaska and Yukon. The federal government suspended plans for what
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Knowing. Anthropology and Education Quarterly, (2005):36(1), 8-23. quoting Richard Glenn. Traditional 
Knowledge, Environmental Assessment, and the Clash o f  Two Cultures. In Handbook fo r  Culturally 
Responsive Science Curriculum. (2000)S. Stephens, ed. 13-14. Fairbanks: Alaska Native Knowledge 
Network.
88 See Thomas R. Berger. Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report o f  the Mackenzie Valley 
Pipeline Inquiry. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1977), and Village Journey: The Report o f  the Alaska Native 
Review Commission. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985).
89 Fischer, 232.
90 Berger (1977).
36
was to be, up until then, the biggest private construction in history. Canada Native 
leaders were satisfied with the Inquiry, and praised Berger’s efforts. “George Manuel, 
president of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, says the report is what his 
people have been demanding for years —  a true recognition of native problems and 
goals. He calls it "a charter of Indian rights, the best statement on native rights since the 
Europeans came to Canada.”91 The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry is still an 
unprecedented example of participatory inquiry, and IK inclusion in national-level 
environmental policy making.
Berger was again commissioned for a similar task by the Alaska Native Review 
Commission, to study the impacts of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) on 
Alaska Native communities. As he had done before, Berger and his assistants visited 
over sixty rural fishing villages and camps in an attempt to offer every Alaska Native the 
opportunity to participate personally in the inquiry. Berger heard testimony from 
thousands of residents, and ultimately recommended the dismantling of ANCSA regional 
corporations, and the retribalization of Native corporation land at the village level. 
Although the Berger Commission’s recommendations did not win the kind of federal 
recognition seen in the Mackenzie pipeline case, the forum it created to give voice to IK 
has been an invaluable contribution to the cause of Alaska Native self-determination. 
The legacy of Berger’s work continues even today, and his model is still considered the 
grandfather of a publicly oriented model for participatory inquiry.93
The case studies presented in this research demonstrate some of the existing 
inclusion schemes for IK in Alaska’s oil resource management. Policymakers are 
confronted with social and political issues stemming from the divisions between 
community and state-level interests, as well as from conflicting cultural rationalities as 
stakeholders relate differently to resource and knowledge definitions.94 According to 
Beck, such conditions are necessary for subpolitical groups to emerge in RS.
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2.3 Risk Society
As the national debate over energy needs continues, offshore oil drilling in Alaska 
has been receiving increased attention for both its economic potential, and the hazards it 
may pose to the sustainability of Arctic environments. Definitions for, measurements of, 
and perceptions of risk diverge among stakeholder groups. Risk research can be 
conducted from a sociological perspective, by investigating the cultural formations of risk 
ideologies and their impacts on social change, or from a psychological perspective, by 
exposing people’s common-sense approaches to the estimation of probabilities; that is 
how they visualize and process information relating to hazards.95 The term ‘risk’ is often 
used interchangeably with seemingly similar terms, but not without consequences:
In the contexts of sociology, a great deal of attention has been directed 
toward the variety of ways in which people are inclined to codify ‘danger’ 
as ‘risk’ in order to cast a negative moral judgment upon (...) the 
trustworthiness of expert opinion. Accordingly, by noting the widespread 
-and relatively recent -  adoption of ‘risk’ as a popular pseudonym for 
‘potential hazard’ or ‘impending catastrophe’, sociologists understand 
themselves to be witness to a transformation in cultural outlooks that lead 
some sections of society to display an aggravated hostility towards the 
progressive claims of modem, state-sponsored science.96 
The point at which risk is identifiable to stakeholders and it begins to exist as risk 
consciousness greatly varies based on social conditioning, and the cultural processes 
which shape personal perception. For this reason, the ongoing collective, cultural and 
moralizing risk dialogue between social institutions and individuals about effective risk 
management must begin “by questioning the social boundaries of belonging across which 
cultural dialogues about risk take place”, because risk judgment is a reflection of “social 
identifications, moral practices and commitments of trust.”91 The debate over whether
95 Iain Wilkinson, Psychology and Risk. In Beyond the Risk Society: Critical Reflections on Risk and 
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risk is real or not is often framed by the subtleties of definitions, such as ‘perceived risk’ 
versus ‘identifiable risk’. Issues with elements of scientific uncertainty often lead to 
political debates about the economic cost of precautionary regulation, which in turn 
require political priority setting; and so science and politics are fundamentally entwined 
with one another. Environmental politics can, and often do become hostage in a battle of 
expertise and counter expertise in the absence of certainty. When scientific findings lack 
proof of absolute certainty, the ensuing disagreement among experts can weaken 
environmental regulation: should an expert interpret data counter to what the existing 
regulation is based upon, producers of risk such as industrial stakeholders, may demand 
fewer regulations citing scientific uncertainties. Similarly, in the absence of absolute 
proof of safety, citizens who become the potential consumers of produced risks may 
demand tighter regulations on industry. Ultimately, even with the help of science, 
decision-making is reduced to value-laden judgment calls through processes that will 
always be vulnerable to political pressures. The purpose of this section, however is not to 
engage in an in-depth analysis of risk research in general. This section provides a 
glimpse into what risk means in the specific context of the RS thesis -a complex social 
theory of modem society-, with emphasis on its implications on knowledge production. 
Following this introduction to RS theory, Section 2.3.3 provides a critical examination of 
areas of weakness in RS theory, as noted by critics of Beck’s work.
In his RS thesis, Beck studies post-modern society and the existing institutional 
risk production and denial. Beck posits that the way in which we experience omnipresent 
risks to health and environment today constitutes a distinctive form of society, a 
globalizing shift from industrial modernity towards something new. According to Beck, 
risk society is not a choice to be made through political debate; rather it is an unintended 
consequence of "automatic operations of autonomous modernization processes, which are 
blind and deaf to consequences and dangers.”98 The notion of risk therefore is central in 
Beck’s risk society thesis. At its focus are rapid, globalizing changes that constantly 
reform social, economic and political institutions, which have been intertwined with an
98 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society and the Provident State. In Risk, Environment, and Modernity: Towards a 
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omnipresent phenomenon of risk. As research produces answers, it also generates 
complex questions, and reveals new hazards, enhancing insecurities in the social 
climate." The rapid expansion of institutionalized knowledge -public institutions that 
generate scientific knowledge- has created expert systems of risk calculation, assessment, 
and management, while failing to determine the meaning and extent of various risks.100 
This lack of consensus among experts has elevated the climate of uncertainty to new 
heights; one in which negotiating changes and assessing the impacts of hazards is 
increasingly difficult.
This changing structure of risk is at the focus of Ulrich Beck's risk society theory. 
Beck differentiates between natural hazards and 'manufactured risks', proposing that 
manufactured risks are decision-contingent, and arise as the side effects of the 
developmental processes of modernization.101 Beck argues that these new risks are very 
different from natural hazards, as they are potentially more catastrophic yet not restricted 
temporally and spatially as natural hazards often are. The inequality of risk distribution 
is also changing, according to Beck, who argues that new mega-hazards of modernity 
threaten individuals regardless of status quo, or geographic location.102 Therefore, in RS 
the allocation of modem risks can no longer be modeled along socio-demographic and 
geospatial lines. Global-scale decisions result in local consequences- such as nuclear 
power or global warming-, while local activities may impact distant locations -such as 
pollution.103
As public interest rises with regards to environmental issues, with it the pressure 
increases on the state to take action, and environmental risks become a political issue. 
The political discourse on manufactured risk-issues has manifest a risk regulation system 
based on expert knowledge. Although the regulatory tendencies of these expert systems 
are not static (e.g. from 1960s-1970s the US emerged as the pioneer of consumer and 
environmental protection, and employed precautionary regulatory policies), there has
99 Mythen (2004), 3.
100Ibid., 2.
101 Ibid., 16.
102 Beck (1992), 36-37.
103 Mythen (2004), 5.
40
been an overall simultaneous scientification of politics, and politicization of science. 
Political discourse engages in scientific debates of expertise and counterexpertise, with 
the ultimate goal of decision-making. At the same time, the scientific community is not 
autonomous of politics, because science is a human endeavor and as such, cannot escape 
partiality.
The technical nature of modem risks has caused environmental decision-making 
to be embedded in technocratic practices. For example, expert language and processes of 
impact-assessments, cost-benefit analyses dominate the debate among industry-oriented 
experts and environmental counter-experts.104 Fischer provides the following description 
of such ‘environmentalism.’
To adequately appreciate this connection between environment, science, 
and technology, one need only observe the science-based nature of 
environmental policy making (...). Scientific and technological 
determinations have become the primary standards by which substantive 
regulatory decisions affecting environmental quality are reached.105 
In this process, the human factor is often lost as the divide between experts and citizens 
widens, and risk-relevant policymaking is distanced from laypersons. As local 
knowledge loses validity within the administrative devices of government, laypeople are 
underrepresented in expert risk-decision making systems. This idea, central to his RS 
theory also applies directly to this study of Alaska’s oil resource management because 
Alaskan stakeholders vary in their consciousness of risks. Opposing viewpoints and 
perceptions of risks are often at the center of conflict regarding oil development, as 
evidenced by frequent legal battles surrounding offshore drilling.
2.3.1 Citizens, experts and risk
The technocratic nature of environmental policymaking has serious consequences 
to the expert-citizen relationship. Stakeholders’ risk rationalities vary greatly, making the 
distinction between ‘real’ risk and ‘perceived’ risk impossible. Beck indicts the
104 Fischer, 94.
105 Ibid., 91.
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monopoly expert systems of risk calculations have on rationality. He argues that science 
‘determines’ risks and the public ‘perceives’ risks. “Deviations from this pattern indicate 
the extent of ‘irrationality’ and ‘hostility to technology’.”106 He adds that such 
technological elitism mistakenly views the public as well intentioned yet ignorant would- 
be engineers, who would be at ease with expert decisions if only they were well 
informed. This is a fallacy, says Beck “for statements on risk contain statements of the 
type that is how we want to live -statements, that is, to which the natural and engineering 
sciences alone can provide answers only by overstepping the bounds of their 
disciplines.”107 Beck’s analysis of scientific risk calculation underscores the notion that 
science isn’t a purely objective realm, nor should it pretend to be when it delves into the 
uncertain.
In the RS thesis, Beck features the concept of 'reflexive modernization', which 
refers to processes of unintended consequences. "Risk may be defined as a systemic way 
of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization 
itself.”108 The idea of risk society does not suggest a world that is more hazardous than 
previous eras, rather it implies a society increasingly preoccupied with, and organized in 
response to, risks that threaten its future safety.109 The risk society is Beck's 
interpretation of risk as a new, intellectual and political concept responsible for the steady 
crisis of modernity.110 This crisis consists of a paradox in which the processes of 
modernization are tasked with mediating risks, which they are responsible for causing in 
the first place. The institutions charged with minimizing these risks to health and 
environment are paralyzed by the nature and magnitude of risks, such as particulate air 
pollution.
A major feature of Beck's thesis is that the hazards of modernity escape 
perception, and hide behind physical and chemical formulas.111 We can no longer see,
106 Beck (1992), 57.
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taste, or smell danger; it has to be broken down and explained to us by experts. Nuclear 
threat, or chemicals in foodstuff are modem, invisible, and highly technocratic threats. 
Furthermore, the consequences of modem hazards have a new global, and catastrophic 
quality. Risk management becomes an obsolete idea as manufactured risks are beyond 
the reach of protective institutions.
The entry into risk society occurs at the moment when the hazards, which 
are now decided and consequently produced by society undermine and/or 
cancel the established safety systems o f the provident state’s existing risk 
calculation. In contrast to early industrial risks, nuclear, chemical, 
ecological and genetic engineering risks (a) can be limited in terms of 
neither time nor place, (b) are not accountable according to the established 
rules of causality, blame and liability, and (c) cannot be compensated or 
insured against. Or, to express it by reference to a single example: the 
injured of Chernobyl are today, years after the catastrophe, not even all 
born yet.112
Modem threats do not break down along traditional patterns of risk distribution, such as 
time, space, class structure, or nationality. "In the risk society the unknown and
113unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and society.” Indeed, 
managing and averting potentially catastrophic consequences may reorganize power and 
authority, as catastrophes gain political potential.114
What does this all mean to society and the risks we face today? Beck contends 
that this model has implications for risk identification, definition, and the relationship 
between experts and laypersons. Science has been the organizing mode of inquiry in 
industrial societies. The dominant direction of risk information flows from expert to 
layperson, since modem risks Eire often invisible, and technocratic.115 Beck notes the 
imbalances of such communicative powers, and posits that in a RS, competing values of
112Beck (1992), 31.
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'scientific' and 'social' rationalities blur institutional boundaries.116 Scientific rationality 
refers to dominant devices of science and technology utilized by expert systems, while 
social rationality refers to cultural evaluations based on everyday experiences.117 Yet 
Beck points out, that despite talking past one another, and breaking apart, the two sides
t 1 o
remain interwoven and interdependent. While science relies on certain social 
expectations and value judgments, social discussions of risk also depend on scientific 
arguments. Jasanoff supports this idea:
There are in any functioning society shared understandings about what 
credible claims should look like and how they ought to be articulated, 
represented, and defended (...) Public reasoning, then, achieves its 
standing by meeting entrenched cultural expectations about how 
knowledge should be made authoritative. Science, no less than politics, 
must conform to these established ways of public knowing in order to gain 
broad-based support- especially when science helps underwrite significant 
collective choices.119
The inability of existing institutions to contain contemporary risks results in what Beck 
calls 'organized irresponsibility'; a system that is at once forced to recognize catastrophic 
risks, and to dismiss public concerns.120 Organized irresponsibility describes the process 
of symbolic detoxification, the institutional denial of risks through the notion of 
'acceptable levels'. Beck posits that through such cosmetic makeover of poisoning, risks 
gain a normative meaning, as non-poisoning is rejected as utopian.121 Beck concludes 
that the production of toxins disappears behind these ‘acceptable’ values, and poisoning 
becomes harmless. Through technocratic rationalizations of ecological issues, existing 
bureaucratic structures seek to retain legitimacy; however, public dissent and 
environmental subpolitics intensify as scientific rationality and social rationality clash.
116 Mythen (2004), 57.
117 Ibid., 56.
118 Beck (1992), 30.
119 Jasanoff (2005), 249.
120 Mythen (2004), 60.
121 Beck (1992), 65.
44
2.3.2 The subpolitics o f knowledge
1 '7'JSub(sy,stem)politics means shaping society from below. “It is distinguished 
from ‘politics’ first, in that, agents outside the political or corporatist system are allowed 
to appear on the stage of social design (...), and second, in that not only social and 
collective agents but individuals as well compete with the latter and each other for the 
emerging shaping power of the political.”123 Subpolitics is a progressive form of public 
involvement through self-coordination and direct action.124 Environmental NGOs, 
citizen initiatives, and social movements are but a few examples of subpolitical entities, 
and these have been gaining political influence in national and global politics. 
Subpolitics in the RS is a revolutionizing political force, and most importantly, it evolves 
outside of the main devices of political systems. Beck asserts that the democratic 
processes rooted in industrial-modemity go on simultaneously, continuing the power 
struggle between parties for political leverage, economic growth, and social security. 
However, subpolitics forces new conflicts, and new coalitions between institutions, 
interest groups, and the public and social systems become “malleable” as a result. 125 
This process happens as subpolitical groups, or “alternative lines of action” become 
successful, profitable, and divide the power bloc of business.126
Much of Beck’s subpolitical theory lies within the realm of knowledge 
production, because the core principle of the RS is knowledge. As knowledge production 
is a political issue in environmental debates, subpolitics of science can change the rules 
of political analysis, to open it to new linkages, and negotiations.127 As the authority of 
technocratic science is challenged in RS on the basis of social rationality, the evolution of 
science gives way to a new, reflexive scientization. This form of science is more
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Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, ed. Beck et al., 1-55. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 
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complete, since it extends scientific skepticism to its own truths and consequences.128 As 
a result, technocratic science loses its monopoly over knowledge claims, and definitions 
of truth gain social importance and relevance.129 This does not mean that expert science 
becomes irrelevant. In fact, science becomes even more pertinent to the public, as
1 30citizens become 'active coproducers' of knowledge. This paradox does not escape 
Beck, who notes "with reflexive modernization, public risk consciousness and risk 
conflicts will lead to forms o f scientization o f the protest against science (...) In short, (...) 
science forces itself to run its own gauntlet”, and as such, science opens new fields of 
activity and application for itself 131 Many environmental cooperative agreements, in 
which federal, state, and local governments collaborate, increasingly combine local 
knowledge and research-based science in decision-making and policy legitimation, as is 
evidenced in the case studies chosen for this thesis. Subpolitics is a challenge to the 
status quo of knowledge-producing institutions, a call for the realigning of interests into 
new arrangements in which stakeholders would mutually benefit from knowledge co­
production.
2.3.3 A critical look at the risk society thesis
Beck's risk society thesis offers helpful insights into the sociopolitical structures 
of environmental policy making. His work represents an “important contribution to a 
critical understanding of science and expertise in environmental policymaking”, and has 
proven to be a thought-provoking thesis providing the basis for much academic
1 39discussion about science and citizens. Reception of Beck’s thesis hasn’t been without 
criticism however. This brief overview is intended as an informative guide to areas of 
weakness and limitation in RS theory as noted by some of Beck’s peers. Due to the 
avalanche of discussion that has emerged on RS and the complex social theories outlined
128 Beck (1992), 155.
129 Ibid., 156.
130 Ibid., 157.
131 Ibid., 161.
132 Fischer, 48.
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in the thesis itself, this assessment features a thematically selective list of criticisms 
focusing on the relations of risk, risk management and knowledge.
Hood et al. map differences in risk regulatory regimes and trace institutional 
dynamics in contemporary risk regulation, and question the very existence of a single 
‘risk’ society. The authors conclude that contemporary risk regulatory regimes are very 
different, and even within a single country, uniformity in regulating risks does not 
exits.133 Going further, the authors note that the regulatory differences are so great, that 
looking at a historical ‘big picture’ of regulatory tendencies, as is done in RS literature, is 
not possible without losing too much regime context and content, and assuming a tone 
which is too generalist.134 They disagree with Beck’s assessment regarding regime 
content (risk regulation practices) being a mere factor of regime context (natural hazards 
vs. manufactured risks), and propose that a methodologically conservative approach 
needs to be implemented to provide a systematic comparative description of risk 
regulatory regimes, lest we end up with mere impressionistic explanations. Hood et al. 
however do not discount the tenets of RS entirely, and conclude: “We began this book 
by arguing that ‘risk society’ was the wrong place to start in seeking to account for 
variety in risk regulation regimes, but a dimensional analysis linking regime context to 
regime content can help us to put ‘risk society’ in its place using fairly conventional 
analytic tools.”136 Merging these angles produces a more precise depiction of those 
elements of a regime which can be dominated by technocrats and professionals, and those 
which cannot, and help sort out contextual conditions of RS from conventional forms of
1 -5*7
interest-group activity and capitalist democracy.
Mythen finds Beck’s thesis clumsy for implying that pressure groups are some 
sort of arbiters of environmental truth, and that subpolitical knowledge about risk is 
superior to information passed on by state institutions.138 In this sense, Mythen
133 Christopher Hood et al., The Government o f  Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 58.
134 Ibid.
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represents critics of Beck who ask whether Beck is misguided in believing “that truth 
about environmental risk belongs to certain organisations, and not to others.”139 
However, Beck’s enthusiasm towards subpolitical truths doesn’t stem from a doctrinal 
belief in its infallibility. Rather, his RS theories serve to emphasize the importance of 
identifying the social components, which direct and organize science and technology. 
We must confront the powers delegated to expert decision making processes the moment 
we acknowledge that the ideal of the neutral expert, who is able to calculate 
unambiguously correct answers, is a myth. Therefore, Beck’s strong convictions towards 
subpolitical knowledge is a call for the rethinking of the relationship between experts and 
citizens, in order to align scientific achievements with the objectives of the society. 
DeSario and Langton support this view by noting: “Science is most effective in achieving 
objectives, not in defining them.”140
Other critics have pointed to the largely negative overtone of ‘risk’ as a hazard 
under ‘grand theories of risk’, and the absence of its role as a positive, innovative driving 
force in modernity.141 Kemshall encourages the inclusion of positively framed risk 
definitions and productive risk taking in the context of social policies and welfare, as a 
way of promoting individual autonomy.142 The discussion surrounding constructive risk 
taking confronts “how much security the state should afford the citizen, and the 
appropriate balance between risk and security.”143 Mythen and Walklate also hint at this 
dilemma,
By cherry picking the fruits of the risk society, govemmentality and 
cultural/symbolic approaches we can gain a decent vantage point on the 
current socio-cultural context and how this itself shapes and conditions 
responses to risk. The rudimentary question remains, however, about 
what exactly people are doing with all of this. As Bauman (2000)
140 DeSario and Langton, 10.
141 Hazel Kemshall, Social Policy and Risk. In Beyond the Risk Society: Critical Reflectionson Risk and 
Human Security, ed. Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, 60-74. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
2006), 66-67.
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ponders, how do we seek biographical solutions to what are clearly 
systemic problems? (...) Is there a conceptual apparatus that might enable 
us to transcend the age-old problem of connecting individual risk 
assessments with embedded structural conditions?144 
Mythen observes, “One person’s risk may constitute another person’s pleasure.”145 
Mythen underscores the point that human beings are not inherently risk-averse, and 
questions the value of a society that would seek to completely disconnect itself from 
danger.146 Beck seems hooked on an analysis of negative risks, or lose-lose situations, 
ignoring positive risks, which may facilitate social progress.147 One missing link in 
Beck’s social analysis may be the role of individual responsibility, as the focus is laid 
heavily on institutional culpability. How do citizens as consumers influence the 
production of manufactured risks through choices? How might citizens improve RS 
conditions through facilitating better legislation? Yet another limitation of RS is in the 
bipolar categorization of risk, as Beck greatly generalizes when he draws the line
1ARbetween natural hazards, and the manufactured risks of modernity. Mythen opposes 
this clustering of risks, as he believes this to be a crude division and insufficient narrative 
of variant dangers.
Be it Beck’s description of the nature of risk, or his emphasis on institutional 
culpability, there has been mixed reaction to his RS thesis. However there has also been 
great support for the application of the RS thesis to grounded research, and empirical 
evidence supports the theory that there has been a relative rise in public risk 
consciousness, and in the perceptions that protective institutions are failing to controlling 
manufactured risks.149 Mythen comes to Beck’s defense and reminds critics that 
“progressive utopian demands are not always consonant with the rigorous requirements
144 Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate. Beyond the Risk Society: Critical Reflections on Risk and Human 
Security. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006), 235.
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of academic theory building.”150 He warns that despite the lack of empirical evidence in 
RS theory, Beck’s failure to provide hard data does not disprove his analyses of social 
trends. Mythen warns not to throw out the empirical baby along with the theoretical 
bathwater.151 Mythen concurs with Bronner:
For all its problems, the work of Ulrich Beck retains an electric quality.
Idea after idea jumps off the pages of his work. Some lack precision, 
others never receive justification, and still others contradict one another. 
Qualifications sit on top of one another; arguments disappear only to 
appear once again; fuzzy slogans compete with the claims of common 
sense. But then come the golden nuggets of dazzling insight.152 
Beck’s work has been instrumental in forcing the risk debate onto the academic agenda, 
and it has been pivotal in the evolution of cross-discipline debate between sociology, 
cultural studies, environmental studies and political science.153 Applying the RS 
framework to the politics of knowledge within Alaska’s oil regime, we gain important 
insights into the social climate of risk regulation and ultimately uncover the missing 
linkages between scientific and social rationalities of risk. Most importantly, the purpose 
of this study is to contribute to the dialogue about the changing dynamics of knowledge 
and politics regarding environmental risk.
2.4 Discussion
With the increasing number of scientific issues requiring expert advice, 
environmental policymaking has become the realm of technocrats. The discoveries of 
science and technology have, in many areas, been beneficial to humankind, but the 
omnipotence of our technology has also empowered us to achieve radical alterations of 
society.154 “If technology is viewed as instrumental, it is important to identify the social
150 Mythen (2004), 184.
151 Ibid., 183.
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mechanisms and values which direct and organize this knowledge.”155 Chapter 2 
presented an overview of the interactions of politics and science, focusing on the 
relationship between experts and citizens in the context of modem risks. The risks of 
modernity depend on decisions, because they exist as the by-products of modernization, 
and the increasing energy needs brought about by its processes. Given the highly 
technical and invisible nature of these risks, the politics of risk has emerged as the 
politics of knowledge.156 The assessment and mediation of risks requires the intervention 
of experts, leaving little room for public engagement with expert risk regimes. 
Furthermore, the extent and nature of modem risks have spatial and temporal 
consequences beyond the reach of protective institutions. For Beck, this is the central 
fault line of RS and reflexive modernization.157 This imbalance between the complexity 
of existing risks and their regulation has reached a crucial point, beyond which 
technocracy and democracy have emerged as the chief protagonists in the uses of 
scientific knowledge.158 An active, engaged democracy is key in closing the gap between 
those with, and those without knowledge, and in joining scientific and cultural 
rationalities in policies.
One of the mechanisms that allow citizens to participate in the democratization of 
science decisions is the utilizing of institutionally established avenues for inclusion. 
Such opening of technocratic administrative structures to non-expert input does not stand 
in contradiction to the tenets of RS. Beck suggests that the processes of modernization 
not only alter technology and risk definitions, but simultaneously, a political 
modernization of RS “disempowers and unbinds politics and politicizes society” in 
developed societies of the West.159 In other words, the checks built into democratic 
societies to limit the extent of centralized political powers constantly progress to fulfill
155 DeSario and Langton, 4.
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civil and constitutional rights. In the end, “the modernization process furnishes the 
gradually emerging centers and fields of action it makes possible for subpolitics.”160
The political modernization of Western democracies facilitates the progression of 
citizen-initiated knowledge, and makes possible the demonopolization of scientific 
rationality over truth definitions. In addition to using established routes of inclusion, 
citizens may also organize outside the public sphere in order to promote their truth 
definitions, and to gain inclusion in the public structuring of knowledge. The first case 
study is a great example of subpolitical push towards IK inclusion, and establishes the 
presence and importance of RS in Alaska. The history of the Alaska Native Science 
Commission highlights the importance of cultural rationalities to risk definitions in RS.
160 Beck (1992), 194.
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Chapter 3
The Pursuit of Knowledge in Alaska’s Risk Society: A Case Study
3.1 Introduction
The first case study traces the linkages between the origin of the Alaska Native 
Science Commission and Beck’s risk society thesis. This study establishes the presence 
of a RS in Alaska, and demonstrates that a RS in the Alaskan context exhibits distinctive 
features. Alaska-specific issues, such as IK, susbsitence, and Arctic contamination mold 
the relationship between expert and citizen, and set the stage for subpolitics to shape 
knowledge production. The Alaska Native stakeholders in this case fit Beck’s profile of 
reluctant consumers of risks: Arctic contaminants are an incidental problem of 
modernization, in undesirable abundance, and they must be eliminated, or denied or 
reinterpreted.161 Locals tend to interpret risks differently from experts, and they may 
constitute (at least from a cultural rationality perspective), a better system to judge 
hazards. This ideology is at the heart of the subpolitical model. The following Alaskan 
example illustrates the social changes that may take place as risk consciousness rises and 
propels local perspectives onto a global scene.
3.2 Case study: The genesis of the Alaska Native Science Commission
In order to fully understand the significance of the Alaska Native Science 
Commission (ANCS) in the context of the risk society, we must identify common 
variables in the history of the Commission, and Beck's thesis. It is important to examine 
the circumstances that prompted the establishment of the ANSC, and to look for 
similarities between ANSC's mission and Beck's notion of citizen initiated knowledge 
production, or the subpolitics of knowledge. The methodology employed to accomplish 
this task divides the case study into three sections. Section 3.2.1 examines the production 
and nature of risks through the lens of RS. Section 3.2.2 offers a scrutiny of the 
interaction between experts and citizens, and the role of scientific and cultural 
rationalities in the specific context of the case. Finally, Section 3.2.3 probes whether the
161 Beck (1992), 26.
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ANSC is a sign of Beck's subpolitics. This final analysis investigates what shape 
subpolitics has taken in the pursuit of IK inclusion and risk mediation in the case of the 
ANSC.
3.2.1 The changing pillars o f risk: Arctic hazards and the Workshop on Arctic 
Contamination
The Workshop on Arctic Contamination (WAC), held May 2-7, 1993 in 
Anchorage, Alaska was convened by the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee 
(IARPC), composed of senior officials from fourteen federal agencies that conduct and 
manage scientific activities in the Arctic, and also drew international attention, as 
participants from Norway, Russia, Canada, and organizations such as the International 
Permafrost Association, and World Wildlife Fund attended along numerous US federal 
agencies, and academic institutions. Concerns on the agenda included the atmospheric 
and oceanic circulation of pollutants, human health, the health of terrestrial and marine 
biota, and risk assessment and data management requirements for arctic contamination. 
Mandated by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA), the IARPC's mission 
has been to coordinate the planning and management of Arctic research. The purpose of 
the workshop itself was the collection of factual (i.e. objective) information for US 
government decision-makers, in support of US policy on Arctic contamination, and to 
assess "whether specific Arctic contaminants present a risk to the environment, 
ecosystems, or human health.”162 What are Arctic contaminants, and how do they 
compare with Beck’s risk definitions?
Arctic contaminants are a result of industrial processes. Contamination can occur 
as a byproduct of local activities (e.g. natural resource development, transportation, 
heating homes), but the cumulative effects of nonpoint source pollution in the Arctic is of 
increasing concern. Nonpoint source pollution is a process in which pollutants are 
transported north, long distances, via air and water currents. Heavy metals and Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs) are especially prevalent in Arctic systems. POPs are chemical
162 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC). Workshop on Arcitc 
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compounds that are resistant to environmental degradation, and bioaccumulate in living 
tissue (accumulating over time, and especially in fat tissue) through the food web. Prey 
animals therefore are particularly susceptible to accumulating these contaminants, and 
levels of POPs tend to increase the higher one moves up the food chain.163 Examples of 
POPs include pesticides, insecticides, industrial chemicals, PCBs (polychlorinated 
biphenyls) and byproducts of combustion processes.164 Human intake of POPs through 
contaminated food and water supplies is of great concern to residents of Arctic 
communities. Fish and marine mammals are important diet staples in many coastal 
communities. Foods loaded with fat such as seal and whale blubber, otherwise valued for 
their dense caloric concentration and cultural significance, accumulate high 
concentrations of contaminants. Incidentally, high fish consumption has been tied with 
high levels of POP contamination in Arctic residents: a 1987 study conducted by Laval 
University (Quebec, Canada) found that Inuit women of Northern Quebec had some of 
the highest concentrations of PCBs in breast milk in the world.165
The extent of radioactive waste pollution in soils and waters and the legacy of 
Project Chariot166 were recurring themes at the WAC workshop. Guest speaker, Native 
Elder and executive director of the Arctic Marine Resources Commission, Caleb 
Pungowiyi voiced Alaska Natives’ concerns on Arctic contamination. Pungowiyi's 
presentation revealed that Alaska Native concerns over POPs, heavy metals, radioactive 
waste, and oil spills were overwhelming, and people feared the effects of pollution on 
human health, and their subsistence way of life.
163 Norwegian Polar Institute, Contaminants. Available from:
http://npweb.npolar.no/english/subjects/Miljogiffer ; Internet; retrieved on February 24, 2010.
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breast-milk.html?pagewanted= 1 ; Internet; Retrieved on February 24, 2010.
166 Project Chariot (1958) proposed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, was a nuclear excavation 
project. It called for the detonation o f 5 nuclear devices approx.30 miles from the Inupiat village o f Point 
Hope, in order to create an artificial harbor at Cape Thompson in the Chukchi Sea. Although the plan was 
never realized, radioactive materials were released to test their effects on tundra systems. The U.S. 
Department o f  Energy conducted remedial action in 1993 to remove contaminated soil, (source: U.S. 
Department o f  Energy. Project Chariot. Available from: http://www.lm.doe.gov/Chariot/Documents.aspx; 
Internet; retrieved on February 24, 2010.)
55
The workshop revealed that the vast majority of Arctic contaminants are the result 
of manufactured risks: trace metals occur naturally in water, sediments, and organisms, 
yet the most significant pollutants, both in quantity and quality are results of industrial
i fnand agricultural activities. These activities have caused POPs to persist in the 
environment, resistant to environmental degradation, and readily transported through 
particulate matter and the food chain to faraway places where they've never even been 
used. Radionuclide contaminations from Cold War era experiments (such as Project
Chariot), as well as radioactive waste dispersed through oceanic circulation from Russian
1 68sites have polluted Alaska's soil, waters, and wildlife. These risks are often invisible, 
highly technical, and pose unpredictable environmental hazards. Beck's ‘pillars of risk’ 
(the relationship between risk, time and space, and the inadequacies of protective 
institutions) resonate well with the Workshop's agenda: first, unlike most natural hazards 
-such as floods and earthquakes, Arctic contaminants are restricted by neither time, nor 
space. Decades old nuclear activities still threaten Arctic environments; while POPs and 
radioactive pollutants from far away have reached the Arctic. Additionally, current 
institutional devices responsible for risk management are inadequate to control these 
risks, due to both the quantity of risks and the often-uncertain human and environmental 
cost. Patterns of risk production for arctic pollutants, as well as the nature of risks 
imposed upon Arctic systems support the arrival of modem risks in Alaska. With the 
arrival of modem risks come new challenges for expert systems of risk calculus, and for 
society as a whole. These new challenges often merge the political and the scientific 
spheres: evidence is mounting that new terms for public engagement need to define 
flexible relationships between experts, citizens and science in order to resolve the highly 
complex problems of RS and preserve an active democracy.
167IARPC (1993).
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3.2.2 Citizens, experts and inclusion: Diverging risk rationalities at the Workshop on 
Arctic Contamination
Based on the agenda of the workshop, Alaska Native participation was minimal, 
as the vast majority of speakers represented scientific organizations, and federal agencies. 
Pungowiyi stated that his people felt the US government has been slow in recognizing the 
importance of Arctic research, focusing too much on endeavors in Antarctica, and 
research supporting economic development. In a revealing statement, Pungowiyi voiced 
the skepticism of many towards scientific research: "Much information gap exists 
concerning scientific knowledge of the Arctic.”169 Alaska Native representatives were 
also weary of providing information and facilitating scientists, while getting what they 
felt was little, in return. They felt some clearinghouse of information was necessary in 
order to track changes, and distribute information well. As Pungowiyi remarked: "Most 
of the research is done during the summer months as the scientists come trooping to the 
north with their instruments and binoculars and see only what they wish or are requested 
to see.”170
The Anchorage Daily News, in a May 7, 1993 article titled Natives, Scientists 
Lack Trust, Alaska Leaders Ask Researchers to Listen covered the conference. The 
characterization of the conference noted that, "the communication and trust between 
Alaska Natives and government scientists have deteriorated to the point that neither is 
benefiting from the other's knowledge. That is the message a handful of Native leaders
1 71brought to the Workshop.” The article lists concerns brought to the workshop by 
Alaska Natives. Many voiced their desire to participate in research and wished to be 
recognized as valuable participants in science. Similarly, Alaska Native participants 
sought recognition for being first observers of problems, given their close cultural and 
physical proximity to the locale. The overall tone of these sessions echoed the desire for
169 IARPC (1993).
170 Ibid.
171Natalie Phillips, “Natives, Scientists Lack Trust, Alaska Leaders Ask Researchers to Listen,” Anchorage 
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inclusion in research and decision-making, and concerns about possible links existing
172between cancer rates and pollution.
As the WAC illustrates, such a systemic approach to risk assessment and 
management was bound to encounter the pitfalls of conflicting value systems: while 
officials and scientists gathered to discuss hard data for risk management and policy, 
Alaska Native representatives gathered to formulate solutions to issues crucial to cultural 
survival. Under RS conditions, the competing scientific rationality and social rationality 
clash. James specifically explores the meeting ground between science and Native 
American communities, and concludes that engineers and scientists are often socialized 
and trained to develop and apply scientific understanding and knowledge without 
consideration of "anything other than its scientific or technical accuracy.”173 Beck 
illustrates this limitation by the following example: a report issued by the German
Council of Experts on Environmental Issues (Rat der Sachverstandigen fur 
Umweltfragen) makes the claim that “the exposure of the population to lead is not 
dangerous on average,” and “only in the vicinity of industrial emitters are dangerous 
concentrations of lead sometimes found in children.” Such analysis of pollutants on 
average fails to acknowledge socially unequal risk proportions and groups and living 
conditions “for which the levels of lead and the like that are ‘on average harmless’ 
constitute a mortal danger.”174
Beck indicts the institutional methods of risk management on these grounds, for 
dehumanizing risk production: he argues that the human factor is missing from a risk 
management scheme purely concerned with formulas of natural science. When toxicity 
is defined in terms of ‘acceptable levels’, and declared safe via ‘on average’ 
measurements, it fails to acknowledge the social, cultural, and political risks of 
modernization. Furthermore, Beck is worried that discussions purely conducted through
m  Phillips (1993), B l.
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scientific terms include human beings only as organic materials, and consider nature 
without people, or matters of social and cultural significance.175
What is astonishing about that is that the industrial pollution of the 
environment and the destruction of nature, with their multifarious effects 
on the health and social life of people, which only arise in highly 
developed societies, are characterized by a loss o f social thinking. This 
loss becomes caricature -this absence seems to strike no one, not even
1 7 f>sociologists themselves.
As the WAC commenced, there were clear signs that communication and trust between 
scientists and Alaska Natives had deteriorated, and conflicting rationalities emerged. As 
the workshop concluded, Alaska Natives clearly felt the divide between their 
understanding of risks, and the official (scientific) rationale of risk.177 The unexplained 
changes in human and wildlife health, scientific evidence of harmful contaminants, and a 
lack of an information clearinghouse of environmental issues constituted a cause for 
action: time has come to participate in and influence research. As Beck points out, 
laypersons do not routinely reject expert claims, rather they "engage with scientific 
information in diverse and sometimes contradictory ways.”178 "Risk consciousness of the 
afflicted (...) is usually both critical and credulous of science.”179
3.2.3 The subpolitics o f knowledge: The Alaska Native Science Commission and the 
Traditional Knowledge and Contaminants Project
Following the Workshop on Arctic Contamination, Alaska Natives felt strongly 
about getting involved in scientific research, and being aware of the science used to 
investigate their lives and environment. In October 1993 the Alaska Federation of 
Natives (AFN) passed a unanimous resolution to establish the Alaska Native Science
1/5 Beck (1992), 24.
176 Ibid., 25.
177 Alaska Native Science Commission. History. Available from
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1 80Commission (ANSC) at their annual convention. Realizing the opportunity for 
scientists to understand the public, and vice versa, the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) provided funding to assist in the foundation of the commission. Neal Lane, NSF 
Director (1993-1998) stated:
Mutual respect opens the door for synergy between the scientific method 
and indigenous knowledge (...) NSF has taken the lead in formulating 
principles for the conduct of research in the Arctic (...) Researchers we
support are directed to consult with local communities in planning their
181work and to respect local cultural traditions.
The plans for such collaborative efforts in synthesizing local and academic knowledge
1 89envisioned joint workshops, meetings and the dissemination of data. The first series of 
workshops in 1994 included community leaders, elders, scientists, and researchers in 
order to plan the structure and mission of the ANSC.183 In March of 1997, the ANSC 
hosted the Traditional Knowledge Systems in the Arctic workshop, in order to begin the 
collaboration between scientific researchers and local residents.184 This workshop was 
convened to outline definitions of knowledge-acquisition systems, to pinpoint the 
differences between Western scientific methods and TEK. Alaska Native elders, Arctic 
scientists and researchers, policymakers, various agency managers and educators were 
present. In June of 1997, the ANSC officially installed seven commissioners 
representing six Alaskan tribes, and published several project priorities on the agenda, 
including Social Transitions in the North, Contamination of Subsistence Foods Harvest, 
and Workshops on Traditional Knowledge Systems in the Arctic.185 ANSC
180 Alaska Native Science Commission. History. Internet; Available from 
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commissioners are nominated by Alaska Native communities to serve on the Board, and 
include Native knowledge experts, educators, and scientists.
The ANSC has collaborated closely with the University of Alaska over the years. 
In the years since its formation, the ANSC has worked to integrate local and traditional 
knowledge into research and science, and to influence research priorities. Encouraging 
Alaska Natives to participate in science and research, and facilitating community 
feedback on results, the ANSC has focused on environmental health, causes of diseases 
specific to Alaska Natives (especially cancers), cultural survival, partnerships with 
agencies and researchers who have advanced Native community involvement in research, 
and active community involvement in science and research involving Native Alaskan 
communities. The ANSC coordinated the Traditional Knowledge and Contaminants 
Program (TKCP), a collaboration of traditional, and research-based knowledge, focusing 
especially on the contamination of native subsistence foods by radionuclides and POPs. 
Other projects have included a searchable, online database of traditional knowledge and 
native foods (again, as Beck observes, subpolitical groups do not reject, but make use of 
expert science and technologies), analysis of Native foods, workshops, meetings and 
publications on subsistence issues. Since 2002 the ANSC is an independent non-profit 
organization, continuing to provide the link between the scientific community and Alaska 
Native Communities.
The relationship between subpolitical organizations and expert science is not 
widely documented. Examining the goals and projects of the ANSC may shed some light 
on how citizen initiated knowledge production organizes science. Looking at the 
methodology and outcomes of the Traditional Knowledge and Contaminants Program 
(TKCP) can reveal what roles locals and experts have in a cooperative, inclusive 
knowledge production scheme. The TKCP was a collaborative pilot study between the 
University of Alaska's Institute of Social and Economic Research and the ANSC. It 
received funding from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National 
Science Foundation (NSF). The goal of the TKCP was to "build capacity among Alaska 
federally recognized tribes to address their concerns about adverse changes in the
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environment." The TKCP was a participant-based research project, aimed to provide a 
clearinghouse of information for Native communities on the safety of subsistence foods, 
and the research available on contamination of Native foods. A Tribal Review Panel, in 
ten locations, selected the participants. The project began in spring 2003, after the ANSC 
had finalized agreements and budgets with the tribes. There were seven components to 
the project, designed to increase community ownership and trust of the study:187
(1) Develop a traditional knowledge base: Through seven regional meetings, 
Native elders, hunters, youth, and Alaska Native scientists were asked to share their 
concerns in a talking circle. The talking circles were guided by local concerns rather than 
a set of questions, in order to avoid prejudging the scope of the meetings. The most 
important goal of these circles was to increase trust, and local control among the Alaska 
Native communities.
2) Develop a science-knowledge base: This component was aimed at recording 
and databasing existing research-based knowledge about contaminants and climate 
change, compiling nutritional information about Native foods, and working with the 
Subsistence Division of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game to incorporate data and 
description of activities from Native food harvests. This collection of scientific 
knowledge focused on areas of concern to locals, such as contaminant effects on human 
health, wildlife health, and took into account the differences in perceptions of risk 
between experts and Alaska Native communities. The team hoped that the synthesis of 
traditional and science-based knowledge would result in a "consensus action agenda, and 
an integrated approach to helping tribes address their concerns about environmental 
change.”188
3) Develop an integrated database: This step of the project was designed to make 
available both traditional knowledge and science-based knowledge about contaminants 
and subsistence foods, in the form of an online, computerized database.
186 University o f Alaska Anchorage (UAA) Institute o f  Social and Economic Research. (ISER). TKCP 
Final Report (2004). Available from http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/TKRadionuclides.pdf; 
Internet; retrieved on February 25, 2010.
187 UAA ISER (2004), 1.
188 UAA ISER (2004), 56.
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4) Develop a web-based resource guide for tribes wishing to act on their concerns: 
This component of the project provided tribes "on-demand" technical assistance with 
environmental concerns, and started a mini-grant program.
5) Design and implement a pilot program of mini-grants to tribes: The EPA had 
funded a mini-grant program, administered by the ANSC, in order to aid tribes in getting 
started in research. The mini-grant program was meant to complement other EPA grants, 
and was designed for ease of use.
6) Based on the mini-grant experience, recommend ways to support tribal actions: 
The mini-grant experiment served as a tool in making future recommendations for 
funding of tribal research activities, and the level of interaction with tribes.
7) Share the experience, and conclusions with Native communities, scientists, and 
agencies.
The TKCP pilot project was groundbreaking in its community-based, holistic 
approach. The ANSC and the University of Alaska Institute on Social and Economic 
Research prepared a final report on the TKCP project. The documentation of IK in the 
final product, a searchable database, contains verbatim input from Alaska Native 
participants, and includes information about changes in animals, plants and fish and their 
behaviors:
Why are our people getting sick? A young kid came to my office. He had 
been looking for ivory across the east side of Kotzebue Sound. He found 
two mud sharks which still had meat. The sea gulls wouldn't eat them and 
you know sea gulls will eat anything (...) This summer we had no 
sockeye. The sockeye they were catching up the river in June, they had
1 O Q
tumors, they were deformed. Some had only one eye, some had bumps.
In their final report, the team compiled their recommendations for strategies to improve 
participant research in Alaskan Native communities. Based on the TKCP experience, the 
team made the following observations: the unique cultural and sociological aspects of 
each community involved presented unforeseen challenges, such as slowed
189 UAAISER (2004), 9-12.
63
communication due to technological challenges, and delayed decision making due to 
conflicting schedules of members. Personnel turnovers, political changes, illness, and 
limited human resource pool for sampling also were factors in the success of the 
project.190 The TKCP final report includes an extensive analysis of these challenges. 
The TKCP was an ambitious undertaking, resulting in a unique collaboration of agencies, 
communities and individuals. Its final product, a searchable Traditional Knowledge and 
Native Foods191 database is a useful tool of empowerment against modem risks. 
Although the information contained in the database cannot ease the risk burden of local 
communities (especially so with regards to nonpoint source pollution), in the RS thesis 
knowledge equals power. As science becomes less and less sufficient for the “socially 
binding definition of truth”, the new, public-oriented experts and alternate forms of 
knowledge can initiate a demonopolization of scientific knowledge claims.192 The 
“equalization tendencies in the gradient of rationality between experts and laypeople” 
brings about a decline of the power of technocracy, and its usual parameters of power 
(modernity vs. tradition, experts vs. laypeople).193 In such a climate, the complexity of 
risk decisions requires an approach in which scientific and social rationalities are 
resolved.
In RS, we have to redefine the definitions of wealth and progress in the context of 
risk, and make decisions about how we want to live. The TKCP project allowed Alaska 
Native communities to have ownership in the study, and proved that a holistic approach 
to risk assessment, through the collaboration of local and research-based knowledge, not 
only builds understanding, but also improves the quality of science used: community- 
level involvement enhances data collection, and it fills the social and cultural gaps in 
technocratic science.
190 UAA ISER(2004), 64.
191 The database may be found at http://www.nativeknowledge.org/login.asp
192 Beck (1992), 156.
193 Beck (1992), 165,
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3.3 Discussion
The conditions and circumstances for the Workshop on Arctic Contaminants of 
1993, and the subsequent rise of the ANSC support the existence of the risk society in 
Alaskan politics. The birth of the ANSC exhibits telltale signs of the risk society: 
manufactured risks, and the pillars of risk -as discussed earlier. Beck connects politics 
and science through the dialogue over modem risks: "Risk has become an intellectual and 
political web across which thread many strands of discourse related to the slow crisis of 
modernity and industrial society.”194 The WAC merged intellectual and political 
discourses as scientists and political agencies assembled to advise public policy related to 
risks. Clearly, existing protective institutions, and the public have conflicting 
rationalities at times. Through reforming knowledge production, and community 
involvement, as we see through the life of the ANSC, stakeholders may seek alternate 
routes of political engagement. Subpolitics offers such direct route to political 
engagement for stakeholders. Beck notes that during the subpolitical discourse, as 
groups, and communities take on direct leadership roles in environmental politics, the 
hegemony of dominant institutions is penetrated by new types of conflicts and coalitions 
between and within institutions, parties, interest groups and the public.195 The birth of 
the ANSC has indeed resulted in new collaborative efforts, and new coalitions in 
knowledge production.
As this historical overview of the ANSC suggests, environmental politics is 
malleable to alternative actions, and waves or reform. Naturally, subpolitics requires 
supporting norms and institutions within a democratic society, such as right to free 
speech, assembly, and a critical press. Dominant institutions may in fact be supporting of 
such direct participation. Beck describes this new political culture, as a reality in which 
“heterogenous centers of sub-politics have an effect on the process of politically forming 
and enforcing decisions, on the basis of utilized constitutional rights.”196 It seems that 
environmental subpolitics is one way to take ownership for the world we live in when RS
194 Beck (1992), 3.
195 Beck (1999), 92.
196 Beck (1992), 194.
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conditions are present. There may not exist a single, perfect method for combating the 
risks of industrialization, but the inclusion of subpolitical groups may fill some of the 
gaps that exist in expert risk calculus. Groups such as the ANSC may not only bring to 
the table cultural definitions for risk, but can boost the scientific database of hard data on 
ecosystem changes. The genesis of the ANSC establishes the presence of RS in Alaska, 
and attests to the power of subpolitical groups to elevate their risk consciousness to the 
public space. The TKCP project highlights ways in which alternate knowledge and 
expert science can interact and mutually benefit, by providing a glimpse into RS in the 
Alaskan context: Alaska Native people and experts need to engage each other through 
science in order to combat the Arctic risks that threaten health and the traditional way of 
life.
As an added benefit, the published findings of such community-based research 
make available local risk experiences to global audiences. As local knowledge and 
experiences are shared among distant communities, groups with similar risk experiences 
and cultural backgrounds may leam from each other, and extrapolate information 
otherwise not available. Common observations and experiences of locals pooled from 
within a wider geographic radius could, perhaps, be helpful in combating the 
uncertainties surrounding the science of modem risks. For instance, the causality 
between contaminants and illness often remains uncertain and tentative. As Beck 
suggests: “presumptions of causality escape our perception (...) they must always be 
imagined, implied to be true, believed. In this sense too, risks are invisible.”197 Perhaps 
collaboration among communities can reduce the uncertainties, and increase the visibility 
of risks. For example, the Laval University study on contaminants in Northern Quebec 
Inuit women’s breast milk and their exposure to PCBs (see Section 3.2.1) may be a 
valuable resource for a comparative study of PCB levels in Alaskan Inupiat subsistence 
foods and breast milk. Similarities and differences found in pollution trends may 
contribute to the overall understanding of Arctic risks and possible links to health effects. 
The benefits of shared knowledge motivated the founding of several pan-regional
197 Beck (1992), 28.
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subpolitical entities. The Inuit Circumpolar Council was established in 1977 to advocate 
for all Inuit and their IK, and it is dedicated to organizing the international Inuit 
community in response to “increasing attacks on the Inuit way of life, environment, and
human rights that were initiated by industry, states, and others with interests in the
1 08Arctic.” These transnational actors are part of what Beck calls ‘global subpolitics’, a 
process of globalization from below, in which a world public appears, and organizes to 
challenge established political institutions.199 As pollution and risks are globalized, they 
begin to shape and facilitate the creation of international organizations, both within and 
outside of nation-state politics.
Knowledge equals power in RS not only because it may change individual risk 
consumption patterns, but also because it can reorganize power and authority: averting 
and managing modem risks becomes a political issue due to the social, economic and 
political consequences of side effects, such as mammoth costs, legal proceedings and 
collapsing markets.200 The next two case studies draw attention to the competing 
political, economic, and cultural imperatives that drive stakeholders to seek authority 
over risk decisions.
198 Inuit Circumpolar Council. Activities and Initiatives. Available from
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/section.php?ID=12&Lang=En&Nav=Section ; Internet; retrieved on February 
25,2010.
199 Beck (1999), 37.
200 Beck (1992), 24.
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Chapter 4
Indigenous Knowledge and Oil Resource Development in Alaska: Case
Studies
4.1 Introduction
The first case study set forth some of the challenges in risk management posed by 
the processes of modernization. It also revealed one of the main dilemmas of RS: new 
types of risks have simultaneously global and local consequences. The Workshop on 
Arctic Contamination revealed that a significant portion of the contaminants found in 
Arctic environments are carried from faraway places, and are the result of long-distance 
irresponsibility, because manufactured risks are not restricted by the same spatial and 
temporal boundaries as natural hazards are. Thus the RS thesis suggests that, ultimately, 
there is no escape from the catastrophic potential of modem risks, and the widespread 
pollution from POPs underscores this proposal. However, the industrial processes that 
are responsible for modem risks also threaten communities near these risk production 
sites. Residents living in close proximity to point source pollution face increased hazards 
in many cases. The second and third case studies deal with such localized hazards. 
These risks, like the ones discussed in the first case study, also fall under the collective 
umbrella of manufactured risks. However, the focus is on decision-contingent, local risks 
resulting from local risk production processes, and the politics of risk decisions. This 
chapter examines Alaska’s oil resource policies concerning environmental risk 
management, and the use of science within state administrative agencies in order to 
assess the role of oil policy development on the progression of RS in Alaska. In 
particular, these case studies investigate the role of IK in policy decisions, with regards to 
North Slope oil resources.
The chapter begins with a brief history of oil policy development in Alaska, and 
an overview of the public process at state departments today. The case studies follow the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 1.2 and also employed in the first case study. Both 
cases are first assessed for their risk contents, followed by a narrative of the expert- 
citizen relations, and conclude with an examination of the subpolitical pushback.
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4.2 Overview of Alaska’s oil administration regime
Oil development in Alaska is administered through a multi-tiered management 
process, which includes federal oversight where applicable, state-federal cooperative 
arrangements, state governance, and local (borough, city) involvement. This chapter 
intends to uncover existing institutional arrangements, which provide a platform for 
public participation in this process. In order to provide an analysis of the flow of 
information from citizens to policymakers, this discussion demonstrates the broad 
spectrum of authorities involved in the process, but does not aim to give a comprehensive 
list of all laws and regulations applicable to oil operations. The purpose of this section is 
to re-examine the history of the politics of oil in Alaska in order to give a background for 
the development of RS to be discussed in two case studies in Chapters 4.3 and 4.4. Its 
focus lies more on the relationships between state, petroleum industry and citizens, and 
less on offering a comprehensive account of policy development, because this approach 
respects the qualifications necessary to analyze the progress of RS in Alaska, since the 
RS thesis is a scrutiny of relationships as opposed to end products. This section 
concludes by providing a map of the current public input process at state departments. 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to provide a glimpse into the evolution of interactions 
among stakeholders in Alaska over an extended period of time in order to lay the 
foundation for the arrival of RS in Alaska’s oil management regime.
The Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is the primary agency 
charged with administering oil exploration and development on state lands. The 
commissioner is the chief executive officer in the department, in charge of establishing 
resource management policies (in accordance with state statutes and legislation), and of
901directing departmental resource management programs. The Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC) is also involved in several permitting processes in 
accordance with its missions to conserve, improve and protect Alaska’s natural resources 
and the environment. The Department of Fish and Game (DF&G), and the Alaska Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) are also involved in the permitting
201 State o f  Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency. “Handbook on Alaska State Government,” available from 
http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/handbook.pdf; Internet; retrieved on September 24, 2008.
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process, and are also included in this discussion. The Alaska Department of Labor and 
Workplace Development, the Alaska Department of Public Safety Division of Fire 
Prevention, and the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities also have 
authority in enforcing safety codes and regulations in the licensing process, however 
these agencies will not be discussed here for they are not as relevant to the public input 
process in the management of environmental risks as are the DNR and DEC. For an 
overview of state agencies involved in the permitting process, see Figure 1 titled 
“Generalized Permit Process.”
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Figure 1: Generalized Permit Process202
202 Alaska DNR Division o f Oil and Gas. Generalized Permit Process. Available from 
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/products/publications/cookinlet/ciaw_2009_final_finding/CI%20Prelim 
BIF%20Chap07-GovPwrs.pdf, page 7-4; Internet.
70
4.2.1 Synopsis o f the State o f Alaska’s oil policy development
A brief historical overview of oil in Alaska, and related policy development is 
necessary in order to understand the current state of legislation.203 Prior to the 1957 
discovery of oil at Swanson River on the Kenai Peninsula, concerns over the economic 
viability of Alaska marred its campaign as a potential new state to the US. Despite 
efforts from groups of individual speculators as well as companies, Alaskan oil wells did 
not produce in commercial quantities. Multinational oil corporations could find and 
produce oil cheaper elsewhere. During the first half of the 20th century, oil exploration in 
the Cold Bay region, in the Copper River Basin area, and on the northern coast of the 
Gulf of Alaska disappointed developers. However, based on the geological descriptions 
of the US Geological Survey (USGS), and under the urging of President Harding, 
Congress set aside 25 million acres of land in the North Slope in 1923. This area is 
known today as the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPRA). The taking of vast 
tracts of land has been a controversial issue with the Arctic Slope Inupiat communities 
who had inhabited this region for thousands of years, due to the lack of negotiations over 
aboriginal land rights.204
It wasn’t until the discovery of oil in the Swanson River area of the Kenai 
Peninsula, that Alaska began its history as an oil state. Ritchfield Oil Corporation filed 
lease application in the Swanson River area, and by 1955 filed for an exploration unit 
with the USGS. This area of interest was situated within the Kenai National Moose 
Range, and prior approval of development from the US Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS) was required. In spite of protests from the National Wildlife Federation, the 
USGS and USFWS authorized development, and drilling began in 1957. Early tests 
showed that the Swanson River fields contained oil in commercial quantities. This 
discovery prompted a new land rush to Alaska, and gave sizeable support to Alaska’s
203 This section follows McBeath et al., pp. 23-53.
204 Eben Hopson Memorial Archives. Mayor Eben Hopson's testimony before the Berger Inquiry on the 
experience o f  the Arctic Slope Inupiat with oil and gas Development in the Arctic. 1976. Available from 
http://www.ebenhopson.com/papers/1976/BergerSpeech.html; Internet; retrieved on February 26, 2010.
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statehood campaign. During this time, the number of new applications for leases, and the 
sudden massive interest in Alaska’s development revealed the lack of existing regulation.
The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1955 created the Alaska Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (AOGCC). Abolished in 1959, the Legislature created the 
new Commission in 1979 to protect the state’s interest in total ultimate recovery. The 
Commission is a quasi-judicial agency, housed within the Department of Administration. 
The Commission functions as a regulatory agency overseeing underground operations of 
Alaska’s oil industry on private and public lands and waters. The mission of the AOGCC 
is “to protect the public interest in exploration and development of oil and gas resources, 
ensuring conservation practices, and increasing ultimate recovery, while protecting 
health, safety, the environment, and property rights.”205
Drilling permits for all oil and gas wells in Alaska need to be obtained from the 
AOGCC. AOGCC orders require a 30-day public comment period. The limited 
legislation in existence at this point included the Alaska Oil Conservation Act to regulate 
well spacing, a maximum economic recovery policy, and two oil and gas taxes designed 
to fund the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.206 The last session of the 
territorial legislature passed the Alaska Land Act, providing competitive lease bidding on 
three classes of land (the 1 million-acre Congress-granted Mental Health Lands, 
University of Alaska lands, and tidal and submerged lands lying within specified 
parameters of high tide). Following Statehood in 1958, Alaska obtained through 
Congress the right to all subsurface minerals within its land grant. In its first state 
legislative session, the state legislature addressed the pressing issues of competitive and 
noncompetitive lease bidding, royalty paid to the state, and tax rates. Thanks in part to an 
active industry involvement in these early regulation efforts, and in part to an 
impoverished state eager to develop its natural resources, oil-related policies were written 
with the industry’s interest in mind. For example, royalty to be paid to the state was set
205 Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. “Mission,” available from 
http://www.state.ak.us/admin/ogc/WhoWeAre/mission.shtml; Internet; retrieved on October 1, 2008.
206 McBeath et al., 27, quoting Jack Roderick, Crude Dreams: A Personal History o f  Oil and Politics in 
Alaska (Fairbanks: Epicenter Press, 1997), 99-100.
207 McBeath et al., 28.
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at a remarkably low percentage compared with other geographical locations, and the cost 
of transporting the oil from well to refinery was deducted from the oil’s value.208 State 
bureaucracy was still immature and willing to compromise with industry in hopes of 
bolstering state finances. Indeed, by 1967 oil was the number one income generator in 
the state.
The next significant event in the economic history of Alaska placed it on the map 
as an oil-producing giant, and set the course for major political changes in the new state. 
The discovery of oil on the North Slope in 1968 set into motion a powerful chain of 
events, with an aftermath that altered the state’s economic, social and political landscapes 
permanently. One of the most significant factors in bringing about such change was the 
issue of Native land claims settlement. In the 1958 Statehood Act, Congress reaffirmed 
Alaska Natives’ land rights originally set forth in the Alaska Organic Act of 1884. The 
Organic Act aimed to protect the rights of Alaska Natives to lands, which were in their 
individual and actual use or occupancy; however no legal distinctions were made with 
regards to vast land areas of tribal property.209 The legal confusion surrounding much of 
the concept of ownership was at the time, and today still is deeply rooted in cultural 
differences. For example, for Alaska Native ancestors and descendants, ownership 
embodies a concept “entirely different from that of western society, yet equally valid (...) 
The point then was not that the land belonged to the Natives, but rather that the Natives 
belonged to the land.”210
Through the Statehood Act, Congress authorized the state to select up to 102.5 
million acres of vacant public lands in Alaska, but mandated that Alaska and its people 
“forever disclaim all right and title...to any lands and property (including fishing rights), 
the right or title which may be held by Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.”211 As the new state 
began the process of land selections, Alaska Native claims grew to 122 million acres by
208 McBeath et al., 29.
209 David S. Case, and David A.Voluck. Alaska Natives and American Laws. (Fairbanks: UA Press,
2002) ,7 .
210 Case and Voluck, 174-175 quoting Ann Fienup-Riordan, Papers Prepared for Overview Round Table 
Discussions Alaska Native Review Commission”(February 27 to March 16, 1984, Anchorage, AK.
Archived at the University o f  Alaska Rasmuson Library in Fairbanks).
21'Case and Volcuk, 56-57.
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1951; and by 1966, 150 million acres of state nominated land tracts drew protests by 
Alaska Natives. A complete history of this period of initial land selections, and the 
complex legal matter of aboriginal title, are beyond the scope of the thesis.213 In 
summary, the legal tug-of-war between the state and Alaska Native peoples over land 
rights had a huge influence on oil production and legislation, and brought about a 
landmark piece of legislation, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 
1971 after the following events described below:
U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall issued a land freeze in 1966 in order 
to suspend any further approval of state land selections, due to the issue of contested land 
rights. The future of oil production was uncertain. But by this time, the state had been 
granted tentative approval of some selected land in the Arctic Slope area, and began 
development. Then in 1968, ARCO (Atlantic Richfield company) discovered good- 
quality oil in the Prudhoe Bay, in quantities never before seen in the Western 
Hemisphere. The ensuing interest in North Slope leases, and their increased value 
prompted the state to sell all its leases in the area, and the owners with the major leases 
(ARCO, Exxon, BP) began planning the method for transporting crude oil to out-of-state 
markets. As the plans for a pipeline and an all-Alaska route began to take shape, the 
resulting 800 mile-long route from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez was to cross areas of Alaska 
Native land claims, as well as federal lands. Congressional resolution of land claims 
became urgent as the state began to seek federal and state permits for the construction of 
a pipeline. ANCSA was enacted December 18, 1971 endorsing land title to 44 million 
acres of land and approximately $1 billion, to be managed by twelve for-profit Alaska 
Native regional corporations. These twelve regional corporations were also granted 
subsurface land rights. A complete analysis of the Claims Act is not possible here, but in 
short, it converted communal, aboriginal claims of Alaska Natives into private property 
rights through shares of stock in over 200 various Native regional, village and group
212 McBeath et al., 31, quoting Alaska Division o f Lands, 1966 Annual Report.
213 For more information on aboriginal title, and land selections o f this period see McBeath et al., 23-56, 
and Case and Voluck, 44-63.
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corporations.214 Section 4 of ANCSA also extinguished aboriginal claims. Land 
allocations were based on population size, and larger villages and regions received more
'J 1 c
land. With regards to land in the oil-producing North Slope, village corporations 
(without subsurface mineral rights) were allowed to select their estate within the National 
Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (NPRA). However, the local regional Native corporations 
were prohibited from selecting the subsurface of these lands due the area’s reserve status 
for possible oil production.216
The cultural shock of such an abstract, western economic-scheme was immense, 
as the idea of land as corporate asset was alien to Alaska Native culture and organization. 
Alaska Native individuals, who up to this point were used to identify themselves by tribal 
ancestry, now found themselves identified as “shareholders.” Additionally, residents of 
some areas with an otherwise homogenous cultural base found themselves divided into 
multiple corporations, and therefore divided as shareholders with vested interests in
717separate corporate entities. ANCSA was a complex, pivotal piece of legislation, 
bringing with it compromises and a good amount of confusion to guarantee its future 
amendments and restructuring due to highly intricate provisions.
Following ANCSA, authorization of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) 
faced additional hurdles. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 had 
put in place review processes to determine the environmental impacts of proposed federal 
actions (and alternatives for these actions), through the filing of environmental impact 
statements (EIS). The final EIS of the TAPS project was finished in 1972, and 
incorporated Department of Environmental Conservation’s design requirement that the 
pipeline be elevated in areas of unstable soils, such as permafrost. Approval of TAPS did 
not occur until 1973 however, when Congress passed the authorization act despite 
protests from an influential environmental coalition. Major international developments,
214 Case and Voluck, 157.
215 Ibid., 161.
216 Ibid., 159.
217 For example, Alutiiq Native people o f the Kodiak Island area may hold shares in Afognak Native 
Corporation, or Uganik Native Group, Inc. depending on place o f residence.
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especially the Arab oil embargo and ensuing oil crisis, played a major role in swinging 
the political pendulum towards economic, as opposed to environmental considerations.
While the federal legislative branch debated over the authorization of TAPS, 
regulation and taxation of oil revenues became a battleground between the state and 
interested oil companies. The pressure in Alaska to negotiate with oil companies grew 
due to the uncertainties resulting from the Arab oil embargo, and the economic urgency 
to finalize the exact terms of oil-derived state revenues. By the time the 1973 legislative 
session debated contested issues such as an adjustable, right-of-way leasing fee for use of 
the pipeline, and a cents-per-barrel tax on oil companies, the state could no longer 
withstand lengthy legal battles in the face of strong industry opposition. Governor Egan 
prepared a compromised proposal for legislative consideration, one that saw the right-of- 
way leasing fee repealed. This period of oil policy development in Alaska, much like 
that of the 1950s, was characterized by a lack of legislative expertise, and economic 
pressures resulting in industry-tailored regulations. Because the atmosphere favored 
quick development, things progressed quickly; pipeline construction began in 1974 and 
oil began to flow in 1977.
A later attempt to reform the way oil companies were taxed by increasing 
Alaska’s capacity to assess oil taxes based on local profitability, as opposed to the 
companies’ global earnings, failed. This so-called “separate accounting” tax reform 
initially gained momentum in the profitable economic climate of 1978, partly due to the 
national political mood in the wake of Watergate politics. The legislation drew instant 
legal challenge from oil companies, and ended up in Supreme Court. Due in part to 
shifting legislative powers in Congress favoring Republican agendas, and in part to 
concerns over losing the case, Governor Hammond sponsored legislative repeal of the 
separate accounting tax. The repeal then passed state legislature in 1981. In 1985 the 
court ruled in favor of separate accounting, but the state did not reinstate the tax.
Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, attitudes toward the oil industry 
changed enough to fix a legislative loophole, which up until that point allowed profitable 
Prudhoe Bay wells to claim tax breaks based on the Economic Limit Factor (ELF), a law
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designed to help develop marginal oil fields. However, despite the atmosphere favoring 
environmental legislation and increased taxing, significant reforms were not likely by this 
time due to the declining production value of Prudhoe Bay wells threatening loss of oil 
investments in the state. The debate over oil investment and state revenues has shifted to 
the issue of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, a nearly 20 million acre 
refuge spanning multiple ecological regions. The refuge was established in 1960, and 
originally included nearly 9 million acres of land. This number increased to nearly 20 
million acres following the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) 
of 1980, with nearly all of the land receiving wilderness status, except for a 1.2 million 
acre coastal area known as “Area 1002.” ANILCA left the door ajar for pro-development 
decisions in the future. Section 1002 allowed for investigation of the area’s oil and gas 
potential, but required Congressional action for authorization of oil and gas leasing and 
development. The debate over drilling has been ongoing ever since, with wilderness 
advocates having the upper hand, because it is always easier to block policy change, than 
to bring it about. A policy change in this case would require that pro-drilling advocates 
successfully set oil development on the agenda, and see it through the implementation 
phase.
ANILCA also added significance to the development of public input process in 
Alaska. Title VIII of ANILCA authorize rural Alaska residents to take wild renewable 
resources for subsistence purposes, while the overall administrative scheme of ANILCA 
required the state to set up a system of local advisory committees and regional advisory 
councils.218 The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) implements this 
scheme, formulates management plans to support the constitutional mandate to maintain 
fish and game populations on sustained yield principles and ensures that the 81 local 
advisory committees and the general public “are provided an opportunity to participate in 
the state’s regulatory process.”219 The 81 regional advisory committees provide local 
forums to discuss fish and wildlife issues, and to develop regulatory proposals for
218 Case and Voluck, 272, 289.
219 Alaska Department o f  Fish & Game. “Boards Support,” available from 
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/bbs/index.php, Internet; retrieved on July 23, 2008.
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submission to the appropriate Board. In addition, these local committees are tasked with
99ftadvising the appropriate regional council on resources.
In sum, the history of oil-relevant policy in Alaska tells of a state dependent on 
oil firms for jobs, development of infrastructure, capital and access to world markets due 
to its lack of diversified economies.221 McBeath et al. point to the easy access of oil 
industry lobbyists to legislators, and a public supportive of economic development as 
signs of a powerful oil industry, poised to gain favorable tax terms and high profits in the 
new state, but with a few caveats to their dominance: first, the oil industry has benefited 
most under a Republican controlled legislature, while it found the political mood more 
adversarial in the Democrat-lead sate. Second, oil companies lost their dominance during 
periods of eco-disasters, and the ensuing mobilization of opposition, such as the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill and its aftermath, making it more difficult to conduct closed-door talks 
with bureaucrats.222 In addition, federal involvement during the early years of 
development diversified the list of stakeholders, and with multiple interests involved the
9 9 -2
oil industry was forced to compete under greater pressure. The policy development of 
ANCSA well illustrates this point.
Declining oil production and revenues have influenced petroleum tax policy from 
the 1990s up until today. As the petroleum industry began looking for avenues to finance 
its endeavors and stay in business, so too the state has been promoting oil field 
investments; causing the relationship between state and the oil industry to shift towards
224one of accommodation, negotiation, and bargaining. In this process there has been a 
significant loss of transparency, as state agencies have achieved a stronger institutional
9 9 c
capacity to bargain directly with industry, but often in closed-door talks.
220 Alaska Department o f  Fish and Game. “Boards Support,’’available from 
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/advisory/index.php, Internet; retrieved on July 23, 2008.
221 McBeath et al., 52.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., 53.
224 Ibid., 105.
225 Ibid.
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4.2.2 State departments and the public process today
The idea of participatory democracy has a strong tradition in US politics.226 The 
benefits of participation stem from community-level involvement, through which citizens 
and officials alike are educated about their communities.227 This section provides an 
overview of public avenues in Alaska’s oil administration regime, and the mechanism 
they provide for public input. This is an analysis of the inclusion process at the state 
altitude, at the two state agencies, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR), 
and the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) that oversee the bulk 
of permitting procedures in oil development.
Department of Natural Resources (DNR')
Within the DNR’s Division of Oil and Gas, the Exploration Incentives Program 
allows the DNR Commissioner to adjust royalties reserved to the state, in order to 
encourage production on otherwise uneconomical fields or pools. The preliminary 
findings and decision made by the Commissioner in response to an application filed 
under the royalty modification legislation are given public notice of a 30-day public 
comment period. Additionally, the Commissioner is to offer to appear before the 
Legislative Budget and Audit Committee to provide a review of the Findings and 
Determination and administrative process of the royalty modification.228 Interested 
organizations and individuals may provide input during the public comment period. The 
Commissioner will prepare a summary of public comments and a “Final Findings and 
Determination” once these requirements for public and legislative input are met.
The Exploration Licensing Program evaluates proposals submitted to the agency 
to conduct exploratory activities. According to the program’s website:
Within 30 days of receiving any proposal, the commissioner will either 
reject it in a written decision or give public notice of the intent to evaluate
226 Jeffrey M. Berry, The Rise o f  Citizen Groups. In Civic Engagement in American Democracy, ed. Theda 
Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, 367-393. (Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 1999), 367.
227 Ibid.
228 Alaska Department o f Natural Resources, Division o f  Oil and Gas. “Exploration Incentives Program,” 
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/incentives/incentives.htm. Retrieved on September 24, 2008.
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the proposal's acceptability. This notice will solicit public comments on 
the proposal(s) and request competing proposals. The commissioner may 
also modify any proposal and request a new one based on those 
modifications.229
After reviewing all public comments, and submitted proposals, the commissioner will 
issue a written “Best Interest Finding” determining whether granting the exploration 
license is in the state’s best interest.
The Division of Oil and Gas conducts competitive oil and gas lease sales on state 
lands through its Lease Sale Program, and submits its Five-Year Oil and Gas Leasing 
Program to the Alaska Sate Legislature each January per AS 38.05.180.230 This section 
also coordinates the public and agency review of proposed sale areas, and develops the 
Best Interest Findings, as well as the Alaska Coastal Management Program consistency
231findings. The sale of oil and gas leases is the initial step in the process that generates 
the majority of the state’s income. According to the DNR website:
Prior to a lease sale there is ample opportunity for individuals, 
organizations and agencies to comment on potential impacts of oil and gas 
exploration, development and transportation, and for agencies to consider 
these impacts. In response to comments received, and as a result of its own 
analysis, the Division of Oil and Gas develops mitigation measures 
designed to eliminate or reduce potential negative impacts that might 
occur. The division director then determines, in writing, whether or not it 
is in the state’s best interest to proceed with a sale.232
229 Alaska Department o f Natural Resources, Division o f Oil and Gas. “Exploration Licensing Program,” 
available from http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/licensing/licensing.htm. Internet; retrieved on 
August 7, 2008.
230 Alaska Department o f  Natural Resources, Division o f Oil and Gas. “Lease Sale Program,” available 
from http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/programs/leasesales/leasesales.htm. Internet; retrieved on 
September 24, 2008.
231 State o f Alaska Legislative Affairs Agency. “Handbook on Alaska State Government,” available from 
http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/handbook.pdf; Internet; retrieved on September 24, 2008.
232Alaska Department o f  Natural Resources, Division o f Oil and Gas. ’’Introduction,” available from 
http://www.dog.dnr.state.ak.us/oil/products/publications/otherreports/5year99/5year99_intro.htm. Internet; 
retrieved on September 29, 2008.
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Another division, the Division of Coastal and Ocean Management (DCOM) is 
responsible for the overall administration and management of the Alaska Coastal 
Management Program (ACMP). The ACMP was implemented by Alaska legislation in 
1977 as the state’s effort to create a voluntary partnership with the Coastal Zone 
Management Act passed by Congress in 1972. This individual state program is designed 
to manage coastal resources (such as petroleum resources), and to improve stewardship 
of Alaska’s natural resources. Chapter 4.3 offers an in-depth case study of the ACMP 
and its implications on the public process.
The Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP) was signed into law in Section 
384 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-58). The CIAP is another 
example of a voluntary, joint federal-state partnership. Under the CLAP, the Secretary of 
the Interior is authorized to distribute federal funds to Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil 
and gas producing states in order to mitigate the impacts of OCS oil and gas activities.233 
The Act provides that 35% of each OCS producing state’s share of the funds will be 
distributed among its Coastal Political Subdivisions (the local political subdivision 
immediately below the level of state government, including counties, parishes, and 
boroughs).234 The State of Alaska has eight Coastal Political Subdivisions meeting the 
criteria to receive CIAP funds, to include the Municipality of Anchorage, Bristol Bay 
Borough, Kenai Peninsula Borough, Kodiak Island Borough, Lake and Peninsula 
Borough, Matanuska-Susitna Borough, North Slope Borough, and Northwest Arctic 
Borough.
The State of Alaska, and its eight Coastal Political Subdivisions may submit their 
project proposals each year to the Department of the Interior, Minerals Management 
Service through the DNR’s Division of Ocean and Coastal Management. The 
development of the state’s CIAP Program Plan must be carried out with public
233Alaska Department o f  Natural Resources, Division o f Coastal and Ocean Management. “Coastal Impact 
Assistance Program,” available from http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/coastal/CIAP/ciap.htm. Internet; retrieved 
on August 7, 2008.
234 Alaska Department o f  Natural Resources, Division o f Coastal and Ocean Management. “State of 
Alaska CIAP Final Plan,” available from
http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/coastaFCIAP/ALASKA%20CIAP%20-FINAL%20PLAN.pdf; Internet; 
Retrieved on September 30, 2008.
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participation, and be open to public comments per CIAP’s authorizing legislation. The 
governor of each state must certify and detail in writing the public participation process 
that preceded the final plan. Generally speaking, this public participation includes a 30- 
day public comment period, and a public meeting. In addition, interested individuals and 
organizations may participate at their local Coastal Political Subdivisions in the drafting 
of project proposals. In 2008 the Northwest Arctic Borough, which consists of eleven 
Inupiat villages and is Alaska’s second largest borough, proposed two projects designed 
to enhance public participation, and to increase the role of local knowledge in decision­
making. The projects are titled “Improving Public Involvement for Implementation in 
Federally Approved Plans”, and “Village-Based Environmental Monitoring to Protect 
Coastal Areas.”
The Division of Mining, Land and Water is involved if an operation uses 
significant amounts of water. Public input in the form of comments, or objections 
regarding water appropriations is handled through this unit. Figure 2 titled “Department 
of Natural Resources: Public Input Process in Oil and Gas Development Management” 
provides a visual guide to the existing avenues for public input at the DNR. It shows that 
DNR’s divisions accept public comments for review and this method is the status quo for 
direct citizen participation in agency decisions. This is a mechanism that is promoted by 
numerous state agencies, and is often used by citizens. However, this method of civil 
engagement exhibits signs of technocratic institutionalization of knowledge. The 
administrative agency holds a monopoly over ultimate truth claims - public comments 
and industry proposals bottleneck at the top on the desk of high ranking experts, who 
possess a great deal of discretion in making final determinations. The only recourse 
citizens have by which to counter these expert decisions, is to raise objections with the 
same agency and elevate the matter for final review by the highest ranking expert: the 
agency’s own Commissioner, or seek a legal resolution through the court system. 
Stakeholders may also participate in their local governments, where public face-to-face 
meetings are often used in the uptake of citizen input. Such public engagement can
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increase the reciprocity of the expert-citizen relationship by allowing for two-way 
communication between policy makers and citizens.
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC)
In order to obtain a permit for an operation to drill in an area where oil may be 
found, a DEC oil discharge prevention and contingency plan approval must be submitted 
and approved.235 The Division of Spill Prevention and Response is charged with 
oversight of this process. Before the approval of such a plan, the DEC publishes a public 
notice for comments on the proposed permit, and may hold a public meeting if residents 
of the governing body in the affected area request so in writing.236 The Division_of Air 
Quality issues and renews air permits for industrial activities involving emissions to the 
air. Proposals to issue or renew air permits are subject to a public comment period, 
during which interested members of the public may submit written comments to the 
DEC, or request a public hearing. The Division of Environmental Health: Solid Waste 
Program manages waste for industrial operations. A waste disposal plan must be 
submitted to the Solid Waste Program.237 Public complaints regarding waste disposal 
are also handled by this unit of the DEC.
Figure 3 titled “Department of Environmental Conservation: Public Input Process 
in Oil and Gas Development Management” illustrates the public input process in the 
management of oil resources at the DEC today. The DEC used to be a part of the Alaska 
Coastal Management Program (ACMP), and its consistency review process, but the 2003 
reforms made to the program removed matters regulated by the DEC, and currently the 
DNR is the sole agency coordinating the ACMP.238 The removal of the DEC from the 
consistency review process has reduced the options available to the public for input about 
oil project proposals. As Figure 2 shows, public access to DNR decisions is mandated by
235Petroleum News, “Dispelling the Alaska Fear Factor: Guide to Alaska’s Oil and Gas Basins and 
Business Environment” (2007), 9.4.
236Alaska Department o f  Environmental Conservation. “Public Notices,” available from 
http://www.dec.state.ak.us/public_notices.htm; Internet; retrieved on October 1,2008.
237 Petroleum News, “Dispelling the Alaska Fear Factor,” 9.5.
238 More information on this DEC “carve out” can be found in the case study under Section 4.3.2
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the requirements of the consistency review process. Citizen input can reach officials via 
direct comments, and through their local governments and the public meetings they must 
conduct. Per the reformed ACMP, local governments no longer have authority to adopt 
policies that address air and water quality concerns via the DEC, and these are excluded 
from the consistency review process. The DEC, whose mission is to ” conserve, improve 
and protect Alaska’s natural resources and environment to enhance the health, safety, 
economic and social well being of Alaskans,”239 still accepts public comments during 
issuance of permits for oil and gas operations, but local governments and their CMPs are 
severely restricted in setting environmental standards, and transmitting local input. This 
next case study digs deeper into the politics of knowledge inside the ACMP, searching 
for connections between stakeholder transactions, and the RS thesis.
4.3 Case Study: The politics of conflicting rationalities inside the Alaska Coastal 
Management Program
Local governments may have their own permitting requirements with regards to 
natural resource development, and the North Slope Borough (NSB) offers a good 
example of such local participation. The available avenues for public input are somewhat 
wider than at state department, because they often include public hearings in addition to 
comment periods. Agents of local governments are closest in physical and cultural 
proximity to local citizens, and it is often at this level that local and traditional knowledge 
enters policy initiatives. This transaction is often aided by tribal governments and 
organizations, which may increase local-level participation and inclusion of traditional 
and local knowledge in decision-making. After a brief overview of the public input 
process at NSB departments, this case study begins with a discussion of the changing 
pillars of risk for local communities.
The NSB Department of Planning and Community Services (DPCS) is 
responsible for protecting the land and cultural resources, managing land assets and 
fostering future growth, and supporting community sustainability and local traditions and
239 Alaska Department o f  Environmental Conservation. Internet; Available from 
http://dec.alaska.gov/index.htm ; Retrieved on February 26, 2010.
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lifestyles. Among the goals stated in the NSB DPCS mission statement; the Borough’s 
policy is to “Empower community-level decision-making in social, economic and 
development issues.”240 More specifically, this goal states the NSB’s dedication to hold 
workshops, and community-wide meetings to enhance community understanding and 
participation in decision-making, and to reach consensus on issues of economic, social 
and cultural importance. The overall management and direction of the DPCS is the 
responsibility of the Central Office. The office is often the first point of contact for the 
public, and for the various departments of the NSB. Its Village Affairs division provides 
representation to village residents, by coordinating responsive services through 
workshops and communications between residents and state and federal government 
officials, and the private sector. The office also monitors the NSB Comprehensive plan.
The DPCS Land Management Regulation Division’s Permitting Section is 
charged with ensuring compliance with land management regulations, including 
monitoring the CMP. The Permitting function of this section makes it a point of contact 
for Borough residents who wish to comment on development in their area. Moreover, 
the Permitting Section coordinates communication among groups proposing 
development, and village governments and residents.
NSB Department of Wildlife Management (DWM) administers the review of 
major technical and policy documents that may affect the borough’s environment, 
wildlife resources, or subsistence users. These reviews include environmental impact 
statements, and environmental assessments.241 The department itself does not hold public 
hearings, but attends those hearings as a representative for NSB residents. The DWM 
represents the borough in dealings with the multi-agency North Slope Science Initiative 
(NSSI), which was established in 2004. The goals of the NSSI are to provide a science- 
based framework to guide the development of inventory, monitoring, and research 
activities on the North Slope. Through prioritizing projects, and coordinating research
240 North Slope Borough. “Department o f Planning and Community Services,” available from 
http://www.north-slope.Org/departments/planning/index.php#mission; Internet; retrieved on October 2, 
2008.
241 North Slope Borough. “Department o f Wildlife Management,” available from http://www.north- 
slope.org/departments/wildlife/; Internet; retrieved on October 2, 2008.
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activities across multiple agencies, the NSSI aims to improve the flow of information 
across these platforms, as well as among the public and decision-makers. Section 4.4.2 
provides more information in an in-depth case study of the NSSI.
The NSB Planning Commission makes amendment recommendations to the NSB 
Assembly on the NSB Comprehensive Plan, the NSB Coastal Management Plan, and also 
recommends public improvements. Members of the Planning Commission come from 
the eight villages of the NSB. The permitting process for various uses of NSB land, 
including development, includes a public comment period. If a permit requires a coastal 
review, the reviewing parties may include the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, the 
Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope, and Native Village Tribal Councils, or village
0  d.‘Jcorporations who are also notified of the written comment period.
Figure 4 titled “North Slope Borough: Public Input Process in Oil and Gas 
Development Management” outlines the avenues for public input at NSB departments. 
Public hearings and meetings facilitate the uptake of local input at all points of contact 
within these agencies, supporting the notion that local governments use more 
democratically engaged, responsive communication methods, than do top-level 
departments.
The following is an overview of a case of conflict following the inclusion of local 
knowledge in expert institutions. This case is a good example of the power struggle that 
may occur when diverse group of stakeholders from federal, state, private and municipal 
organizations clash over diverging interests. In Chapter 4.5, the case study concludes 
with reflections on the role of RS and environmental risk as grounds for this conflict.
242 Petroleum News, “Dispelling the Alaska Fear Factor”. 9.14.
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4.3.1 The changing pillars o f risk: Subsistence issues and oil development in the North 
Slope Borough
The dimensions of the North Slope Borough are immense. It is a municipality 
encompassing 89,000 square miles, with a population of about 7,000 people who live in 
eight villages. For a map of the NSB villages, see Figure 5 titled “Villages of the North 
Slope Borough.”
NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH
Figure 5: Villages o f the North Slope Borough243
The largest village, and the center of government for the NSB is Barrow. The NSB is 
bordered by the foothills of the Brooks Range to the south, and the Arctic Ocean to the 
north. “The North Slope is a land of superlatives. On an annual basis, its coastal area has 
the coldest climate in Alaska; the region contains the nation's largest oil field; and 
Barrow, the northernmost community in the United States, has one of the largest Eskimo
243 Source: www.north-slope.org.
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populations in the world.”244 The NSB was incorporated in 1972, largely due to the 
efforts of Inupiat leader Eben Hospon who became the borough’s first Mayor. The 
Inupiat of the North Slope decided to form a local governmental unit above all else, in 
order to maximize self-determination. Mayor Hopson saw an opportunity for a bright 
future for his people:
We wanted to determine for ourselves the nature of our destiny and then, 
act to fulfill that destiny to the best of our ability. We believed the right of 
self-determination was inherent within the constitutional provision for a 
“maximum of local government.” That is why we established our North 
Slope Borough.245
When the borough started, it had initial revenue of 500 thousand dollars, and had to 
overcome a series of legal challenges brought about by the oil industry, and the 
reluctance of the state legislature, who together fought the incorporation of the borough 
and its authority to tax.246 The NSB developed despite these initial challenges, but has 
since, to some, become a model for indigenous self-determination through municipal 
government.
The borough has also met resistance to its claims to control of the land, 
waters, and subsistence resources that are closely associated with 
traditional Native values. Conflicts with external agencies and interests 
have been central and persistent in the experience of the borough’s 
leaders, who accordingly have been preoccupied with strengthening and 
exercising the centralized regional authority necessary to defend and
244 North Slope Borough. “History o f  the North Slope Borough,” available: http://www.north- 
slope.org/nsb/69.htm ; Internet; retrieved on February 27, 2010.
245 Eben Hopson Memorial Archives. Re: Proposed Ad Valorem Tax on Oil Properties: A Statement o f  
Policy. Available from http://www.ebenhopson.com/papers/1973/AdValoremPosition.html; Internet; 
retrieved on February 27, 2010.
246Beaufort Sea Region Governance Study Executive Summary. Bureau of Land Management. Internet; 
Available from http://www.mms.gov/alaska/reports/1970rpts/78_TR16A ; Retrieved on February 27, 
2010,.3.
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extend North Slope claims to self-determination vis-a-vis outside
947authorities and interests.
However, the perception of the NSB as a vehicle for self-determination may not be 
homogenous among its residents, after all, the borough is a modem bureaucracy, whose
948bureaucratic functions are funded by “Big Oil” projects.
The Inupiat have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years, and have subsisted on 
whale, caribou, seal, walrus and birds. For the North Slope Inpuiat people, subsistence is 
still the predominant way of life, and a continuation of a traditional way of life.249 
Subsistence is a vital part of Inupiat culture and still provides the bulk of Eskimo diet. 
Yet the revenue derived from oil resource development also plays a major part in NSB’s 
cash economy and infrastructure, much the same way it sustains the state economy. 
Taxes from the oil and gas industry accounted for more than 98 percent of 2007 property 
tax revenues to the borough.250 The revenue from oil and gas property taxes is used to 
empower local communities in areas of healthcare, and education, and to increase the 
political capacity of the Inupiat people by boosting the financial resources of NSB 
programs. In this way the municipality of NSB and the North Slope oil industry have 
evolved together, side-by-side and have shared the natural resources of this region.
The relationship between the NSB and the oil industry is based, on the one hand, 
on collaboration due to shared economic interests. On the other hand however, the NSB 
has to also fulfill social and cultural needs that are very important to its Inupiat 
stakeholders, but may conflict with economic incentives. Borough agencies often 
conduct public hearings before making decisions on proposals, and solicit IK from 
residents regarding subsistence areas under review, in order to combat the environmental 
risks posed by the oil industry. Prior to the 2003 reforms made to the Alaska Coastal 
Management Program (ACMP), local governments had significant authority over
247 Bureau o f Land Management (1978), 3.
248 See Point Hope residents’ comments in: Peter Matthiessen, “Big Oil and the Inupiat-Americans,“ The 
New York Review o f Books, 22 November 2007, Internet; Available from 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20835 ; Retrieved on February 28, 2010.
249 North Slope Borough Coastal Management Program. Areas Meriting Special Attention. 1989.
250 Alaska Oil and Gas Association. The Role o f  the Oil and Gas Industry in Alaska’s Economy. 2008. 
Available from http://www.aoga.org/pdfs/report2008.pdf; Internet; retrieved on February 27, 2010, 58.
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permitting, and were able to set district-enforceable policies regarding environmental 
standards on lands falling within 25 miles of the coast, and applicable even to those 
federal projects that met the criteria for ACMP consistency review.
Oil development poses direct environmental risks such as contamination of 
wildlife, waters, and soil due to toxic discharges, and disruption of subsistence activities 
such as bowhead whale migration due to pollution and noise from offshore drilling. 
Should these risks materialize, the Inupiat culture and way of life is endangered. Oil 
extraction is also indicted for its association with greenhouse gas emissions, and climate 
change, therefore its connection with the RS thesis is quite inherent. In the RS risks are 
decision contingent, irreversible, and unrestricted in their temporal and spatial effects. 
The potential negative externalities of oil resource extraction match Beck’s criteria for 
these manufactured risks, since the side effects of large-scale crude oil pollution are 
carried long distance both by water and atmospheric currents (via evaporated noxious 
fumes), and can disrupt marine and terrestrial life for many years.251 A major component 
of stakeholders’ risk perceptions is the element of uncertainty about environmental 
degradation. While the majority of NSB residents have supported onshore oil 
development, offshore oil projects still draw opposition (see Section 4.3.3). Inupiat 
Eskimo consider the ocean their people’s garden and the potential for oil-related disaster 
a real risk. “A million gallons of oil in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas would be 
devastating and there can be no denying that the risks are real and particularly 
challenging under seasonal conditions of ice and weather and darkness.”252 The 
difference between experts and citizens often is in the timing of when risks begin to exist, 
and in the perceived magnitude of consequences: to NSB locals, the potential harm from 
offshore oil development may seem imminent, unavoidable, and above all, devastating. 
In the meantime, risk managers living far away may examine risk potentials for their
251 Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Science. 
(2003). 302(5653): 2083-2086.
252 Alan Bailey. “North Slope Mayor Urges Caution in Arctic Development,” Anchorage (Alaska) Daily 
News, [newspaper on-line], 5 December 2009; Internet; Available from
http://www.adn.com/2009/12/05/1042631/north-slope-mayor-urges-caution.html; Retrieved on February 
28, 2010.
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mathematical calculability, and may write off unintended consequences in contingency 
plans. Just how personal risks are to stakeholders is a factor of their risk rationalities. In 
the RS, social and scientific rationalities clash.
Residents of the NSB are consumers of both the benefits and risks of oil resource 
extraction. NSB and state officials are accountable to the public, especially when the 
potential for harm to health and culture exists. The NSB’s participation in the ACMP 
used to provide a meaningful forum for IK input, but the amended program restricts local 
input in the permitting process.
Under the revised statewide standards, subsistence resources under the 
preferred alternative may receive a reduced level of identification, priority, 
and protection by the districts. Districts’ ability to designate subsistence 
use areas and to create subsistence use policies is more limited and they no 
longer have the “seat at the table” they had under the CPC. Also, districts 
will no longer have the ability to negotiate with applicants to provide 
mitigation for any negative impacts to subsistence resources that result 
from an approved project, no matter how minimal.253 
Beck notes that in the RS risk definitions are often manipulated by decision makers in 
charge of risk regulations, who try to interpret risks away. Shielding a program such as 
the ACMP from the information it was designed to pool can produce a risk regime where 
risks are trivialized. According to Beck, the industrial model for wealth distribution has 
changed, and its ‘logic of wealth’ no longer applies in the RS. The fundamental 
difference between industrial society and RS is, that in RS the distribution of wealth and 
risks are no longer compatible with each other.254 Democratic institutions designed to 
safeguard social well-being are increasingly aware of new, social definitions of wealth, 
and the interest groups pursuing these causes. The ACMP reforms however have caused 
a disconnect between citizens and officials, and increased the hegemony of technocratic 
institutions.
253Ocean and Coastal Resource Management. Final Environmental Impact Statement. Internet; Available 
from coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/assessments/docs/akfeis.doc ; Retrieved on February 27, 2010, 186.
254 Beck (1992), 154.
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4.3.2 Citizens, experts and inclusion: The public process under the reformed Alaska 
Coastal Management Program
The primary purpose of the ACMP is twofold: it is to facilitate economic 
development, while protecting coastal resources and their uses. Coastal residents were 
meant to benefit from the involvement of their local government in the ACMP, especially 
so before the sweeping reforms of 2003. There are 35 coastal districts in Alaska, by and 
large consisting of local (borough level) governments. Each coastal district develops its 
own coastal management plan (CMP), creating policies that align with the districts’ goals 
and objectives for development in their own area. Once approved, district CMPs become 
part of the ACMP. The NSB Coastal Management Plan under ACMP was initially 
created in 1988 in order to enhance local management of coastal resources, while 
providing for future growth and conservation. The integration of traditional knowledge 
into management decisions was one of many priorities of the CMP.255 The uptake of 
traditional knowledge in the ACMP process showed promise, as evidenced by the 
participation of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) in the review process. 
Originally formed in 1977, the AEWC represents the ten bowhead-whale subsistence 
hunting villages of Barrow, Nuiqsut, Kaktovik, Pt. Hope, Wainwright, Kivalina, Wales, 
Savoonga, Gambell, and Little Diomede. The AEWC is a critical regional entity, and it 
often participated in ACMP consistency review processes. In doing so, the AEWC has 
relied on the NSB CMP, as a positive force and legal basis in including traditional 
knowledge in the regulation of coastal activities:
The NSB could incorporate Inupiat traditional knowledge of 
environmental conditions into its consistency reviews that would 
otherwise not play a role in regulation of coastal activities. The NSB also 
was able to require applicants to consult with the AEWC on matters that 
could adversely affect the subsistence bowhead whale hunt. The ACMP 
and the NSB CMP thus have played an important, positive role in bringing
255 North Slope Borough. CMP Scoping Report. Internet; Available from http://www.nonh- 
slope.org/programs/coastal_management/Scoping%20report/text/Appendix%20B.pdf retrieved on 
November 25, 2009, 2.
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operators and subsistence communities together to avoid potential 
conflicts.256
Under the old NSB CMP, the AEWC was able to effectively communicate Inupiat 
traditional knowledge to influence development decisions. For example, Inupiat IK was 
instrumental in stopping a flawed project from moving forward, when, during a 
consistency review process the AEWC demonstrated that the designs for a drilling 
structure on an ice island were inadequately prepared to withstand the ice forces in the
257area.
The approval process designed by ACMP was intended to create a network of 
federal, state, and local interests, and to ensure a single review and approval process for 
oil and gas projects. The ACMP requires that projects in Alaska’s coastal zone meet 
ACMP’s statewide standards, as determined by coastal resource management 
professionals, before project permits are issued.258 This coastal zone includes lands 
falling within 25 miles of the coastline, excluding federal lands. However, if a coastal 
district can prove that a federal activity, or an activity that requires federal permit affects 
lands or water within the jurisdiction of the coastal district, then the permitting process 
must meet the ACMP consistency review requirements, and districts enforceable policies 
must be followed. In accordance with 11 AAC 110.010, coastal districts and local 
stakeholders are included during the consistency review process if the proposed project 
affects coastal waters and resources, even in cases of federal uses such as offshore 
drilling projects. In addition to district-level input through CMP, the public may also 
provide their input during a public comment period. Interested coastal residents, as well 
others may submit written concerns regarding project inconsistencies with ACMP’s
256Alaska Department o f Natural Resources. “Comments o f  the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission to 
the Alaska Office o f  Program Management and Permitting on the Alaska Department o f  Natural 
Resources’ Preliminary Recommendations for the Amended North Slope Borough Coastal Management 
Plan” (July 2006), 1.
http://alaskacoast.state.ak.us/District/Tables/NorthSlope/AEWC_Comments_NSBCMP_FINAL.pdf. 
Retrieved on October 3, 2008.
257 Alaska DNR. “Comments o f  the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission,” 3.
258Alaska Department o f Natural Resources, Division o f Coastal and Ocean Management. “Coastal Project 
Review,” Internet; available from: http://www.alaskacoast.state.ak.us/Projects/pfirstl.html. Retrieved on 
August 7, 2008.
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policies. Proposed final findings by the Division of Coastal and Ocean Management may 
be challenged by any state or borough agency under Alaska statutes, in which case the 
review of the ACMP findings falls on the Commissioner, who must issue a final finding 
within 45 days.259
The ACMP process underwent significant reforms in 2003. Responding to 
charges on behalf of industry stakeholders, that duplicate standards and regulations had 
resulted in time consuming delays in permitting, and confusing boundaries between 
statewide and district enforceable policies, House Bill 191 mandated significant changes 
to the ACMP consistency review process. The changes brought about by House Bill 191 
(fully implemented in 2004) have been controversial. Many coastal districts have 
complained of what they see is an industry-tailored, watered-down ACMP program, 
which in the end diminishes the role of local knowledge in resource development. Some 
of the issues of contention are as follows: 1) coastal districts now suffer from the 
narrowing of the scope of district enforceable policies, 2) Regional Citizens’ Advisory 
Councils have been removed from the list of mandatory ACMP review process 
participants, although they may still participate as interested parties 3) removal of 
language authorizing coastal districts to designate subsistence areas where subsistence 
activities have priority over all nonsubsistence uses, and 4) the DEC “carve-out”, which 
is the elimination of DEC permits from the ACMP process.260
Initial review of, and the feedback on the proposed reforms to the ACMP 
prompted the federal oversight agency, the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource 
Management to initially reject the state’s reformed ACMP. One reason for the 
preliminary denial was the reduced scope and subject of coastal district enforceable 
policies set forth in the new regulations. In February 2005, Governor Murkowski 
pressured the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management to accept the reforms 
by threatening to end Alaska’s participation in the program, citing issues of state
259 Petroleum News. “NSB Issues Challenge,” Vol. 12, No. 26. Internet; Available from: 
http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/711261476.shtml Retrieved on October 20, 2008.
260 Alaska Department o f  Natural Resources. Response to Public Comments February 20, 2004, Public 
Notice Draft o f  Proposed ACMP Regulations, On file with the author.
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sovereignty. In the end, the amended ACMP regulations won federal certification in 
December of 2005. Coastal districts were asked to create new Coastal Management 
Plans (CMPs) according to the reformed ACMP, while their old CMPs sunsetted. The 
old CMP sunsetted in 2007, and the revised CMP plan under the reformed ACMP has not 
been approved by the DNR, and AEWC’s role in the review process is uncertain. 
Without an approved CMP, the NSB uses the state’s own program. There is a growing 
divide between coastal communities and the economic imperatives of state departments 
with regards to resource uses, as summed up by Caroline Cannon from the tribal council 
of Point Hope: “It’s just like a recording, we’re repeating ourselves. It just seems like 
these giants are just getting bigger without the consideration of our people, our way of 
life.”262
4.3.3 The subpolitics o f knowledge: Reactions, legislative actions, departmental reviews 
North Slope Borough representatives feel that rural residents’ input has been 
severely diminished under the new ACMP regulations, and overall meaningful 
participation in project reviews is impossible under a system that allows the state too 
much interference with local management. Much decisive power concentrates at a 
single, top-level agency, the DNR, and its experts. For example, under the old ACMP 
‘elevations’ (appeals regarding consistency determinations), were reviewed by three 
resource agency directors within 15 days of request. As amended, elevations are 
reviewed and decided upon by the DNR commissioner, with an extended timeframe for 
issuance of that decision 264 DNR representatives say they understand that some districts 
have felt disenfranchised under the new ACMP because some local power has been 
moved to the state, but maintain that individuals still have the opportunity to participate
261 Alaska Legislature.com. “Threat to pull out o f  coast plan,” Internet; Available from: 
http://alaskalegislature.com/stories/022805/coastal.shtml.
262 Beth Ipsen, “Residents Voice Opposition to Shell’s Offshore Drilling,” Pacific Environments 19 April, 
2007. Internet; Available from http://www.pacificenvironment.org/article.php?id=2340 ; Retrieved on 
February 28, 2010.
263 Gordon Brower (NSB). Personal Communication. October 21, 2008.
264 Ocean and Coastal Resource Management. Final Environmental Impact Statement. Internet; Available 
from coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/assessments/docs/akfeis.doc ; Retrieved on February 27, 2010.
98
in the review process through their coastal districts (working with their district 
coordinators), as well as directly through the public comment period at DNR’s Division 
of Coastal and Ocean Management.
The proposed new NSB CMP is heavily scrutinized by the state, while the 
Borough maintains its views on the extent of local input needed in the ACMP review 
process. With emphasis on preserving subsistence resources, habitat, and managing 
natural resource development to safeguard against adverse outcomes, the 2005 draft 
version of the revised NSB CMP included the objective of using traditional and local 
knowledge about geophysical hazards.266 The NSB CMP is still in mediation, and its fate 
remains to be seen. Some coastal districts are still in negotiations with the DNR over their 
CMPs, while others have opted out of the program altogether. Complaints with regards 
to the public process involved under the ACMP reforms, as well as what is perceived by 
coastal districts as power grab by the state when it comes to district enforceable policies 
prompted the DNR to began a reevaluation of the new ACMP program.
The State of Alaska and coastal districts continue their fight over the reformed 
ACMP. House Bill 74 titled "An Act relating to the Alaska coastal management 
program; and establishing the Alaska Coastal Policy Board", introduced in January 2009 
proposes a number of amendments to the new ACMP, such as a repeal of the DEC carve- 
out, reaffirmation of district enforceable policies, creation of a Coastal Policy Board to 
represent and reflect the diversity of regional and state agency interests, and inclusion of
267subsistence as one of ACMP’s objectives. However, as of February 2010, both the 
House and Senate versions of the coastal management bills are locked up in the
265 David Gann (DNR). Personal Communication. October 21, 2008.
266 North Slope Borough. “North Slope Borough Coastal Management Plan Public Review Draft,” 
Internet; available from http://www.north-
slope.org/NSB/acmp/CMP%20Plan/NSB%20Chapter%202%20IGOs%20PHD.pdf 
Retrieved on October 2, 2008.
267 State o f Alaska. The Alaska State Legislature, Internet; Available from
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill.asp?bill=HB%20%2074&session=26 , retrieved on November 
25, 2009.
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Resources Committees of both bodies.268 It is usually easier to protect policy already in 
place than to bring about change, therefore opponents of the new ACMP program are 
fighting an uphill battle. Not surprisingly, coastal districts support the bill, while the 
DNR and industry representatives oppose the amendments.
The controversy surrounding the ACMP reforms at first glance seems to have 
taken place within the traditional bounds of politics. The NSB and other coastal districts 
are pushing for a legislative change with regards to the diminished powers of coastal 
district CMPs, and are actively advocating for increased local powers. Since the ACMP 
is a top-down initiative that includes federal and state agencies, the course of action for 
repeal is through traditional nation-state politics, though legislative reform. However, 
there are signs that North Slope-based subpolitical groups are influenced by, and are 
reacting as a result of, the new ACMP regulations. There is likely a connection between 
the diminished authorities of NSB and its citizens in the consistency review process, and 
the increase in litigious opposition to oil projects by the Alaska Eskimo Whaling 
Commission (AEWC), and the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope.
The AEWC together with a number of environmental groups, filed suit against the 
Mineral Management Service (MMS), the federal agency in charge of environmental 
impact assessment, to halt a Shell offshore project on grounds that the environmental 
risks were not well assessed. The 2007 suit charges, among other things, that the MMS 
failed to take into consideration assessment criteria such as uncertainty and scientific 
controversy, and significant unknown risks to subsistence activities.269 Two years later, 
the AEWC together with the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope filed a second 
lawsuit to stop the Shell project, again on grounds of insufficient risk assessment.270 The
268Arctic Sounder. “Energy Bills a Bright Spot for Rural Legislators,“ 25 February 2010, [newspaper on­
line]; Internet; Available from http://www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1008energy_bills_a_bright_spot 
for rural legislators; Retrieved on February 27, 2010.
269Crag Law Center. Opening B rief at the U.S. Court o f  Appeals fo r  the Ninth Circuit. Internet; Available 
from http://crag.Org/wp-content/uploads/2008/l 1/final-opening-brief.pdf; Retrieved on February 28, 2010, 
4.
270 See Dan Joling, “Alaska whalers, environmental groups sue to block proposed 2010 Beaufort Sea 
drillingf  Business News, 15 December 2009, [newspaper on-line]; Internet; Available from 
http://blog.taragana.com/business/2009/12/15/alaska-whalers-environmental-groups-sue-to-block- 
proposed-2010-beaufort-sea-drilling-l 1729/; Retrieved on February 27, 2010.
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lawsuit proceeded despite an initial agreement from Shell to shutdown operations near 
two Inupiat villages during fall subsistence whaling season, and to install best available 
discharge technologies.271 No doubt Beck would note the irony, and symbolic 
detoxification of such description, because what is being discharged is hidden behind the 
promise of technology, as a supreme solution. What may be the finest available 
technology to some, to others, it may still be an agent of great hazards.
What are the sources of conflict behavior? The fundamental source is that 
the goals and/or objectives of people differ and that action intended to 
achieve one agent’s goals or objectives often results in costs (including 
monetary and non-monetary ones) for other agents in the social network.
In the context of knowledge integration, exchanges among agents can 
result in increasing resources and opportunities for some and in decreasing 
resources, constraints, and risks for others.272 
The feeling of uncertainty about the impacts of resource development in itself is a real 
risk to the consumers of risks. As Point Hope resident Alfred Downey said: “We found 
that the information was insufficient and we still don’t have enough information about 
what is being proposed and what Shell would do if  there are impacts.”273 The restrictions 
placed on local input into the reformed ACMP obstruct the flow of information between 
locals and officials, and they may increase the perceived uncertainty factor of risk 
decisions, and subsequent resistance to proposals.
Lack of effective communication between experts and citizens deepens the 
technocratic divide, and contributes to the agitation of subpolitical groups. This impasse 
is often the result of the industrial versus risk society tension: Beck suggests that the 
definitions of growing wealth change in RS, and “the distributional logic no longer
271 Shell Offshore, Inc. Shells ’ Beaufort Sea Exploratory Drilling Program Oil Spill Response. Internet; 
Available from http://www-
static.shell.com/static/usa/downloads/shell_for_businesses/exploration_production/alaska/oil_spill_respons 
e_brochure.pdf, Retrieved on February 27, 2010.
272Exerpt from Joseph M. Firestone, (author of: Joseph M. Firestone and Mark W. McElroy. Key Issues in 
the New Knowledge Management. KMCI Press/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003), “Knowledge Management 
and Conflict,” Internet; Available from http://kmci.org/alllifeisproblemsolving/archives/knowledge- 
management-and-conflict-part-two-integrating-knowledge/; Retrieved on February 27, 2010.
273 Ipsen (2007).
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revolves around how the ‘cake’ might be divided up, instead it becomes clear that the 
cake has become poisoned.”274 The production of risks and unintended side effects are 
no longer accepted in RS as inherent. Rather, political conflicts emerge around liability,
975and institutional management. The political opposition to the ACMP reforms, and the 
legal blocks thrown at offshore projects prove that many NSB stakeholders do not believe 
they are afforded meaningful input into risk decisions regarding oil development. Risk 
society has reached even the most remote whaling villages in Alaska.
4.4 Case Study: The politics of knowledge inside the North Slope Science Initiative
This case study of the North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI) explains the 
initiative’s use of science to communicate risks and collaborate with stakeholders. The 
beginning of the NSSI dates back to 2004, when federal, state and local governments 
collectively conceived of an agency to monitor the effects of a rapidly changing climate 
in the North Slope, in order to “support climate-based and development decisions.”276 
The 109th Congress formally authorized the multi-agency, long-term NSSI through the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (H.R.6, Section 348). The NSSI was envisioned as a 
replacement for the Research and Monitoring Team (RMT), a chartered organization in 
effect between 2000-2002 as an integral part of the Integrated Activity Plan and
977Environmental Impact Statement for the Northeast Petroleum Reserve -Alaska. The 
RMT was designed to investigate the effectiveness of oil and gas development-related 
mitigation in the area. After the RMT sunsetted in 2002 development continued to 
expand beyond the Petroleum Reserve, -as did consensus among North Slope managers
278about the need for a new monitoring organization with a broader mission. The NSSI 
is intended to meet that need, by providing managers with the scientific resources they 
will need to evaluate the simultaneous goals of resource development and environmental
274 Mythen (2004), 25.
275 Ibid.
276 North Slope Science Initiative. “2009 Report to Congress” Internet; Available from 
http://www.northslope.org. ,  retrieved on November 25, 2009., 3.
277 North Slope Science Initiative. “History and Current Status,” Internet; Available from
http://www.northslope.org/, retrieved on November 25, 2009.
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conservation. In essence, the NSSI was tasked with studying the effects of oil and gas 
activities on local ecosystems, and subsistence.
This study follows the same methodology used in the previous case studies, and is 
divided into three sections: risk analysis, assessment of institutional responsiveness, and a 
breakdown of the subpolitical sphere.
4.4.1 The changing pillars o f risk: Resource development, environmental impacts, and 
the North Slope Science Initiative
The NSSI intends to produce high caliber science and provide scientific data to 
policy makers on North Slope ecosystems, while meeting the informational needs of 
regulatory agencies, local governments and the public.279 Figure 6 titled “North Slope 
Science Initiative Knowledge Production Process” maps the knowledge production 
process of the NSSI, created based on the language of the Energy Policy Act. As the 
map shows, the NSSI, much like any scientific endeavor, relies on as much subjective 
decisions and knowledge as it does on objective data. During the data input process, 
‘information needs’ data (a highly subjective realm) enter the system, then these are 
‘evaluated’ and ‘prioritized’ (another opportunity for biased decisions). Following this 
process, the previously raw data are transformed into ‘data of highest technical quality’ 
that are ready to be disseminated to experts and the public. In order to avoid a scientific 
process that is completely biased in a technocratic direction, it is crucial to facilitate 
effective, meaningful citizen participation. This is especially so in light of the fact that 
the NSSI is intended to mediate the environmental risks posed by oil development. 
Meaningful citizen input regarding competing resource uses should be one of the key 
components of the NSSI. This case study builds on this premise, and begins with an 
evaluation of the risks NSSI intends to lessen, from the viewpoint of RS theory.
279 Govtrack.us “H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act 2005,” Internet; Available from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl09-6 , retrieved on November 27, 2009,115.
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Figure 6: North Slope Science Initiative Knowledge Production Process
As previously discussed, North Slope stakeholders participate in a cash economy, 
but subsistence is still a vital part of their lives, both for economic and cultural survival 
(see Chapter 4.3). Negative externalities of oil development can have harmful effects on 
subsistence. The most infamous disaster, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince 
William Sound released eleven million gallons of crude oil into the waters of the Sound. 
The short-term effects on the local ecosystem were enormous, but the area has also 
suffered long term, chronic effects as a result.280 The subsistence lifestyle of fifteen
280 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: How Much Oil 
Remains? Internet; Available from: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Quarterly/jas2001/feature_jas01.htm ; 
Retrieved on February 28, 2010.
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predominantly Alaska Native communities was disrupted for many months, perhaps for 
years to come, and the physical and psychological effects of this disaster resonated 
throughout a larger, global community. Such mega disasters aside, oil spills are not rare 
in oilfield operations, and the question maybe not if, but how frequently spills might 
occur. The November 2009 spill on the North Slope was one of its largest reported spills, 
estimated at forty-six thousand gallons of spilled crude oil.281 Oil spills are not the only 
risk concern for Alaska Natives however. There may be unforeseen negative 
consequences of oil development; and some of these consequences may only be 
discovered by IK. For example, it was observed shortly after construction of the Trans- 
Alaska Pipeline, that caribou used the pipeline corridor to migrate instead of Anaktuvuk 
Pass, leaving villagers there without caribou.
Residents near oil project sites may have different risk priorities from risk 
regulators, industry representatives, and the general public. According to Beck, when 
risk analysis and regulation is left up to scientific and technical experts, the scientific 
processes can sanitize the language of risk, and legitimize potential harm. Through 
defining ‘acceptable levels’ of pollution, or as Beck calls it, permanent ration o f  
collective standardized poisoning, risk is co-produced across political, institutional and 
industrial boundaries. The mandate of the NSSI is to coordinate and coproduce
scientific data across scientific and cultural boundaries, and effective inclusion is an 
essential part of this premise. The next section is an analysis of stakeholders and their 
hierarchy within the NSSI.
281 Lisa Demer, “Spill is One o f the Worst on the North Slope,” Anchorage (Alaska) Daily News. 9 
December, 2009. [newspaper on-line]; Internet; Available from
http://www.adn.com/2009/12/08/1046914/spill-is-one-of-worst-on-the-north.html; Retrieved on February 
28, 2010.
282Eben Hopson Memorial Archives (1976).
283 Beck (1992), 63.
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4.4.2 Citizens, experts and inclusion: The North Slope Science Initiative and its 
stakeholders
This case study highlights socio-political issues specific to Alaska under RS 
theory. Alaskan politics is especially vibrant, due in part to the fact that Alaska has over 
two hundred active tribal governments. There are at least three different types of 
federally recognized Native governments: 1) traditional governing councils, 2) IRA 
[Indian Reorganization Act] councils, and 3) the Tlingit and Haida Central Council.284 
The complicated web of legalities surrounding federal and state recognition of tribal 
governance, and the differences between the three types of government are beyond the 
scope of this paper. For the purposes of this case study we’ll consider tribal governments 
from a legal standpoint to be agents of litigation, and administrative recognition (mostly 
for administration of federal Native programs and services), while from a cultural 
standpoint, they are institutions closest in proximity to the Alaska Native individual 
(potential traditional knowledge holder). Individual participation in local council 
decision-making processes in Alaska’s vibrant, extensive tribal governance is encouraged 
and managed locally.
NSSI member organizations include federal, state and private agencies. Federal 
members include the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
National Park Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, Minerals Management Service, 
and U.S. Geological Service. State agencies include the Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources, and the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. According to the NSSI 
charter, the ASRC (Arctic Slope Regional Corporation), -an Alaska Native (ANCSA) 
corporation is a member of the NSSI, because the ASRC “represents more than nine 
thousand Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska’s North Slope. The shareholders of ASRC own 
surface and subsurface title to more than four million acres of North Slope lands. By 
virtue of this title, the ASRC represents the largest private landowner on the North 
Slope.”285 The North Slope Borough (NSB) is included among the NSII members based
284 Case and Voluck, 320.
285North Slope Science Initiative. “Charter,” Internet; Available from: http://www.northslope.org , 
retrieved on November 25, 2009.
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on its function to mandate management of active land uses across federal, state, Native 
and municipal lands, and to represent local interests:
All of the Borough’s planning and research activities are conducted in part 
to guarantee strong local input into subsistence resource management, 
with a special emphasis on the blending of contemporary and traditional 
local knowledge as a mechanism to sustain the resources and the local 
indigenous culture.286
Together, these federal, state and private organizations direct NSSI activities through the 
NSSI Oversight Group. The Oversight Group consists of one high-ranking representative 
from each agency with voting privileges, and meets twice a year. These meetings are 
open to the public and offer opportunities for public comment. In addition, the NSSI 
prepares an annual progress report for the Secretary of the Interior as mandated by the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005.
There are a number of stakeholders significant to this case study. This section 
provides a quick view of the complex legal and political web of interests. Figure 7 titled 
“Oil and Gas Development Regulations and Participant Hierarchy in Alaska” is a 
summary of the hierarchy of stakeholders and regulations influencing Alaska’s politics of 
oil. Alaska’s tribes enjoy special govemment-to-govemment political status with the 
federal government, but exist without a specific land base since ANCSA lands are not 
considered “Indian Country” by legal definition.
Tribal governments often collaborate under umbrella organizations. The Alaska 
Federation of Natives (AFN) is the largest, most prominent statewide Alaska Native 
organization with its 178 member villages (federally recognized tribes, and village 
corporations), 13 Native regional corporations, and 12 regional nonprofits and tribal 
consortiums. The 37-member board that governs the AFN is elected annually. The 
mission of AFN is to enhance and promote the cultural, economic and political voice of 
the entire Alaska Native community.287 Created in 1966, the AFN was instrumental in
286 North Slope Science Initiative. “Charter,” Internet;. Available from: http://www.northslope.org.
287 Alaska Federation o f Natives. “About Us,” Internet; Available from: 
http://www.nativefederation.org/about/index.php.; Retrieved on October 7, 2008.
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the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), and other federal 
legislations, such as Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). The 
AFN continues to promote laws and policies in resource management, health, education, 
labor and government.
Of particular interest to this case study are the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council 
(AITC), the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (ICAS), and the Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation (ASRC), which is an ANCSA Regional for-profit corporation. The 
Alaska Inter-Tribal Council AITC is a statewide, tribally governed non-profit 
organization promoting “indigenous self-determination by providing technical assistance 
to tribal governments, facilitating inter-governmental and inter-agency communication 
and collaboration, offering public education regarding Alaska Native cultures and tribal 
governments, and advocating on behalf of tribal initiatives and self governance.” 
According to the AITC Constitution (first adopted in 1992), the Council consists of two 
elected Alaska Native members from each of the twelve geographic areas of Alaska. As 
part of its mission statement, the AITC works to embrace the traditional values, 
knowledge, and wisdom of Alaska Native cultures in promoting their way of life.289 The 
many issues advocated by AIC illustrates a broad focus on tribal affairs.
The Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (ICAS) was formed in 1971 as a 
federally recognized regional native government under the amended federal Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1936, the ICAS provides assistance to eight North Slope 
villages in resource management programs among other things. As an IRA tribal entity, 
the ICAS is an organized tribe (representing several North Slope tribes), and enjoys a 
govemment-to-govemment relationship with the federal government. The ICAS is 
frequently the active agent of legal action in cases of environmental hazard and
288Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. “About AITC,” Internet; Available from http://aitc.org/node/5 , retrieved 
on November 25, 2009.
289Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. “AITC Vision Statement,” Internet; Available from 
http://aitc.org/?q=node/31 , retrieved on November 25,2009.
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contamination suits, and aboriginal title issues among others. Recently, the ICAS filed 
suit in federal court in opposition to Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea.290
The Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) has approximately nine thousand 
shareholders, title to five million acres of land, and is a regional ANCSA for-profit 
corporation. Regional for-profits own significant amounts of land in Alaska, including 
subsurface rights. These regional corporations are charged with meeting their 
shareholders’ economic needs. Natural resource development is a very important aspect 
of these profit-making enterprises. In natural resource development decisions, regional 
corporations have a stated mission of protecting traditional uses of land, and developing 
resources with the least impact on the environment.291 Regional corporations have a 
precarious role in tribal affairs. Though not recognized as tribes within Alaska Native 
communities, the legal and political definition of ANCSA regional for-profits make them 
federally recognized tribal entities. The Self-Determination Act recognizes ANCSA 
regional, and village for-profit corporations as “tribes”, and recognizes them as 
“governing bodies” for certain purposes, so long as “maximum participation” of Alaska 
Natives is permitted in their affairs.292 While it is not clear what the measure of 
maximum participation may be, inclusion of public input is mentioned in broad terms in 
corporate mission statements.
A good point of reference as for the intent of the Initiative on the issue of 
traditional and local knowledge is the draft version of the NSSI’s Science Strategy (May 
2005). According to the draft, the NSSI aims to “maintain and improve public and 
agency access to accumulated and ongoing research and to contemporary traditional and 
local knowledge.”293 As for data interpretation regarding collected traditional knowledge, 
the Draft stated: “Traditional knowledge has been used by other agencies on the North
290 Lee Poston. “Native and Conservation Groups Voice Opposition to Lease Sale 193 in the Chukchi 
Sea”. Common Dreams.org News Center, http://www.commondreams.org/news2008/0206-10.htm. 
Retrieved on October 3, 2008.
291 For example see “Doyon Lands, Natural Resources”. Doyon Ltd. 
http://www.doyonlands.com/resources.html. Retrieved on October 5, 2008.
292 Case and Voluck, 336.
293 North Slope Science Initiative. Science Strategy. Internet; Available from: 
http://www.northslope.org/; retrieved on February 18, 2010, V.
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Slope, in other parts of Alaska, and elsewhere and these past efforts should be studied to 
determine their applicability to the NSSI and to provide initial guidance for its use.”294
The Initiative’s draft discusses the differences between traditional knowledge 
(TK) and local knowledge (LK) in the Alaskan context. The drafts notes that in the case 
of TK, there is a majority consensus, it is integrated culturally, and is taught to future
9Q Sgeneration “as the way it is.” Additionally, local knowledge and user knowledge differ 
in that user knowledge is the experience of an individual, while local knowledge is 
correlated, and shared by others. The NSSI strategy posits that user knowledge, and local 
knowledge are frequently integrated into environmental documents in Alaska, on an 
issue-driven basis through community meetings, public hearings, and workshops. As for 
TK, NSSI plans to mandate the use of methods for TK representation, in a way that is 
useful to all interested parties.
The NSSI was plagued by poor funding during its developing stages, and its 
actual effectiveness in incorporating traditional knowledge into research decisions was 
questionable.296 This was, in part, due to an initial identity crisis of the initiative; 
whether it would serve as a clearinghouse of information, or as an organization that funds 
its own projects.297 Per the 2009 NSSI Annual Report to Congress, the NSSI has 
developed a website, designed a data management and information system (designed to 
pull ecosystem-related information from multiple entities on multiple layers into visual 
information), and an Arctic Project Tracking System, and held workshops in 
collaboration with other initiatives and organizations.298 Within the NSSI structure, the 
North Star Borough is intended as the primary point of contact for the uptake of TK and 
LK: ” The Borough’s primary responsibility is to address the concerns and interests of 
NSB residents through a coupling of western and traditional knowledge.”299 Several
294 “North Slope Science Initiative. Science Strategy. Available from: 
http://www.northslope.org/; Internet; retrieved on February 18, 2010, V.
295 Ibid., 23.
296 Brian Pierson (NSB / DWM). Personal Communication. October 22, 2008.
297 Noah Ashley (NSB, NSII). Personal Communication. October 22, 2008.
298North Slope Science Initiative. “2009 Annual Report to Congress,” Internet; Available from 
http://www.northslope.com, retrieved on November 25, 2009, p. 19-24.
299North Slope Science Initiatve, “2009 Annual Report to Congress,” 37.
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recent and ongoing projects however, propose to include TK and LK through local 
residents, such as the Snowshoe Hare Ecology and Contaminants Project, and the 
Bowhead Feeding Variability in the Western Alaska Beaufort Sea.300 This type of 
collaboration highlights the fact that one of the main advantages of the initiative is in 
bringing together industry representatives, state agencies, local municipalities, and local 
residents. The AITC however has brought up issues it considers serious shortcomings in 
the NSSI mandate.
4.4.3 The subpolitics o f  knowledge: The Alaska Inter-Tribal Council’s objections to the 
North Slope Science Initiative
In its Cover Letter to Tribal Preclusion White Paper the AITC voiced strong 
objections to the participation of the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) in the 
North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI).301 The allegations regarding the inclusion of the 
ASRC were a scathing indictment of expert institutions, and their policies of “political 
ethnic cleansing.” In order to find out how a collaborative, knowledge-producing 
organization could receive such criticism, it is necessary to examine the science-policy 
background of NSSI.
The 2005 Energy Policy Act explicitly mentions TK and LK in NSSI’s 
objectives, stating that NSSI is to “maintain and improve public and agency access to 
contemporary and traditional local knowledge.”302 The language seems to imply the 
potential for inclusion but is vague as to the extent of the use of such knowledge bases. 
The bill further states that the federal government is to enter into a cooperative agreement 
between State, and Borough agencies, and the ASRC to coordinate and share the efforts, 
resources and funding needed to accomplish the Initiative’s goals.303 This relationship 
between the ASRC, NSSI and the federal government is at the heart of the controversy.
300 North Slope Science Initiatve, “2009 Annual Report to Congress,” 31-32.
301 Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. Cover Letter to Tribal Preclusion White Paper, Internet; Available from 
http://aitc.org/?q=node/81, retrieved on November 25, 2009.
302 Govtrack.us “H.R. 6: Energy Policy Act 2005,” Internet; Available from 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd7billHil09-6 , retrieved on November 27, 2009,115.
303 Ibid., 116.
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Regional ANCSA corporations’ simultaneous drive for economic development, and their 
legal definition as tribal entities often create tensions in Alaska Native communities. In 
some instances, public participation may be hindered, or perceived hindered due to these 
conflicting roles of regional corporations.
The AITC contends that by way of consultation and funding of a corporation to 
study the effects of petroleum development on Alaska Native culture and subsistence 
(especially when that corporation is simultaneously engaged in such development), 
ANCSA corporations are stepping into the shoes of Tribes.304 The AITC charges that a 
superior local agent of Alaska Native culture and knowledge, the Inupiat Community of 
the Arctic Slope (ICAS), a federally recognized regional native government should have 
been consulted instead. The questions raised by the AITC center around the legalities 
brought on by this arrangement, but it is easy to see the relations between the political 
and the scientific. Since the ASRC is a corporation, as such it must abide by state and 
federal regulations while carrying out its functions under “non-traditional enforcement, 
and state sanctioned regulatory schemes.”305 On the other hand, the AITC charges, 
consulting with and providing funds to the regional native government would enhance the 
sovereignty of North Slope Tribes by allowing them to enforce Traditional and Elder 
Councils, and Native customs and traditions.306 Clearly, the political and scientific 
interface beneath unresolved socio-political issues such as tribal sovereignty, and the 
battleground inherently spills into the frontiers of science. As discussed earlier, politics 
and science are inherently linked in traditional Native American culture because the way 
o f knowing and is the guiding set of principles by which people abide. When integrating 
IK into expert science processes, the added issues of authority, autonomy, and moral 
conflicts may arise if IK is removed from its context.307 The NSSI validates inclusion of 
the ASRC in research based on its status as a private landowner, and as an authentic
304 Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. Cover Letter to Tribal Preclusion White Paper, Internet; Available from 
http://aitc.org/?q=node/81, retrieved on November 25, 2009, 3.
305 Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. Tribal Preclusion White Paper, Internet; Available from 
http://aitc.org/?q=node/81, retrieved on November 25, 2009, 32.
306 Ibid.
307 Leach et al., 9.
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advocate for its shareholders. As the AITC posits that this state-sanctioned regulatory 
scheme promotes a non-traditional enforcement of knowledge production, it becomes 
clear that within the multi-altitude, representative structure of the Initiative the power 
play for input evolves at the lower (local) levels.
4.5 Discussion
The two case studies discussed in this chapter depict the many stakeholders and 
interests competing within Alaska’s oil administration regime. Expert institutions work 
to understand and manage ongoing changes to local ecosystems, and to facilitate resource 
development. During this process they build new relationships, antagonisms, and create 
new infrastructures designed to support these new relationships, under a “systemic way 
of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization 
itself.”308 The ACMP review process, and the NSSI are both good examples for this 
transforming power of risk in RS: when risk definitions enter expert systems of validation 
(risks require scientific recognition), conflicting rationalities between the producers of 
risk definition, and consumers of risk definition emerge. In the case of the NSB, the old 
CMP was an efficient link between residents’ IK and decision makers. The NSB lost a 
significant amount of control in shaping risk definitions under the reformed ACMP. This 
loss of control contributes to what Beck calls symbolic detoxification. In this case, the 
power grab of risk management institutions implies an authoritative monopoly over risk 
claims, and may result in a systemic rationalization, rather than elimination, of hazards.
These two cases also highlight the implications of clashing rationalities: the NSSI 
expert system is designed to foster agency access to IK via local government, and to 
engage corporate interests on behalf of local shareholders in collecting scientific data. As 
discussed earlier, the social rationality of risk is much different from scientific rationality, 
and this divergence often causes conflict. When existing knowledge producing entities 
established by citizens for the purposes of scientific collaboration, or legal entities 
designed to represent shared knowledge (e.g. Alaska Native Science Commission, local
308 Beck (1992), 21.
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and regional tribal entities) are left out of collaborative efforts, the divide between experts 
and citizens is evident, and signs of technocratic environmentalism are present. When IK 
is lost in this process, the consequences of RS reach far into and beyond the political 
sphere, and issues of morality emerge. As the AITC charged with regards to the 
employment of ASRC, the NSSI “used the indigenous people themselves to eliminate 
indigenous sovereignty.”309 On a more positive note, Turner posits that a globalized, 
industrial society not only grows the environment of risk, but it also is an opportunity to
I I  A
grow social rights. The growth of IK inclusion projects, and systemic support for 
subpolitical groups -as seen in the case of the ANSC, support Turner’s observation and 
Beck’s remark that in RS knowledge gains new importance.
In the next chapter, the research turns to formulating answers to these concerns in 
contexts important to Alaskan stakeholders. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this 
research, and examines some of the available models for effective science uptake in 
expert decision-making, then concludes with a discussion of areas needing further 
investigation.
309Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. Cover Letter to Tribal Preclusion White Paper. Internet; Available from 
http://aitc.org/?q=node/81, retrieved on November 25, 2009, 3.
310 Brian S. Turner. Risk, Rights, and Regulation: An Overview. Health, Risk, and Society 3 (2001):9-18, 
17.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions
5.1 Findings
The purpose of this study was to investigate the use of science and the inclusion 
of North Slope Borough communities in risk-based policymaking inside Alaska’s oil 
management regime. This research identified available avenues for indigenous 
knowledge (IK) input under the current management scheme, and compared the extent 
and meaning of IK inclusion in risk decisions against the environmental risks imposed 
upon locals by the negative externalities of oil development. The approach used to 
accomplish this task relied on Ulrich Beck’s risk society (RS) thesis, in order to assess 
the role of risk in shaping the transactions between experts and citizens, and the general 
flow of information during knowledge production. Briefly stated, RS refers to a society 
increasingly preoccupied with, and organized in response to, risks that threaten its future 
safety. These risks are socially produced, and decision-contingent, and are generated by 
the processes of modernization, therefore they are manufactured risks. Because these 
risks are highly technical and pose unpredictable environmental hazards, the institutional 
apparatus responsible for risk regulation is paralyzed due to the widespread production of 
pollution, as well as the scientific uncertainties, which surround the outcome.
This thesis begins with the premise that RS conditions order current Alaskan 
resource politics, and as a result, expert institutions of risk calculus have reached a 
technocratic state. Of particular interest to this research have been the knowledge 
producing agencies in charge of mediating the risks as byproducts of oil development on 
the North Slope. This thesis proposed that knowledge production processes used by risk 
management regimes fail to include local residents’ IK in proportion with the 
environmental risks they face. Because of this trend, official risk determinations 
regarding oil projects meet frequent opposition and legal challenges, and prompt the 
agitation of subpolitical groups. This adversarial relationship between experts and risk- 
affected communities hinders an already complex administrative process, incurs
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economic costs to state and industry, and fails to provide the public with a feeling of 
protection and security about policy outcomes.
The findings of this research support this hypothesis, and can be delineated along 
three risk themes: First, the nature of risks from oil development match the criteria for 
manufactured risks under RS both for their magnitude and the inability of protecting 
institutions to control them. Second, the use of science in risk determinations is biased 
heavily in favor of scientific rationalities, resulting in the marginalization of cultural and 
social needs. Third, this technocratic hegemony of risk protection regimes pushes an 
active citizenry to challenge institutions from below with subpolitical definitions of 
knowledge.
As Persistent Organic Polutants (POPs) invade even remote areas far from their 
industrial applications and as climate change-induced coastal erosion threatens Alaska’s 
shores, Beck’s warning that ecological risks are no longer an environmental problem, but 
an institutional crisis of industrial society itself, seem to be relevant. Oil development is 
under constant scrutiny for its potential to add to an already impressive load of 
environmental risks, and the general public is forced into self-reflection about past 
choices and future consequences. Market incentives are pressing on the one hand, on the 
other however, a collective disenchantment is growing over the ecological side effects of 
unchecked economic progress.
A historical overview of oil policy in Alaska revealed that the central role of oil to 
Alaska’s economy, an effective oil lobby, the large pool of alternate knowledge forms, 
and the manufactured risks resulting from the byproducts of oil production have 
contributed to a quick rise of RS in Alaska. The extent to which administrative agencies 
are prepared to demonopolize knowledge claims in RS depends on the value placed on 
scientific versus cultural (or social) rationalities in the public sphere. A scientific 
rationality, that we can delegate decision making to objective experts, who rely on value 
neutral scientific calculus to provide solutions to policy dilemmas, still prevails. 
Subpolitical movements are driven to counter this claim. Subpolitical knowledge 
pursuits do not discount the value of science entirely; rather they do not rely solely on
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quantitative risk analysis and judgments, but also take into account subjective decisions 
on how we want to live, and what priorities might drive us beside material wealth. The 
cultural and social rationalities of subpolitical definitions of knowledge are not 
compatible with industrial society, and this trend is a sign of the RS.
New discourses for knowledge production have emerged in recent decades in 
policy initiatives, and expert institutions have opened up to knowledge from the ‘outside,’ 
adopting such egalitarian measures as public comment periods, and public hearings. 
While the bottom-layers of expert science have been democratized by the accumulation 
of a diverse data base, even including IK (see Figure 6), this incoming data flow 
bottlenecks at the top, where final decisions are still left to experts, who sift through 
information to evaluate and disseminate it (e.g. best interest findings by the Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources Commissioner). The end result is the kind of 
technocracy RS theory warns about, and contested policy decisions as evidenced by the 
legal challenges pursued by subpolitical groups in response.
As the Alaska Coastal Management Program (ACMP) case revealed, political 
support for inclusion of alternate knowledge forms depends on the general political 
climate and existing legislation, therefore it is highly dependent on interest politics. The 
pre-reform ACMP allowed extensive local input into project permitting decisions, 
through district-enforceable policies. Legislative changes to the program however have 
delegated much of that power to top-level experts, creating an identity crisis for the 
program, because the founding principle of the ACMP was built on empowering state 
and coastal districts with a powerful tool to monitor and influence development 
decisions. The North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI) has been productive in information 
sharing among state and federal agencies, but the role of IK has not been fully realized. 
Alaska Native subpolitical organizations, such as the Alaska Native Science Commission 
(ANSC), designed for creating a forum for diverse knowledge bases, have been left out of 
the organization. Inclusion of the local ANCSA regional corporation in the research that 
studies the impact of oil development on subsistence, while it profits from the oil revenue
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from these projects, has been controversial especially because North Slope tribal 
governments have been overlooked by the initiative.
It seems the direction of knowledge mobilization is an indicator for the extent 
citizens will recognize the end products as genuine reflections of their risk rationalities. 
The Alaska Native Science Commission (ANSC) began close to citizens, and grew from 
the bottom-up so to speak, and has advocated for citizens based on locally identified 
needs. While the ANSC has collaborated successfully with Alaska Native communities 
and with academic entities such as the University of Alaska, and the National Science 
Foundation, it seems to have been much less relevant with state-level initiatives. On the 
other hand, the ACMP and the NSSI were both initiated at the federal level, and extended 
inclusion downward toward ordinary citizens. While these programs are well received 
among state and federal agencies, they have received mixed reviews at best at borough 
and tribal levels of government, especially since the 2003 reforms made to the ACMP. 
Knowledge producing mechanisms seem to have an allegiance, or credibility with 
stakeholders of similar rationalities and have a hard time crossing this divide.
So what does this all mean to Alaskans? Is there a way to move beyond the RS? 
Are there models for IK inclusion that would work more effectively than current 
practices? This research concludes with a few observations and recommendations for the 
present and future. The public debate surrounding oil frequently deadlocks over the 
tradeoffs between economic gains and ecological costs. In RS, institutions and social 
values are transformed by risk definitions and management, and Alaska’s oil 
management regime is increasingly confronted with this trend. While there may not be a 
perfect model for the use of science in risk management, the lessons learned from the 
case studies presented in this thesis may contribute to a more efficient model. To 
supplement these findings, these recommendations will also include insights from Beck 
(1992), Fisher (2005), and Haley et al. (in press).
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5.2 Moving forward: Recommendations
The pre-reform ACMP seemed to have built a good working relationship between 
coastal districts and state agencies. The authority delegated to local governments via the 
Coastal Management Plan (CMP) to designate subsistence areas and manage their uses, 
provided a fairly efficient route for the uptake of IK. The legislative changes that caused 
this divide between state departments and local districts resulted from heavy oil industry 
pressure. If industry were to allow the restoration of these former powers back to local 
districts through House Bill 74, it would potentially reduce the technocratically biased 
nature of risk regulation. For example, the creation of an Alaska Coastal Policy Board to 
diversify the interests behind permitting decisions may widen the bottleneck of 
information flow. In the case of the NSSI, it should perhaps encourage tribal 
governments to participate and improve IK inclusion. Tribal governments signify 
sovereignty and self-determination, and may be more effective in accommodating the 
transmittal of the cultural meanings that are so essential to IK. Alaska Native people 
engage in a diverse assortment of subsistence activities depending on their location and 
heritage, therefore consulting all the North Slope tribes could give a complete picture of 
the impact of oil development on subsistence.
So, how do we move beyond RS conditions? How do we make sure that risky 
resource development projects touting the latest and safest technology, will definitely not
311unleash ‘uncontrolled and uncontrollable experiments’ upon society? Beck 
acknowledges that modem risks cannot be banned from life; and says instead that we 
should build more effective institutions for risk protection. Beck suggests the creation of 
responsive, democratic institutions that allow citizens to choose the risks they want to 
take through open governments and organizations, well-informed publics and socially 
aware firms.312
Fischer suggests that the Danish Consensus Conference (DCC) contains good 
lessons on participatory inquiry as an integral part of a public sector reform.313 The DCC
311 Beck (1999), 108.
312 Ibid.
313 This section on the DCC follows Fischer, 234-237. ’
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approach is based on a citizen tribunal, a social debate on technological and 
environmental issues. The DCC is a useful model for not only the integration of cultural 
and social rationalities into seemingly exclusively scientific and technical matters, but for 
the strengthening of public discovery, or ‘people’s enlightenment’. First, the randomly 
selected, volunteer citizen panel participates in informal meetings with a steering 
committee who outlines the topic to citizens, and disseminates extensive reading 
materials. There is an extensive period of reading, developing further questions, getting 
answers, refining new questions, and more reading on the topic before the conference 
begins. The interdisciplinary panel of experts who will participate receives citizen 
questions in advance, and prepares further information for them, based on their 
preliminary questions. By the time the conference begins, participants are very well 
informed on the topic and related issues at hand. The DCC lasts three to four days and 
consists of expert presentations, followed by cross-examinations by the citizen panel. 
Members of the audience may also ask questions and make comments, and relevant 
interest groups may also be questioned. Following the DDC, the citizen panel prepares 
an extensive report on their findings including the broad spectrum of legal, ethical, moral, 
and social aspects of the topic. The report is publicly presented, and distributed to 
politicians, scientists, and interest groups.
The DCC results in an inquiry process that is more readily understood by the 
general public, and politicians, and reflect public opinion better than expert 
assessments.314 The DCC has given citizens an increased, meaningful role in 
environmental policy making. The DCC model is a great model for lessening the 
technocratic monopoly over scientific policy decisions, because it integrates scientific 
and cultural rationalities, and brings together experts and citizens who are divorced in the 
Alaskan models. The logistics of implementing a DCC-like model in Alaska would pose 
specific challenges due to geographical and cultural challenges not experienced in its 
European implementations. However, some elements of the DCC could be adapted to the 
Alaskan context. For example, such motivated, intense, in-depth dialogue and exchange
314 Fischer, 237.
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of information between experts and citizens would increase the accountability of officials 
to concerned citizens in Alaska. To move beyond RS, citizen definitions of risk can no 
longer be deemed irrational, and be denied on the basis of being perceived. Cultural and 
social meanings of risks are as real as any ‘identifiable’ risk.
Decision makers struggle with uncertainty, rather than risk, even when 
many risks (as in the case of the space shuttle) appear to be calculable. 
Decisions under conditions of both uncertainty and risk are, of course, 
subject to error. What is at stake is the acceptability o f the error
l i e
[emphasis added].
The DCC’s emphasis on the democratic process in science-based decisions, and the 
meaningful application of the findings of its citizen panel deserves a place in the Alaskan 
public process. Further research is needed to successfully extract those aspects of the 
DCC, which may be injected into a working Alaskan consensus conference model across 
the boundaries of existing cultural and geographical differences between Denmark and 
the U.S. It is impossible to offer explicit recommendations for institutional reforms 
within the pages of this thesis, however lessons from other models of risk management 
systems can provide clues for conflict avoidance.
The emerging challenges in Alaska’s oil resource management require a fresh 
look at current risk management systems, and a renewed effort to include indigenous 
stakeholders in decision-making. The pre-reform ACMP and NSSI were envisioned to 
empower local communities in combating the risks from resource development, by giving 
affected stakeholders increased input in resource management decisions and avenues for 
co-production of scientific data. However, the failures of current natural and scientific 
resource governance regimes have resulted in political and legal conflicts. It may be 
difficult to reform risk and knowledge management models and to empower those living 
closest to risk sources working within the limits of a majority-ruled political process: 
How do we effectively include local stakeholders’ cultural rationalities without 
marginalizing other stakeholder groups? Yet as the health of fragile Arctic ecosystems is
315 Beck (1999), 123. Quoting A.J. Reiss. ‘The Institutionalization o f Risk,’ In Organization, Uncertainty 
and Risk, ed. J.F. Short and Ed Clarke. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 29.
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threatened by RS conditions, place-bound stakeholders have “the most direct and critical 
interests in the sustainable management of the resources, and the strongest, most direct 
historical claim to the Arctic offshore.” These place-based interests warrant the
■> | n
recognition of special status within a governance regime. As illustrated by the Alaska 
Inter-Tribal Council’s objections to the NSSI, to achieve meaningful inclusion of IK 
inside risk management schemes is significant beyond its practical application for filling 
the gaps in existing data, but is also an important social justice issue. Resource 
management decisions, which do not consider “the uniqueness of the ecosystem and the 
relative costs of development to different groups of stakeholders” are undemocratic from 
a participatory democracy standpoint for failing to be based on a full, equitable
T 1 8consideration of “everyone’s account of what’s at stake.” The United States has 
enacted specific environmental justice provisions aimed at enforcing environmental 
regulations equitably and requiring agencies to avoid inflicting disproportionate
-> 1 Q
environmental harms on minorities and the poor (see Executive Order 12898). Such 
special protection is designed to lessen the social and economic effects of institutional 
inequalities on disadvantaged populations.
Haley et al. address numerous grounds for “overrepresenting” the 
underrepresented in Arctic marine resource management. For example, democratic 
asymmetries exist due to what economists call “asymmetric information,” resulting in 
unequal access among stakeholders to information they need to act in their own
-l^ fi 4
interest. This trend can create asymmetries of power in institutions of governance, 
resulting in a disproportionate loss of knowledge claims among some groups of 
stakeholders, such as residents of remote regions of Arctic Alaska. Haley et al. further 
state that due to such hierarchical tendencies of scientific institutions, coupled with
316 Sharman Haley et al., Strengthening Institutions for Stakeholder Involvement and Ecosystem-based 
Management in the U.S. Arctic Offshore. In North by 2020 synthesis, ed. Hajo Eicken and Amy L. 
Lovecraft. Fairbanks: University o f  Alaska Press ( in press), 2.
317 Ibid., 10.
318 Ibid.,
319 Judith A. Layzer. The Environmental Case: Translating Values into Policy. Congressional Quarterly 
Press: Washington, D.C., 2006, 105.
320 Haley et al., 8.
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complexities stemming from constantly changing ecological, social and political 
relationships, as well as policy failures and uncertain regulatory outcomes, institutions 
should first “flatten hierarchies among different types of stakeholders by putting all
'i*\ t
sources and types of information on equal footing.” Haley et al. propose that 
institutional strengthening begins not by organizational restructuring, but by creating 
open and original processes for collecting stakeholders’ storylines.
The technocratic governance of risk mediation under current knowledge 
management schemes fails to adequately and equitably incorporate IK into oil resource 
management and to include IK in the evaluation of relevant policies. Awareness of these 
shortcomings of current governing institutions and policies is an important first step 
toward formulating better, more responsive risk management regimes. The complex 
issues of risk and uncertainty in oil resource development must be approached using 
multiple facets of understanding and taking into consideration cultural as well as 
scientific value premises during decision-making. In a new management model the rights 
and needs of place-bound indigenous communities should merit the meaningful inclusion 
of IK in critical decisions concerning risks.
321 Haley et al., 8.
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